風投商阿施密特·辛達納認為，一些頂尖硅谷公司的成功得益于他們的技術洞察力。

在2013年和Foundation Capital分道揚鑣后，辛達納決定嘗試一種新的投資策略——支持敢于承擔技術風險而非市場風險的創業者。

他的公司Engineering Capital為致力于解決軟件和核心IT基礎設施空間技術問題的公司提供種子輪投資。他為首個基金籌集了3200萬美元，第二個基金籌集了5000萬美元，第二個基金已經在2018年第二季度開始投資。

“大部分投資公司關注的是市場風險。”辛達納說。“也就是說，他們擅長的是判斷公司什么時候有發展潛力，什么時候應當抓住機會進行投資。而我現在的做法恰恰相反。我的思路是，‘如果我們認為人們會樂于看到有人能夠解決這個技術問題，而且僅僅在這種情況下我們才進行投資。’”

Engineering Capital為公司提供的通常是首筆機構投資資金，其投資對象包括Rubrik、Menlo Security、Prismo Systems、Palerra（被甲骨文公司收購）和Netsil （被Nutanix收購）。

辛達納告訴《財富》雜志什么是擁有技術洞察力、如何在種子投資市場中應對不平衡的市場力量，以及他為什么覺得投資不再是生命周期型的行業。

《財富》：你在尋找投資對象時，希望公司及其創始人擁有哪些具體特征？

辛達納：我會著重考慮以下幾點。第一點是技術洞察力。每家公司都稱自己是技術公司，所以我指的是其中一小部分我認為具有“技術洞察力”的公司。按照我的概念，谷歌是這樣的公司，Facebook不是。

第二，我希望投資對象能夠采用高資本效率的方式解決其問題。我的投資對象都是軟件公司，一個五至七人的小團隊可以做出一個產品并在種子輪創造營收。這在企業領域并不常見。我相信一個技術水平高、商業能力強的小團隊可以在種子輪融資中打造一個企業產品。從風投戰略的角度考慮，我的主要投資就是公司資本效率比較高的這個階段。

公司創始人如何判斷自己是否具有有價值的技術洞察力？

辛達納：技術洞察力本身沒有價值。僅僅擁有技術洞察力，不足以建立一家公司。只有當這種洞察力能夠使公司為顧客——最好是大批顧客——提供商業解決方案時，才能稱之為有價值。比如說，一開始開發VMware只是為了給x86系統生產虛擬機。當我運行VMware ESX服務器時，我們注意到用戶想要在新硬件上繼續運行他們原來老的Windows NT系統。使用VMware ESX加固這些老服務器立刻帶來了投資回報，這是今天VMware大型業務的起源。技術洞察力之所以尤為重要，因為如果企業提供的解決方案中含有這種洞察力，能夠賦予創業公司別人難以匹敵的優勢。按照我對技術洞察力的定義，這意味著沒有其它公司可以提供這種解決方案。這不是實現成功的唯一方法，但許多大公司的發展基礎都是技術洞察力。

我們看到，目前一些進行早期階段投資的基金關閉了，原因是擔心種子市場上資本過多、市場力量失衡。作為種子期投資者，你是否注意到了這些變化，準備如何應對？

辛達納：2015、2016年市場經歷了快速發展，我也親歷了當時的發展。我想做個大膽的預測，已經成立的種子基金中至少一半甚至四分之三將不會再建立第二或第三個基金。

現在流行做風投，所以不可避免地，我們會看到因為市場力量使然而出現市場清洗。也就是說，做風投挺難的。風投簡單卻并不容易，人們經常把“簡單”和“容易”的概念搞混。現在很多人覺得風投很容易，他們最后會不幸地發現自己搞錯了。

同時，我們看到出現了巨型基金。軟銀1000億美元巨額基金愿景基金（Vision Fund）采用的戰略是尋找行業領導者，向其傾注上億美元的投資，解決公司因為資金限制帶來的問題。你怎么看這種戰略？

