????在布迪安斯基的書中，大西洋海戰可謂是布萊克特戰爭的主戰場，而他也是奪取最后勝利不可或缺的關鍵。作為曾寫過密碼破譯歷史暢銷書的作者，布迪安斯基講述了一段精彩的歷史，即位于布萊切里公園的英國密碼破譯中心所破譯的情報外加布萊克特的運籌學如何破解和摧毀了納粹德國的“狼群戰術”。

????布迪安斯基敘述的中心就是發生在潛艇、貨船和戰機之間的慘烈戰役。當時，英國的生死存亡完全依賴于貨船所提供的補給、燃料和武器，而德國的U型潛艇卻不斷地將它們擊沉。這種狀況不能再持續下去，正如溫斯頓?丘吉爾在他的回憶錄中寫的：“大西洋海戰是整個二戰的決定性戰役。”

????在肯尼迪的書中，大西洋海戰也是被從頭至尾地深入分析了一通。這場戰役是全書的第一章，他明確地指出這場海戰勝利中的戰略因素。在肯尼迪的書中，新式武器系統、貨船戰術以及戰斗機在貨船易受攻擊區域巡邏的警示作用比布萊克特和布萊切里密碼破譯中心所發揮的作用要更大。

????“在這個獨特的案例中，我們一次又一次地看到各種資源的‘合理利用’給了前線部隊以獲勝的武器，”肯尼迪寫道?！拔覀円膊恢挂淮蔚乜闯觯冗M的應用在何處成為戰爭轉折點的時機，某個想法在何處變成現實，哪些人或組織是處于負責地位，以及他們所實現的技術突破是如何直接影響到戰場上的戰況?！?/p>

????這個主題經常出現在肯尼迪對后勤創新在兩棲登陸戰、空戰、對抗希特勒的閃電戰以及大西洋戰役的全面分析之中。每個章節都是獨立的，但是它們整合成書的累積效應就與肯尼迪在核心觀點相一致，即第二次世界大戰的贏家是那些“在‘情報應用’中處于優勢的一方。”

????但是坦白說，肯尼迪的看法和結論似乎與他籠統地戰略至上的觀點相矛盾，也就是說，這些戰略內在性地需要“更先進的應用”、“某些想法”以及“突破”。沒有實力作為支撐的戰略只是一種期許和愿望而已。

????帕特里克?布萊克特和肯尼迪書中那些無名英雄們的力量就在于他們區分了描繪一種尖端科技與將之創造出來之間的不同。正如H?G?威爾士經典科幻小說《時間機器》（The Time Machine）中的莫洛克斯族一樣，當埃洛伊族人卻整天琢磨些高深的理論的時候，他們卻在默默地辛勤勞動。無論是思想上還是內心中，他們都明白，創造出新的工具與技術可以催生出新的能力，而這種能力進而可以使得他們制定出成功的戰略。而這就是為什么，成功的領導者都會將后勤的重要性置于戰略之上。（財富中文網）

????譯者：唐昕昕

????In Budiansky's telling, the Battle of the Atlantic was the main front of Blackett's war, and he was indispensable to winning it. The author of a well-received history of code-breaking, Budiansky provides a wonderful revisionist history of how intelligence derived from Bletchley Park's breakthroughs combined with Blackett's operational research to bypass and destroy the Nazi Wolfpacks.

????This brutal war between submarines, convoys, and aircraft is the heart of Budiansky's narrative. The convoys that fed, fueled, and armed Britain were essential to her survival. The U-boats were killing them. They had to be stopped. As Winston Churchill observed in his memoir: "The Battle of the Atlantic was the dominating factor all through the war."

????The Battle of the Atlantic also enjoys a thorough and incisive retelling in Kennedy's Engineers. It's the first of his thematic chapters, and he crisply identifies the strategic factors that went into winning it. In Kennedy's story, Blackett and Bletchley Park play less of a role than new weapons systems, convoy tactics, and aircraft to "mind the gap" at sea where convoys were must vulnerable.

????"Time and time again in this particular story we see how the 'proper application' of resources led to endeavors that gave the frontline forces the instruments for winning," Kennedy observes, "Time and time again, too, we can identify where the newer application became turning points: where a certain idea was turned into reality, which people and/or organizations were responsible and how their breakthroughs directly affected the field of battle."

????This leitmotif appears frequently in Kennedy's comprehensive analyses of logistical innovation in amphibious landings, the air war, confronting Hitler's Blitzkrieg, and the war in the Pacific. Each chapter can stand alone, but their cumulative impact lends coherence to his central argument that the Second World War "was won by the 'intelligent application' of superior force."

????But Kennedy's insights and conclusions frankly seem at odds with his more broad and sweeping generalizations celebrating strategy. To wit, these strategies inherently required the "newer applications" and "certain ideas" and "breakthroughs" to occur. Strategy without capability is nothing but a hope and an aspiration.

????The power of a Patrick Blackett and of the unsung heroes whom Kennedy celebrates is that they grasp the distinction between describing an edge and creating one. Like the Morlocks in H.G. Wells' science-fiction classic The Time Machine, they stay below doing real work while the Eloi gambol about thinking grand thoughts. Both intellectually and viscerally, they understand that creating new tools and technologies can spawn new capabilities that in turn enable successful strategies. And that, in the end, is why successful leaders tend to prioritize logistics over strategy.