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????上周四，Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.成為了躋身《財富》美國500強（Fortune 500）榜單的首家私募股權(quán)公司，排名第256。該公司公布2010年營收96.7億美元，位列The Williams Cos.之前、Liberty Global之后。 ????意外嗎？我們很意外。不僅意外于其龐大的營收數(shù)據(jù)，也意外于KKR如何能超越競爭對手黑石集團(Blackstone Group)做到這一點。 ????下面是我的《財富》(Fortune) 同事艾倫?斯隆的點評： ????KKR成為首家上榜的私募股權(quán)公司，是因為一項古怪的會計規(guī)則令其營收達(dá)到了通常計算法的3倍，而且去年該公司從根西島轉(zhuǎn)戰(zhàn)紐約證交所(New York Stock Exchange)，這意味著公司現(xiàn)在向美國證券交易委員會(SEC)提交財務(wù)報告。 ????艾倫說的沒錯（他往往都是對的）。這是一項古怪的會計規(guī)則，沒有虛增營收的花招，KKR去年業(yè)績也沒有突飛猛進。 ????為了解究竟是怎么回事，且看KKR的兩大營收來源： ????1. 收費，包括旗下各個基金的私募投資者(所謂的“有限合伙人”)支付的年度管理費。 2010年收費約為4.35億美元。 ????2. 投資收益，包括實現(xiàn)收益和未實現(xiàn)收益(或損失，如2008年)。2010年投資收益近91.8億美元。 ????《財富》將這兩項數(shù)據(jù)加起來，外加約5,300萬美元的利息費用，得到96.7億美元的數(shù)據(jù)。 ????但這里開始變得有點麻煩：就像大多數(shù)私募股權(quán)公司一樣，KKR事實上并不享有其公布的全部投資收益。它只獲得約20%——所謂的“附帶權(quán)益”——其他都?xì)w有限合伙人(公共養(yǎng)老基金、大學(xué)、主權(quán)財富基金等) 所有。這就像是績效獎金，有助于更好地實現(xiàn)利益一致。有些KKR雇員也對公司旗下基金進行投資，但這些投資回報也屬于80%里(即便由于一些再投資條款，不完全是這樣)。 ????不過，為遵守一般公認(rèn)會計原則(GAAP)，KKR認(rèn)為必須將大多數(shù)基金并表(包括所有的私募股權(quán)基金)。換言之，91.8億美元的投資收益包括歸KKR所有的(20%)和不歸其所有的 (80%)。 ????相比之下，黑石集團未將私募股權(quán)基金并表。假如它這樣做的話，它很容易就能躋身《財富》美國500強。 ????那么，KKR和黑石集團孰對孰錯？又或者它們都是對的，是因為公司和基金結(jié)構(gòu)的差異？ ????坦白講，如果沒有能更好說明經(jīng)濟利益和控制權(quán)問題的原始基金文件，很難斷論。在這方面，10-K文件不能提供多少幫助。 ????但我知道的是：不管是KKR，還是黑石集團，都不應(yīng)躋身《財富》美國500強。至少不是憑借其2010年業(yè)績。 ????KKR甚至也認(rèn)同我的觀點。該公司在一項聲明中稱：“雖然入選這樣一個受人尊敬的榜單是一種榮耀，我們對過去幾年公司的成長也非常欣慰，但我們認(rèn)為這沒有正確地反映我們的公司業(yè)績，因為統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)也包括了我們管理的第三方資本的收益。” ????這樣說并不是批評我們的方法，或者是說《財富》在對待私募股權(quán)公司時應(yīng)不同于零售公司或大型醫(yī)藥公司。區(qū)別對待可能導(dǎo)致一邊倒，最終產(chǎn)生偏倚，喪失可信度。《財富》決定根據(jù)每家上市公司公布的總營收數(shù)據(jù)進行排名，我認(rèn)為這是恰當(dāng)?shù)摹?/p> ????事實上，我認(rèn)為現(xiàn)在是時候了，美國財務(wù)會計準(zhǔn)則委員會(FASB)應(yīng)運用常識、趕上私募股權(quán)公司的上市潮。不能再讓基金結(jié)構(gòu)的細(xì)微差異掩蓋重要的歸屬權(quán)事實。FAS 167(并表規(guī)定)等現(xiàn)有法規(guī)令公開市場投資者很難將KKR、黑石和Apollo Global Management等公司的GAAP財務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)進行比較。雖然名稱聽起來非常類似，但這些數(shù)據(jù)反映的都是不同的事情。 ????這就是為何上市的私募股權(quán)公司往往采用“經(jīng)濟凈收益”指標(biāo)——有些人認(rèn)為這個非傳統(tǒng)的會計指標(biāo)更能代表此類公司實際產(chǎn)生的股東價值多少(去年，KKR的經(jīng)濟凈收益為21.4億美元，而黑石集團為14億美元)。我?guī)缀跄芸隙ǎ绻懈线m的/標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的GAAP規(guī)定，兩家公司定將棄用經(jīng)濟凈收益或至少降低經(jīng)濟凈收益指標(biāo)的重要性。 ????說真的，我絕非夸大美國財務(wù)會計準(zhǔn)則委員會在這方面有多落后。不久前，有傳言稱，美國財務(wù)會計準(zhǔn)則委員會將要求私募股權(quán)公司將組合投資的公司收入并入自身營收。在這樣荒謬的會計準(zhǔn)則下，黑石集團將躋身《財富》美國20強。 ????在編制無端令人困惑的財務(wù)報告方面，私募股權(quán)公司自身也要承擔(dān)一些責(zé)任。我知道此類文件并非有意成為斯蒂芬妮?梅耶的小說，但有些文件比詹姆斯?喬伊斯的小說還要難懂，如果沒有一個翻譯幫忙，投資者要了解這些公司會不會太麻煩了？ ????因此，恭喜KKR上榜。但希望近期內(nèi)不要再有這種事了。 |
????Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR) today became the first private equity firm ever listed on the Fortune 500, slotting in at No. 256. It reported $9.67 billion in 2010 revenue, which puts it just above The Williams Cos. (WMB) and just below Liberty Global (LBTYA). ????Surprised? So were we. Not only at the mammoth revenue number, but also at how KKR made the cut while rival The Blackstone Group (BX) did not. ????Here's what my Fortune colleague Allan Sloan wrote: ????KKR is the first buyout firm to make the list, thanks to an accounting oddity that tripled its revenues from what they'd otherwise be, and because its move last year to the New York Stock Exchange from Guernsey means it now files financial reports with the SEC. ????Allan's right (as he usually is). This is an accounting oddity. Not a trick to inflate revenue, or an indication that KKR had a blowout year. ????To understand what happened, let's take a look at KKR's two primary sources of revenue: ????1. Fees, which include annual management fees paid by private investors (called "limited partners") in its various funds. In 2010, this worked out to around $435 million. ????2. Investment income, which includes both realized and unrealized gains (or losses, such as in 2008). In 2010, this was nearly $9.18 billion. ????So Fortune added together these two numbers, tacked on around $53 million in interest expenses and came out with $9.67 