高盛發(fā)家秘史
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????變得家喻戶曉對高盛（Goldman Sachs）來說一直都不是什么好事。不久前，在華爾街和美國頂級企業(yè)圈之外，幾乎還沒有什么人非常關(guān)注高盛，人們注意到的似乎只是這么多以前在高盛效力過的員工都進(jìn)入了美國聯(lián)邦政府以及其他管理機(jī)構(gòu)的上層。接下來爆發(fā)了全球金融危機(jī)。幾乎在一夜之間，高盛成了人們眼中所有錯(cuò)誤的萬惡之源。 ????史蒂文?曼迪斯于1992-2004年在高盛任職，目前是哥倫比亞大學(xué)商學(xué)院（Columbia Business School）兼職教授和社會(huì)學(xué)系博士研究生。鑒于公眾對自己前雇主的關(guān)注程度，曼迪斯精明地把自己博士論文中的部分內(nèi)容編纂成冊，出了一本書，名叫《高盛怎么了》【W(wǎng)hat Happened to Goldman Sachs，哈佛評論雜志社（Harvard Business Review Press），381頁）。這種做法非常符合高盛的作風(fēng)——這家公司教給人們的就是怎樣在機(jī)會(huì)出現(xiàn)的時(shí)候抓住它。2012年3月14日，格雷格?史密斯曾經(jīng)在《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》（the New York Times）社論版對頁發(fā)表了一篇具有煽風(fēng)點(diǎn)火作用的文章，他在其中公開辭去了高盛常務(wù)董事一職，這也是出于同樣的思路。此舉讓史密斯出了名，還為他贏得了一份價(jià)值不菲的圖書出版合同。 ????不過，和史密斯不同，曼迪斯的寫作動(dòng)機(jī)是悲傷，而非憤怒；而且曼迪斯想對自己的前雇主進(jìn)行解析，而不是加以利用。顯然，盡管已經(jīng)離開高盛近10年之久，他仍然非常尊敬和喜愛前者；同時(shí)，對于公眾對高盛的看法，曼迪斯似乎視而不見。舉例來說，曼迪斯在引言中謹(jǐn)慎地說：“2006年它是如此地廣受贊譽(yù)，到了2009年它卻是如此地廣受指責(zé)，很難相信在這期間這家公司的文化會(huì)發(fā)生這樣的巨變?！?/p> ????然而，公眾對高盛的看法發(fā)生變化當(dāng)然和高盛文化的改變無關(guān)。這種變化來源于公眾開始認(rèn)為高盛是一家“過大因而不能倒閉”的公司，是一家得到了政府援助的公司，在數(shù)百萬美國普通大眾仍處于困境時(shí)，高盛的利潤卻迅速達(dá)到了歷史最高點(diǎn)，而且開始發(fā)放巨額獎(jiǎng)金——就算按華爾街的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來看也是天價(jià)。 ????高盛從一家主要靠服務(wù)客戶盈利的小型合伙企業(yè)變成一家主要靠交易盈利的全球性大型上市公司，曼迪斯在書中冷靜分析了這家公司在這個(gè)過程中所發(fā)生的變遷。為客戶提供服務(wù)時(shí)，長期性最重要。而開展自營交易時(shí)，長期規(guī)劃就變成了“午餐點(diǎn)什么？” ????高盛出現(xiàn)的情況相當(dāng)簡單：動(dòng)力變了。從1869年成立到1986年，高盛一直是一家普通的合伙企業(yè)。也就是說，每位合伙人都對高盛的全部債務(wù)負(fù)責(zé)。因此，這家公司對自己承擔(dān)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)非常、非常小心。公司倒閉會(huì)給所有合伙人帶來滅頂之災(zāi)。在這種情況下，他們（其中幾乎沒有女性）都希望確保公司不會(huì)倒閉。 ????1986年，高盛改組為有限責(zé)任公司——這是一次重大調(diào)整。合伙人在公司的資金依然面臨風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，但除此之外，他們的其他財(cái)產(chǎn)都很安全。 |
????Becoming a household name has not been a good thing for Goldman Sachs (GS). Not long ago, few people outside Wall Street and the top tier of corporate America paid much attention to Goldman, other than to note how many former Goldmanites seemed to be concentrated in the upper echelons of the federal government and other seats of power. Then came the worldwide financial meltdown, and almost overnight, Goldman came to be invoked as a symbol of everything that had gone wrong. ????Steven Mandis, who worked at Goldman from 1992 to 2004 and is now an adjunct professor at Columbia Business School and a doctoral candidate in the sociology department. With public interest aroused in his former employer, Mandis has astutely adapted parts of his Ph.D. thesis into a book called What Happened to Goldman Sachs (Harvard Business Review Press, 381 pages). That's a very Goldman move: The place teaches you how to seize opportunities when they present themselves. It's the same kind of thinking that led Greg Smith to publicly resign from his position as a Goldman executive director on March 14, 2012, via an incendiary op-ed column in the New York Times (NYT). It made him a celebrity and netted him a substantial book contract. ????Unlike Smith, however, Mandis is writing out of sorrow rather than anger, and trying to explain rather than exploit his former employer. He clearly has a lot of respect and affection for Goldman despite having been gone almost a decade, and seems to have a blind spot about how the general public perceives the firm. In his introduction, for example, Mandis muses, "It strains credulity to think that the firm's culture could have changed so dramatically between 2006, when the firm was so generally admired, and 2009, when it became so widely vilified." ????But of course, that change in the public perception of Goldman has nothing to do with changes in Goldman's culture. The change came as the public began to see Goldman as a too-big-to-fail firm, helped by government bailouts, that quickly began posting record profits and paying bonuses that were huge even by Wall Street standards while millions of Main Street Americans were still suffering. ????Mandis's book is a sober analysis of the changes that took place at Goldman as the firm transformed itself from a smallish partnership whose profits came primarily from serving clients into a worldwide colossus with public stock whose major profits come from trading. When you serve clients, the long term matters. In proprietary trading, long-term planning is, "What should we order for lunch?" ????What happened to Goldman is rather simple: Incentives changed. From its founding in 1869 through 1986, the firm was a general partnership. This meant that every partner was responsible for all of Goldman's debts. As a result, the firm was very, very careful about the risks it took. When any partner can be personally wiped out if the firm fails, he (there were few shes) wants to make sure that it doesn't fail. ????In 1986, Goldman became a limited liability company -- a significant change. Partners' capital in the firm was still at risk, but anything they owned outside of the partnership was safe. |
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