吸引瑞安·科頓注意的，是一個與眾不同的標志。2013年的那個冬天，波士頓尤其寒冷。當時，每天走路去科普利廣場（Copley Square）附近上班的他發現了一個趨勢：帶有火紅楓葉圍繞的極地冰冠標志的時髦風雪大衣忽然開始頻繁出現。

科頓是私人股權投資公司貝恩資本（Bain Capital）負責消費品牌投資的總經理。有一天，他伸著脖子更近地看了一眼，被標志上的“Arctic Program”吸引了注意。他感到好奇，這是個什么品牌呢？

仿佛是命運的安排，加拿大的投資銀行加通貝祥（Canaccord Genuity）不久之后聯系了科頓，希望為某客戶尋求融資。該客戶名叫Canada Goose，是一家位于多倫多的小型冬裝廠商。它發展迅速，有進軍全球的野心。科頓很快意識到，這就是那些擁有酷炫標志的風雪大衣背后的公司。他飛去了多倫多，與Canada Goose的首席執行官達尼·瑞斯在時尚餐廳North 44進行了晚餐會面。幾個月后，貝恩資本收購了Canada Goose 70%的股份。

Canada Goose擁有的兩大關鍵特質，是科頓在投資零售業時所看重的：強大的品牌識別度和獨特的市場定位。風雪大衣一直被看作是功能性服裝，而不是時髦服裝，但Canada Goose設法在讓它變得時尚的同時，還維持了優秀的保暖性。這家公司由瑞斯從波蘭移民過來的祖父在1957年創立，主要生產雪地服。通過為前往珠穆朗瑪峰和南極的探險者提供服裝，公司漸漸建立了口碑。演員丹尼爾·克雷格、模特凱特·阿普頓等名流擁躉紛紛為其發聲。科頓表示：“你不會去南極洲，不過因為Canada Goose為那些去的人提供了防護，這個品牌值得信賴。”

這次投資給貝恩資本帶來了豐厚的回報，也讓Canada Goose發生了巨大的變化。Canada Goose在一年前上市，登陸多倫多證券交易所（Toronto Stock Exchange）和紐約證券交易所（New York Stock Exchange），如今股價已經翻番還多，市值達到約35億美元。在截至去年12月31日的九個月中，Canada Goose的收入增長32.2%，達到3.7億美元，商品利潤率也提升了5.5個百分點，達到57.8%。貝恩資產還持有Canada Goose 44%的股份，如果這股熱潮繼續下去，他們的回報還將繼續增加。而對于Canada Goose而言，他們將1,000美元的風雪大衣賣給全世界高端消費者的夢想也實現了。

上述的美好劇情似乎是一個例外，而某種程度上說，確實如此。

在近來零售業的大部分案例中，私人股權投資公司都扮演了惡人的角色，他們堆積債務，把經營者推向毀滅。這不是沒有原因的。控股收購公司是業內許多最大規模的破產的幕后黑手。實際上，2012年以來，14起最大規模的零售商破產——按照《破產法》第11章申請破產時的債務來計算——當中有10起都是控股收購公司持有的連鎖店。排名第一的是去年9月申請破產的玩具反斗城（Toys “R” Us），其負債高達79億美元【貝恩資本也持有了該公司的部分股份，其他持有方還包括KKR和沃那多房產信托（Vornado Realty Trust）】。與控股收購公司有關而破產上榜的還包括許多耳熟能詳的品牌，例如貝恩資本投資的另一家公司金寶貝（Gymboree，14億美元債務），還有運動權威（Sports Authority，15億美元債務）、Payless ShoeSource（10億美元債務）和玖熙控股（Nine West Holdings，14億美元債務）。

還有更多公司也在走向破產。Moody’s在今年3月預測稱，隨著2019年和2020年的到期債務猛增，利率也有所提升，今年又會有一批新的零售商破產。這家信用評級機構目前的觀察列表中有18家零售商被評為“不良”——負債評級達到Caa1甚至更差——其中由私人股本持有的公司包括J. Crew、Guitar Center和內曼·馬庫斯（Neiman Marcus）等。零售業的清算仍在繼續。

不過Canada Goose的案例也表明，如果進展順利，私人股權投資公司的投資者也可以巨大地推動零售商的發展。私人股權投資公司幫助數十家公司加速了演化，這些公司得以在被亞馬遜顛覆、變化劇烈的市場中保持競爭力。

本質上，你在當地的購物中心看到的那些消失的零售商留下的空地，很大可能都與私人股權投資公司的金融專家有關，而那些存活和繁榮的店面也是如此。這就是他們重新塑造商場的方式。

It was the distinctive patch that caught his attention. Boston was enduring a particularly brutal winter in 2013 when Ryan Cotton began to notice a trend on his daily walk to work near Copley Square: the suddenly growing number of sharp-looking parkas with a logo showing a polar cap surrounded by flaming red maple leaves.