辛達納：我覺得這種想法非常好。他們想嘗試利用現有的市場空白。但是沒有第二個軟銀。市面上有大量基金可以取代我的基金，甚至能找到紅杉和格雷羅克（Greylock）的替代者。但沒有公司能像軟銀一樣開出如此巨額的支票，甘于冒這么大的風險，試著推動規則向有利于自己的方向調整。而且我覺得軟銀會成功。我看好他們。

投資界在宏觀層面出現了一些新趨勢，如風投公司在建立巨型基金、風投資助公司維持私有化的時間更長了，你認為這些趨勢會給早期創業公司帶來什么長期影響？

辛達納：這個問題問到了點子上。風投將會從一個生命周期型行業變成只專注于某一個階段的行業。這將會是其中一項根本性改變。將影響每一家公司的戰略，無論是像Engineering Capital一樣的種子輪投資公司，還是像紅杉或者基準資本（Benchmark）等傳統投資公司。所謂“生命周期型行業”，我指的是，以前，創業公司的第一家機構投資者目的是成為公司除創始人之外的頭號股東，并且充當公司從創立到離場整個過程的主要投資者——無論是采用并購還是IPO的方式。所謂“只專注某一階段”，我是指在離場前，企業的主要機構投資者會隨著時間推移發生改變。

關于這個概念，一個很好的例子是基準資本和（Uber前CEO）特拉維斯·卡蘭尼克之間的戰爭，最終基準資本賣出了Uber的股份，紅杉在同一交易中購入。換句話說，在公司實現IPO之前，一家頂級公司賣出投資，另一家頂級公司買入。這不是個意外。這樣的事情還會再次發生。

要知道，基準資本享有創始人友好型投資公司的美譽，被稱為全球被適宜合作的公司之一。但它起訴了所投資的一個公司CEO后，這個好名聲蕩然無存。

【2017年8月10日，基準資本起訴卡蘭尼克和Uber，稱卡蘭尼克隱瞞了“重大管理失誤和其它不端行為”，同時在公司董事會又買下了三個位置。】

辛達納：無論哪種情況，現在我們知道了，最終特拉維斯放棄了原來與其股權不成比例的控制權，基準資本打折出售了股權，軟銀成為最大股東，紅杉在今年早期的同步交易中個買入了股權。也就是說，在公司實現IPO之前，一家頂級風投公司以優惠價格賣出了他們歷史上表現最出色的投資，同時另外一家頂級風投公司買入。在以前風投還是生命周期型行業時，很難想象會發生這種事。我相信，創業公司的第一家風投成為公司的最大機構所有者并且在IPO或者并購前一直保持這一地位的時代已經一去不復返了。

一些公司試圖通過成立價值幾十億美元的巨型基金或平行成長基金來應對這一變化。從創業者的角度看，他們只是想得到100萬美元的種子投資，因而很難從一個10億美元的基金中得到關注，因此出現了專門的種子基金。

8月29日，Axios報道，風投公司安德森·霍洛維茨基金（Andreessen Horowitz）正在改變其籌資戰略，試圖不再使用跨階段、跨行業的手段。這也印證了你所說的風投正在朝向更加專業化的資金方式發展。什么人將從這種戰略中獲益？

辛達納：能夠快速確定自己在這種新版圖中的獨特價值并利用它提升企業表現的人能夠獲益。比如說，將業務重點放在某一個行業領域或者發展階段的風投公司能夠獲益。這也是為什么我認為紅杉擁有不同的團隊負責早期投資和成長階段的投資。以及Emergence為什么總是關注SaaS業務。

如果創業者也能意識到不是所有的錢都一樣，不同公司能帶來不同價值，并且在選擇投資伙伴時銘記這一點，他們就能獲益。而且，這些專業的公司和團隊還會帶來除資金之外的更多價值，他們也能因此受惠。

風投的市場已經發展得足夠大了，創業公司現在實現IPO需要經歷足夠長的時間，需要大量資本，因此他們足以支撐獨立的基金甚至只專注于整個風投市場某一特定細分領域的獨立公司實現發展。

