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????還有第三種可能：考夫曼在二級市場上的時機把握不佳。2007年底，我獲悉考夫曼協議以97折出售約1/3的投資組合（該交易于2008年年中完成）。干得不錯。不幸的是此后隨著二級市場的折扣越來越大，考夫曼還在出售。例如，它以約4折的價格出售NEA組合——回顧來看并不是太好賣。更重要的是，考夫曼只有這些過往基金截至出售時（近期IPO回暖前或Groupon、Fusion-io等NEA組合公司創造巨大價值前的市場底部）的數據。要澄清的是我不是在批評考夫曼的研究人員——我只是在想，它的數據組在當前形勢下有多少代表性。 ????話雖如此，但考夫曼指出，對于很多有限合伙人而言，風投這整個資產類別的表現并不是最好，這句話沒錯。隨著最好的企業家尋找“最好的”風投家，風投行業分化嚴重，而且這股趨勢還將延續下去。如果你不能找到一些最優秀的一般合伙人——包括前景看好的經理——次優選擇或許是投資公開市場指數，而不是二線基金（所有二線，我指的是“最高的10%以下”）。 ????考夫曼關于一般合伙人/有限合伙人并存的基金結構做出的第二點結論也恰如其分。正如它所問，風險投資會給組合公司CEO與有限合伙人一樣的條款嗎？（提示：答案是“絕無可能”）。 ????比如，有限合伙人應能獲得基金的財務信息。如果在一家有很多新星的公司里，兩位高級合伙人獲得大部分利潤分成，這是有限合伙人決策時應了解的關鍵信息。更重要的是，2%的一價制管理費——而不是基于預算的費用——不利于募集更大規模的基金，即便市場機會看好（別忘了，考夫曼認為大基金表現落后）。風險投資怎能對自己的交易優選出售，但在有限合伙人協議中往往反對最低回報率條款呢？ ????要知道，在一般合伙人/有限合伙人失衡問題上，考夫曼批評的并非貪婪的一般合伙人。它批評的是有限合伙人——報告標題就是《我們遇到了敵人，他就是我們》——拒絕推動或接受結構性創新的有限合伙人。總體而言，它相信投資委員會在最小化風投風險時，要么不夠有經驗，要么太慣于以往方式： ????“一個有經驗的一般合伙人籌集自己的首個基金時稱，管理費基于預算，并根據績效接受可調整的利潤分成（比如，2倍以上為25%）。但感覺這樣有違行業慣例，會讓潛在的有限合伙人認為，這支基金急于吸引新的投資者，因此提供獨特優厚的條款。” ????或者以收購領域為例。貝恩資本（Bain Capital）最近的亞洲基金為投資者提供了1/30（1%的年管理費和30%的收益分成——譯注）或2/20（2%的管理費和20%的收益分成——譯注）的選擇權。投資者的選擇大約各半，很多選擇2/20的投資者解釋稱，投資委員會對2/20毫無異議，問了很多1/30的問題。 ????不過，考夫曼推動此類事宜，有點出乎意料。幾年前，考夫曼退出了機構有限合伙人協會（ILPA）——該協會或許是唯一一家有足夠影響力來真正實現一些改變的組織。由有限合伙人要求實施基于預算的費用或一些條款？看起來有點難，更別提范圍更廣的結構性變革了。在我看來，如果考夫曼能冰釋前嫌，它的這番努力就能贏得一位積極同盟者。 |
????Then, a third option: Kauffman did a lousy job timing the secondary market. At the end of 2007, I'm told that the Foundation agreed to sell approximately 1/3 of its portfolio at 97 cents on the dollar (deal actually closed in middle of 2008). That was well done. Unfortunately, it continued selling after that as secondary discounts got deeper and deeper. For example, it dumped its NEA positions for around 40 cents on the dollar – which doesn't look too hot in retrospect. More importantly, Kauffman only has data for these legacy funds as of the time of sale (i.e., a market bottom that came before the recent IPO resurgence, or the big value creation of an NEA portfolio company like Groupon or Fusion-io). To be clear, I'm not disparaging the Kauffman researchers – I'm simply wondering how representative its data set is to current conditions. ????All of this said, however, Kauffman is correct in arguing that, for many LPs, venture capital may not work best as a dedicated asset class. The industry stratification is severe, and becoming self-perpetuating as the best entrepreneurs seek out the "best" venture capitalists. If you can't get into a few dozen of the best GPs – including emerging managers -- perhaps the next-best option is a public index rather than a second-tier fund (and by second-tier, I probably mean "below top-decile"). ????Kauffman is also on target in its second point, about the ridiculous fund structures vis-à-vis GP/LP alignment. As it asks, would VCs ever give portfolio company CEOs the same deal they ask for from limited partners? (hint: the answer is "no way in hell). ????For example, LPs should have information about underlying fund economics. If two senior partners get most of the carry in a firm with young stars, then that is pertinent information LPs should have when making a decision. More importantly, 2% flat management fees – as opposed to budget-based fees – create a perverse incentive to keep raising larger and larger funds, even if not merited by the market opportunity (and, remember, Kauffman believes larger funds underperform). And how come VCs put liquidation preferences on their own transaction, but generally oppose hurdle rates or waterfalls on their LP agreements? ????But, remember, Kauffman doesn't really blame greedy GPs for the misalignment. It blames LPs – the report's title is "We have met the enemy, and he is us" – for refusing to advocate for, or accept, structural innovations. Mainly it believes that investment committees are either too unsophisticated or too set in their ways to minimize their own VC risk: ????"One experienced GP raising his own first-time fund said he offered a budget-based management fee, and was open to a sliding carry based on performance (e.g., 25 percent above 2x), but felt that such a departure from industry practice sent the message to prospective LPs that the fund was desperate to attract new investors by offering unique and better-aligned economic terms." ????Or take an example from the buyout world, when Bain Capital recently offered investors in its Asia fund the option of 1/30 or 2/20. About half took each deal, with many of the latter explaining that investment committees don't blink at 2/20 but ask lots of questions about 1/30. ????There is, however, a bit of irony in Kauffman being the one to push for such things. Several years ago, the Foundation dropped out of membership in ILPA – perhaps the only organization with enough collective clout to actually effectuate change. The idea of individual LPs asking for budget-base fees or underlying economics – let alone broader structural alterations – is daunting. It seems, to me, that Kauffman has a willing partner in its fight, if only it would mend some fences. |
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