Craning his neck for a closer look one day, Cotton, a managing director overseeing investments in consumer brands at the private equity firm Bain Capital, was intrigued all the more by the reference on the logo to an “Arctic Program.” What was this brand, he wondered?

As fate would have it, the Canadian investment bank Canaccord Genuity got in touch with Cotton soon after in search of financing for a client—a small, Toronto-based winter-wear manufacturer called Canada Goose that was growing fast and had ambitions to go global. Cotton quickly recognized it as the company behind the parkas with the cool patches. He flew to Toronto for a dinner meeting with Canada Goose CEO Dani Reiss at a trendy restaurant called North 44. Months later, Bain took a 70% stake in Canada Goose.

Canada Goose possessed the two key attributes Cotton looks for when investing in retail: a strong brand identity and a unique niche. Parkas had long been seen as functional rather than fashionable, but Canada Goose managed to make them hip while retaining high performance. Founded by Reiss’s Polish immigrant grandfather in 1957 to produce snowmobile suits, Canada Goose established its reputation by outfitting explorers to Mount Everest and the South Pole. Then celebrity fans like actor Daniel Craig and model Kate Upton gave it cachet. “You don’t go to Antarctica, but since Canada Goose outfits people who do, the brand has credibility,” says Cotton.

The investment has been both a grand slam for Bain and a transformative deal for Canada Goose. Since Canada Goose went public just over a year ago, listing its shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange and New York Stock Exchange, the company’s share price has more than doubled—giving it a market value of some $3.5 billion. In the nine months ended Dec. 31, Canada Goose’s revenues rose 32.2%, to $370 million, while merchandise profit margins shot up 5.5 percentage points, to 57.8%. Bain, which still owns 44% of Canada Goose’s shares, is well positioned to add to its returns if the hot streak continues. And for Canada Goose, the dream of selling its $1,000 parkas to high-end consumers globally has been realized.

If this happy tale reads like an exception to the rule—to some extent, it is.

In most stories about retail these days, private equity is depicted as the bad guy—dooming operators by piling on debt. And not without reason. Buyout firms have been behind many of the industry’s biggest bankruptcies. In fact, 10 of the 14 biggest retail bankruptcies since 2012—as measured by liabilities at the time of Chapter 11 filing—were buyout-backed chains. Topping that list is the $7.9 billion filing, in September, of Toys “R” Us (which Bain owned as part of a consortium that included KKR and Vornado Realty Trust). But the roster of buyout busts includes a host of familiar brands such as another Bain investment, Gymboree ($1.4 billion filing), as well as Sports Authority ($1.5 billion), Payless ShoeSource ($1 billion), and Nine West Holdings ($1.4 billion).

More carnage is on the way. In March, Moody’s said it expected a wave of new retail defaults this year, with a surge in debt maturities coming due in 2019 and 2020 and rates on the rise. The credit rating agency’s current watch list of 18 retailers deemed “distressed”—with a debt rating of Caa1 or worse—includes PE-owned names such as J. Crew, Guitar Center, and Neiman Marcus. The retail reckoning continues.

But as the example of Canada Goose shows, private equity investors can offer retailers a huge boost when things go right. PE firms have helped speed up the evolution of dozens of companies in ways that now seem to be helping them stay competitive in the much-changed, Amazon-disrupted landscape.

The bottom line: When you go to your local shopping center, there’s a good chance that the finance whizzes of private equity have had a hand in the empty spaces left by defunct retailers, as well as in the ones that are surviving and thriving. Here’s how they’re reshaping the mall.

私人股權投資公司的經典策略是利用大量借入資本購買公司，隨后通過改善經營效率或出售業務部門，或兩種方法同時使用，來增加公司價值。通常來說，私人股權投資公司的投資者會在三到五年后通過公開發售證券（收入往往用于還債）或出售的方式脫手公司。如果一切順利，用作杠桿的債務會增加回報，不過如果進展不順，它就會成為沉重的負擔。借貸還有助于獲取資金來支付高額的管理費和股息，這些都是控股收購公司的重要回報來源。

對于這種依托于債務的策略，一種實事求是的觀點認為，它只是加速了那些注定失敗的連鎖店的死亡。最近破產的一些零售商很可能就是這種情況。密歇根大學（University of Michigan）商學院和該大學風險投資基金的指導教師埃里克·戈登表示：“其中許多公司無論如何都會停業的。”