billion. ????But here's where it gets troublesome: KKR, like most private equity firms, is not actually entitled to all of the investment income it reports. Instead, it only gets around 20% -- a so-called "carried interest" -- while its limited partners (public pensions, universities, sovereign wealth funds, etc.) receive the remainder. Consider it like a performance bonus that helps better align everybody's interests. Certain KKR employees also invest in its funds, but returns from those investments are included in the 80% (even though it's not exactly the same, due to some reinvestment provisions). ????To comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), however, KKR believes that it must consolidate the majority of its funds (including all of its private equity funds). In other words, that $9.18 billion of investment income includes both the money to which KKR is entitled (the 20%) and the money to which it is not (the 80%). ????Blackstone Group, on the other hand, does not consolidate its private equity funds. Were it to do so, it easily would have made the Fortune 500. ????So is KKR correct and Blackstone is wrong? Or vice versa? Or are they both right, due to differences within their firm and fund structures? ????Honestly, it's impossible to tell without access the the original fund documents that better elucidate issues of economic interest and control. The 10-Ks are not really of much use in this endeavor. ????But here's what I do know: Neither KKR nor Blackstone should be on the Fortune 500. At least not based on their 2010 financial results. ????KKR even agrees with me. In a statement, the firm said: "While it's an honor to be on such a respected list and we are pleased by our growth the past few years, we don't think this accurately measures our firm results because the methodology used also includes the income on third party capital that we manage." ????This is not to bash our methodology, or suggest that Fortune should treat private equity firms differently from retailers or big pharma. To do so would lead to a slippery slope that could end with charges of favoritism and the loss of credibility. Fortune has decided, properly in my opinion, to base its rankings on the top-line revenue figures reported by each public company. ????Instead, I mean it's time for the FASB to play common sense catch-up with the slow wave of private equity firms going public. Stop allowing minor differences in fund structures to obscure the larger truths of ownership. Current regulations like FAS 167 -- which governs consolidation -- has created a situation in which public market investors are hard-pressed to compare GAAP financials from firms like KKR, Blackstone and Apollo Global Management (APO). They all are measuring different things, often with very similar sounding names. ????This is the reason that publicly-traded private equity firms often tout "economic net income" (ENI) -- an unconventional accounting measure that some feel is more representative of how much shareholder value such firms are actually generating (KKR's ENI last year was $2.14 billion, compared to Blackstone's $1.4 billion). I can almost guarantee that both firms would give up -- or at least downplay -- ENI were they to have more relevant/standardized GAAP rules. ????Seriously, I am not overstating how backward FASB has been on all of this. Not too long ago, there was rumbling that the group would effectively require private equity firms to include underlying portfolio company revenue as its own revenue. Under such ridiculous accounting, Blackstone would be a Fortune 20 company. ????The private equity firms themselves also bear some responsibility, in creating financial reports that are needlessly confusing. I know that such documents aren't meant to be Stephanie Meyers novels, but some of them make James Joyce look explicit by comparison. Would it be too much trouble to let your investors know what they own without a translator? ????So congrats to KKR for making the list. Let's hope it doesn't happen again any time soon. |
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