你覺得其它公司會如何應對？

辛達納：大公司會擴張，以涵蓋不同的業務。他們會成為平臺型公司。在我看來，A16Z、紅杉、Lightspeed正在朝這個方向發展。擴張不會給大公司帶來風險，但對于其它公司而言，可能會出現過度擴張，導致他們不得不重新尋找自己的信念價值、回歸根本。一些公司會認識到自己的特長所在，并專注于該領域的業務。基準資本目前采取的戰略似乎是保持根基、不再擴張。而且，風投行業不是贏者通吃，也不是一刀切，所以我看到很多不同的商業模型都取得了成功。（財富中文網）

譯者：Agatha?

Venture capitalist Ashmeet Sidana believes that some of the best Silicon Valley companies owe their success to a technical insight.

After parting ways with Foundation Capital in 2013, Sidana decided to try out a new investing strategy — back founders taking technical risk, not market risk.

His firm, Engineering Capital, leads seed rounds in companies solving technical problems in the software and core IT infrastructure space. He raised $32 million for his first fund, and $50 million for his second, which he just began investing out of in Q2 of 2018.

“Most venture firms focus on market risk,” Sidana said. “In other words, they’re good at sussing out when a company has traction, and when it makes sense to invest in that opportunity. Whereas what I’m doing now is the exact opposite of that. The thinking is, ‘We know that people would love this if, and only if, someone had a way of solving this problem technically.”

Engineering Capital typically provides the first institutional money in a company, and its investments include Rubrik, Menlo Security, Prismo Systems, Palerra (acquired by Oracle), and Netsil (acquired by Nutanix).

Sidana spoke with Term Sheet about what it means to have a technical insight, navigating the imbalanced market forces in the seed market, and why he believes venture is no longer a lifecycle business.

TERM SHEET: What are some of the specific characteristics you look for in a founder and company before investing?

SIDANA: I look for the following key elements. First, a technical insight. Every company claims to be a technology company, so I’m talking about a particular subset of that, which is what I define as a “technical insight.” By my definition, Google would fall into that category, but Facebook would not.

Second, I’m looking for a business problem which can be solved in a highly-capital efficient way. In my case, these are all software companies, where a team of five to seven people can build a product and bring it all the way to revenue within the seed stage itself. This is unusual in the enterprise space. I believe that a very small, technically-astute, business-savvy team can actually build an enterprise product with a seed round of financing. From a venture strategy perspective, I have bet heavily on this capital-efficient stage of the company.

How can a founder evaluate whether they have a valuable technical insight?

SIDANA: A technical insight by itself is not valuable. It is not sufficient to build a company. It becomes valuable if it enables a solution to a business problem for a customer, and ideally a lot of customers. For example, the original VMware technical insight was how to build a virtual machine for the x86. When I was running VMware ESX Server, we noticed that customers wanted to keep running their old, primarily Windows NT applications, but on new hardware. Using VMware ESX to consolidate these old servers created an immediate return on investment — which became the genesis of the massive business VMware has today. The reason technical insights are so important is that if a solution includes a technical insight, it gives an unfair advantage to a startup. By definition, no one else can do it. It is not the only way, but many massive companies have been built on the back of a technical insight.

We’re seeing early-stage funds shutting down, citing concerns of excessive capital supply & imbalanced market forces in the seed market. As a seed investor, are you seeing some of these dynamics and how are you navigating them?

SIDANA: We saw a tremendous run up in 2015 and 2016, and I was a part of that. I would go so far as to predict that at least half, and potentially three-fourths of the seed funds that have been raised, will not raise their second or third fund.

It’s fashionable to be a VC right now, and we will inevitably have to see a cleanup of this, which will happen because of market forces. That said, venture is a hard business. Venture is very simple but not easy, and people often confuse “simple” and “easy.” A lot of people right now think it’s easy, and they’ll be sadly mistaken.

Meanwhile, we’re seeing the emergence of mega-funds. The strategy behind Softbank’s mammoth $100 billion Vision Fund is to identify a market leader, pour hundreds of millions of dollars in it, and remove the constraint of capital. What is your view on that playbook?

