十年前的2008年金融危機，在短短兩天之內就達到了頂峰：雷曼兄弟（Lehman Brothers）破產、美國國際集團（AIG）難以為繼，而美國銀行（Bank of America）宣布收購美林證券（Merrill Lynch）。這次危機已經醞釀了許久，但9月15日和16日這兩天讓所有人都認清了現實：一場金融大災難恐怕就要降臨了。

舊金山聯邦儲備銀行（San Francisco Federal Reserve）的一項新研究顯示，這場金融危機給每個美國人造成了7萬美元的損失，而導致它的元兇之一是對系統性風險的不重視，即忽略了金融巨頭彼此之間的聯系，沒有看到在非銀行業的陰暗死角，有多少尚未得到監管卻威脅著整個系統的行為正在活躍著。

監管者沒有足夠的信息，而他們擁有的信息也沒有共享。由于對維持整個金融市場的脆弱聯系知之甚少，在抵押信貸市場惡化之時，政府里的幾乎每一個人都猝不及防。

2010年《多德弗蘭克法案》推行的目的之一就是解決這一問題：政府成立了金融研究監管辦公室（Office of Financial Research），盡管這個重要的機構并非家喻戶曉。不幸的是，正因為它的曝光率不高，才導致國會的共和黨和特朗普當局對它肆意下手。該機構若無法正常履行職能，另一場金融危機爆發的風險也會相應提高。

就像消費者金融保護局（Consumer Financial Protection Bureau）的職能是糾正消費者監管方面的散漫無序一樣，金融研究監管辦公室的任務是解決一大現實問題：金融數據的收集工作是由一系列機構完成的（如果他們確實收集了的話），而這些機構不僅不互通數據，也不會用這些數據對整個系統的風險程度進行評估。

金融研究監管辦公室有著獨立的經費，如果得不到想要的數據，還有權進行傳訊。理論上，它應當向金融穩定監管委員會（Financial Stability Oversight Council）提供信息，后者是金融危機之后成立的另一個機構，任務是發現和處理系統性風險。

金融研究監管辦公室做了不少有益的事情，包括全球數據標準化，從而更好地發現和評估風險。不過共和黨卻不斷打壓它，限制它的職能。

例如，特朗普當局削減了這里25%的預算，減少了40名員工的編制。特朗普還委派迪諾·法拉切蒂擔任辦公室主任，他之前在眾議院金融服務委員會（House Financial Services Committee）的主席杰布·亨薩林手下工作，而亨薩林則力主徹底取消金融研究監管辦公室。甚至在特朗普當政之前，國會的共和黨就對監管辦公室的工作毫不感冒，將其描繪成又一個沒有價值的官僚機構，降低其士氣。

這可不是打造一個成功機構的秘訣。

當然，這不是說金融研究監管辦公室可以獨力阻止另一次金融災難。就像《多德弗蘭克法案》一樣，它尚未經受過考驗，只在許可的范圍內表現得不錯，只有當權者利用好這個工具，才能起到效果。不過它的設立是為了解決一個真實存在的問題。

2008年9月，金融系統的脆弱性讓監管方措手不及。而阻礙金融研究監管辦公室正常運轉，將會讓這些盲點繼續存在下去。（財富中文網）

帕特·加羅法洛，作家、編輯，現居華盛頓，曾在《美國新聞與世界報道》（U.S. News & World Report）和政治新聞博客ThinkProgress擔任編輯。他的著作《億萬富翁計劃：我們的政客如何讓企業和權貴偷走我們的金錢與工作》（The Billionaire Boondoggle: How Our Politicians Let Corporations and Bigwigs Steal Our Money and Jobs）將于2019年4月出版。

譯者：嚴匡正

Over a two-day period 10 years ago, the financial crisis of 2008 hit full stride: Lehman Brothers failed, the mega-insurer AIG was bailed out, and Bank of America announced the acquisition of Merrill Lynch. The meltdown had started long before, but Sept. 15 and 16 made it clear to everyone that a financial apocalypse could be in the offing.

One of the culprits in causing the crisis—which wound up costing every American $70,000, according to new research from the San Francisco Federal Reserve—was a lack of appreciation for systemic risk, or the extent to which financial giants were interconnected and how much activity was occurring in shadowy, non-bank corners where no watchdogs lurked, threatening the entire system.

Regulators didn’t have enough information, and what they did have they didn’t share with each other. When the mortgage market went south, nearly everyone in government was caught off guard by how little they knew regarding the tenuous strands holding the financial markets together.

One aspect of the 2010 Dodd-Frank reform law is aimed at addressing this shortcoming: the creation of the Office of Financial Research (OFR), an important body that is far from a household name. Sadly, its low profile has allowed it to be kneecapped by Republicans in Congress and President Donald Trump’s administration. Failing to let the office do its job properly makes another financial crisis more likely.

Much like the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was meant to correct the scattershot nature of consumer regulations, the OFR aims to address the fact that financial data is collected by a host of different agencies—when it is collected at all—and that those agencies not only don’t share the data with each other, but don’t use it to craft a picture of risk across the system as a whole.

The office is independently funded and empowered to issue subpoenas if it doesn’t get the data it wants. In theory, it’s supposed to feed info to the Financial Stability Oversight Council, another entity created in the wake of the crisis with a mandate to spot and address systemic threats.

The OFR has done some good work, including standardizing global data to more easily spot and assess risk. But it’s been dealt blow after blow from Republicans, which has limited its effectiveness.

For instance, the Trump administration has cut its budget by 25% and laid off some 40 employees. Trump has nominated Dino Falaschetti to be the office’s director; Falaschetti previously worked under House Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling, who has sought to eliminate the OFR altogether. Even before Trump’s presidency, Republicans in Congress evinced no love for the office’s work, characterizing it as just another worthless bureaucracy and driving down the office’s morale.

That’s not a recipe for crafting a successful agency.

It’s not that the OFR is singlehandedly going to prevent another financial meltdown, of course. Like much of Dodd-Frank, it’s an untested tool that is only as good as it’s allowed to be and will only be useful if the policymakers in charge take advantage of it. But it aims to correct a real problem.

In September 2008, regulators were blindsided by the extent of the financial system’s fragility. Preventing the OFR from producing robust work ensures those blind spots will persist.

Pat Garofalo is a writer and editor based in Washington, D.C. He was formerly an editor at U.S. News & World Report and ThinkProgress. His book, The Billionaire Boondoggle: How Our Politicians Let Corporations and Bigwigs Steal Our Money and Jobs, will be published in April 2019.