西爾斯（Sears）和凱馬特（Kmart）在破產后有了一項新戰略：擴大工具和家電銷售，減少服裝銷售并縮小店面。

2004年收購凱馬特使其免于破產，并在第二年將其與西爾斯合并的對沖基金之王艾迪·蘭伯特對《華爾街日報》（Wall Street Journal）表示，近年來這家羸弱的公司旗下的各個品牌都關閉了數百家門店，它將在店內用更多空間銷售工具和家電。雖然西爾斯的市場份額連年下降，門店規模持續縮小，但該公司在這一領域依舊有競爭力。

新公司將擁有223家西爾斯門店和202家凱馬特門店。由于蘭伯特在本月早些時候的破產法院拍賣中出資52億美元，這兩家標志性的零售商有了重獲新生的機會。

但這并不容易。

蘭伯特在2013年至2018年期間擔任西爾斯的首席執行官，也是之前西爾斯的最大股東。但是在他的領導下，兩家連鎖店江河日下，銷售額年復一年下滑，店面投資不足及商品配置優化失敗也讓業務受到了影響。

多年來，西爾斯把長期主導的家用電器等領域的市場份額拱手讓給了家得寶（Home Depot）、勞氏（Lowe’s）和百思買（Best Buy）。而凱馬特也跟不上沃爾瑪（Walmart）、塔吉特（Target）或科爾士百貨（Kohl’s）的崛起速度。

蘭伯特的計劃中有值得贊美之處。服飾領域長期困擾著西爾斯（還記得從上一代人經歷的“西爾斯柔軟的一面”營銷嗎？），甚至連梅西百貨（Macy’s）和彭尼（J.C. Penney）這樣實力更強的零售商也在該市場表現掙扎。所以，除非西爾斯能夠推出爆款，否則降低服飾比重，增加耐用品銷售，蘭伯特的計劃很有道理。（在塔吉特和沃爾瑪甚至還在進一步增加服飾競爭時這樣做，絕非十拿九穩。）

不過耐用品存在的一個問題在于西爾斯浪費了自己最大的優勢：巔峰時期，西爾斯占據了美國41%的大型家電市場。《華爾街日報》援引TraOline的數據指出，這一比例如今已經下滑了13%。（經常與西爾斯在商場中一起出現的鄰居彭尼最近宣布停止銷售家電。該公司曾在2016年決定重返這個33年前離開的市場，希望借著西爾斯的衰退的機會分一杯羹。但最后沒能取得理想的效果。）此外，無論服飾市場的競爭多么劇烈，它至少可以帶來更多的門店客流量：畢竟，你每隔十幾年才會買一臺冰箱，但每年會買好幾次衣服。

蘭伯特縮小門店的想法也符合零售業的發展方向，門店更像是展示間，而更多的銷售在網上進行。科爾士百貨就減小了數百家門店的銷售區，而塔吉特則開設了數十家小型門店。破產后，西爾斯擁有更干凈的財務和更大的靈活性來這么做，不過還需要打通網店店主和供應商。（蘭伯特本人對《華爾街日報》表示，商場老板無意支持一家剛剛破產的公司。）

情況不至于絕望：畢竟，西爾斯和凱馬特依舊是大型零售商，有著忠實顧客，也不再受到債務困擾。不過正如多年銷售額下滑（西爾斯沒有一年的銷售額出現增長）所體現的那樣，許多顧客已經離開。西爾斯能否向顧客提供其他地方所沒有的特色，目前仍然要打個問號。（財富中文網）

譯者：嚴匡正

Sears and Kmart have a new strategy, post-bankruptcy: more tools and appliances but less clothing and smaller locations.

Eddie Lampert, the hedge fund king who bought Kmart out of bankruptcy in 2004 and melded it with Sears a year later, told the Wall Street Journal that the leaner company, which has closed hundreds of stores under each brands in recent years, would allocate more space in stores to areas like tools and appliances, where Sears remains a contender despite years of market share loss, and shrink store size.

The new company, which will have 223 Sears stores and 202 Kmart locations, gives two iconic retailers another chance at life thanks to a $5.2 billion offer by Lampert earlier this month in a bankruptcy court auction.

But it won’t be easy.

Under Lampert, who was CEO between 2013 and 2018 and the former Sears Holdings top shareholder by far, the two chains withered away, with sales declining year in, year out, business hurt by a lack of investment in stores and a failure to improve merchandise assortment.

For years, Sears bled market share in areas like home appliances it had long dominated to the likes of Home Depot, Lowe’s and Best Buy, while Kmart couldn’t keep up with the rise of Walmart, Target or Kohl’s.

There are things to laud in Lampert’s plan. Apparel is a category that has long bedeviled Sears (remember its ‘The Softer Side of Sears’ campaigns from a generation ago?), and even more competent retailers like Macy’s and J.C. Penney are struggling on that side, so he is right to down play that in favor of hard goods unless Sears can come up with a compelling assortment. (That’s no slam dunk at a time even Target and Walmart are upping their apparel game.)

But one problem with hard goods is that Sears has squandered its own big lead: at its peak, Sears commanded 41% of the U.S. major appliance market. According to the WSJ, citing TraOline, that is down to about 13%. (J.C. Penney, Sears’ frequent mall neighbor, recently announced it would stop selling appliances, a category it returned to in 2016 after 33 years in a move intended to take advantage of Sears’ decline. But it didn’t yield the expected results.) What’s more, however competitive the apparel market is, it does at least yield more frequent store visits: after all, you only buy a fridge once a decade or so, but will go shop for clothes a few times a year.

His idea for smaller stores is also in tune with where retail is heading, with stores becoming showrooms and more sales happening online. Kohl’s has shrunk the selling area at hundreds of stores, while Target has opened dozens of successful smaller format locations. Post bankruptcy, Sears has much cleaner finances and flexibility to do that but it will also have to get landlords and vendors on line. (Lampert himself told the WSJ that mall owners “were not rooting for the company to emerge from bankruptcy.”)

The situation is not hopeless: after all, Sears and Kmart remain large retailers with established clienteles, and are no longer choking under debt. But as years of sales declines (Sears Holdings didn’t have a single year of sales growth) have shown, many shoppers have moved on. It’s still not clear what Sears can offer them that they can’t find elsewhere.