SIDANA: I think it’s brilliant. It’s a thoughtful attempt at taking advantage of a gap in the market. I mean, there is no other Softbank. You can name many other alternatives to my fund, you can even name alternatives to Sequoia and Greylock, but there is no alternative to Softbank. There is no one else who can write checks of that size along with that type of risk appetite and willingness to bend the rules in their favor in a way that Softbank has. And I think it will succeed. I am not pessimistic on Softbank.

How will some of these macro-investing trends, such as VC firms raising mega-funds and venture-backed companies staying private longer, affect early-stage startups in the long-run?

SIDANA: That is the golden question. Venture will change from being a lifecycle business to a stage-specific business. That is one of the fundamental changes that will happen. This will affect the strategy of every firm — whether they’re focused just on seed like Engineering Capital or whether they are traditional investors like Sequoia or Benchmark. By “lifecycle business,” I mean the first institutional investor aims to be the largest non-founder owner and is the lead investor from inception through exit, whether by M&A or IPO. And by “stage-specific,” I mean that the lead institutional investor will change over time, prior to exit.

The great example of this is the battle that was fought between Benchmark and [former Uber CEO] Travis Kalanick with Benchmark subsequently selling and Sequoia buying Uber in simultaneous transactions. In other words, one top-tier firm sold and another one bought, prior to IPO. That was not an accident. It will happen again.

Remember, Benchmark is a firm that had a reputation for being founder friendly — for being one of the best firms on the planet to work with. It blew that entire reputation after it sued one of its CEOs.

[On Aug. 10, 2017 Benchmark sued Kalanick and Uber, alleging that Kalanick concealed “gross mismanagement and other misconduct” while procuring three additional seats on the board.]

SIDANA: In either case, as we now know, eventually Travis gave up disproportionate control, Benchmark sold at a discount, SoftBank became the largest shareholder, and Sequoia bought in simultaneous transactions earlier this year. In other words, a top-tier VC firm sold a portion of their all-time best performing investment at a discount, simultaneously while another top-tier VC firm bought, prior to IPO. This was hard to imagine when venture was a lifecycle business. I believe the days when your first VC became your largest institutional owner and stayed that way all the way through IPO or M&A are gone forever.

Some firms have tried to counter this change in the venture business by raising billion dollar mega-funds or parallel growth funds. From an entrepreneur’s perspective, it is difficult to get attention for a $1 million seed investment from a $1 billion fund — hence the emergence of specialized seed funds.

On Aug. 29, Axios reported that VC firm Andreessen Horowitz is changing its fundraising strategy by moving away from multi-stage, multi-sector flagship vehicles. This supports your point that venture is trending toward a more specialized fund approach. Who stands to benefit from this strategy?

SIDANA: The benefit will accrue to whoever can quickly identify their own unique value in this new landscape, and leverage that to enhance their business. So, for example, a VC firm could build a practice with a focus on a particular sector or stage will be served well. This is why I believe Sequoia has separate early stage and growth teams. Or, why Emergence has always had a SaaS focus.

Founders who recognize that all money is not equal — different firms bring different value — will benefit if they choose their investor partners keeping this in mind. They will also benefit because such focused firms and teams will bring more value than just money to them.

Venture has evolved into a big enough market, startups now take long enough, and need so much capital to IPO, that it supports standalone funds, and even standalone firms focused on sub-parts of the overall venture market.

How do you foresee other firms responding?

SIDANA: Great firms will expand and grow to include different offerings. They will become platforms. From my vantage point, it looks like A16Z, Sequoia and Lightspeed are following this strategy. Not a risk to these great firms, but the danger for other firms may be to over-expand and then they will have to find their religion again in order to get back to basics. Some firms will recognize their specialty and stay focused on that. It seems like Benchmark is staying true to its roots and not expanding. Venture is also not a winner-take-all, nor is it a one-size-fits-all market, so I can see many different models being successful.