確實，近年來失敗的零售商都不成比例地集中在商場的服裝連鎖店中，例如Wet Seal、美國服飾（American Apparel）和Aéropostale。在這個領域，幾乎沒有公司還在繁榮發展。另一些破產的零售商則沒能在網絡上迅速提高影響力，這類公司包括運動權威或戶外裝備供應商甘德山（Gander Mountain）。

然而，如今與私人股權投資公司有關、表現掙扎的零售商數量如此之多，也體現了私人股本領域十余年前對零售業的樂觀態度。在2006年至2008年之間，也就是全球金融危機摧垮市場、電子商務產生群聚效應之前，由于養老基金和富有個人等大型投資者的加入，私人股權投資公司的資金達到了歷史高點。于是他們開始了收購。基本原理在于，控股收購公司可以通過減小零售商規模而獲取收益，而房地產價格的飆升也會抑制風險。在需要的時候，零售商總是可以賣掉地段好的門店來獲取現金。這促成了歷史上的零售業收購熱潮：Dealogic 的數據顯示，2006年和2007年，私人股權投資公司付出了1,080億美元，收購了300家大大小小的美國零售商。自2001年的衰退以來，私人股權投資公司在其他任何兩年時間內收購的規模都僅能達到這一數值的十分之一。十年后的2016年和2017年，合計的收購額僅有130億美元。

這段收購浪潮催生了許多巨大的成功。舉個例子，2007年，KKR領頭以69億美元收購了達樂公司（Dollar General），后者如今按照門店數，是美國第一大連鎖商。達樂公司在兩年后的2009年上市，取得了巨大的成功，如今市值高達260億美元。不過，也有相當多的零售商在私人股權投資公司的投資組合中遭受了多年的煎熬。

是哪里出了問題？雖然他們都是金融的行家，但回到2006年，大型私人股權投資公司在預測可能影響零售業的巨大變革上，并沒有比零售商高明到哪里去。

也許最大的顛覆性因素在于消費者出乎意料地迅速接受了電子商務，這讓他們離開了門店，迫使希望存活的零售商加速技術上的投資。根據美國商務部（Department of Commerce）的數據，電子商務在2017年為零售業的總銷售額貢獻了13%，而五年前這一比例是7.9%，2007年則是3.2%。去掉食品雜貨后，網絡零售的銷售額所占的比例還會大幅提升。例如，在上個季度，內曼·馬庫斯的銷售額中有34%來自電子商務。

而亞馬遜看似不可阻擋地崛起，又迫使零售商推出更好的應用，建立最先進的新分銷機構，重新配置門店讓它們作為分銷網絡的節點。網絡化的舉動增加了整個行業的成本，壓縮了利潤空間。

這給在私人股本投資組合中的零售商增加了額外的壓力。在債臺高筑的情況下試圖從根本上改善業務是一種危險的平衡做法。Moody’s的高級分析師查理·奧謝表示：“如果你沒錢投資網絡、門店、員工、定價，你就會陷入深深的麻煩。”

由于必須完成業績，許多零售商采取了保險的做法，他們采取了穩妥的賭注，節約成本。隨之又導致了許多表現掙扎的連鎖店服務糟糕，產品缺乏區分度。這一切都是失敗的征兆。正如AlixPartners’零售實踐部門的聯席主管喬爾·拜恩斯所說：“當你的改變與消費者無關時，你就死了。”

我們很容易把私人股權投資公司當作零售業之殤的替罪羊。不過有必要記住，過去幾年里最成功的零售商都由私人股權投資公司持有或曾是如此，并在此過程中變得更好了。它們包括之前提到的達樂公司、折扣店Burlington Stores以及在最火的零售領域家居用品蓬勃發展的大賣場At Home。

這些成功的連鎖店有什么共同點？他們都處于零售業的邊緣地帶，因此相對較少受到亞馬遜的影響。全世界以Ross Stores和馬歇爾百貨（Marshalls）為代表的“折扣”店僅有1%的銷售額來自網絡，不過它卻是實體零售業過去十年里最成功的案例。與此同時，一元店由于低廉的價格與親民性開始蒸蒸日上。

與亞馬遜之間存在緩沖很重要。不過貝恩資本的科頓表示，零售商要在2018年取得成功，還必須向消費者傳達他們明確的價值觀。

私人股本在這方面可以給予幫助，因為控股收購公司會帶來大量的專業知識。例如，貝恩資本內部就有從優化供應鏈運行到選擇店面位置等一切方面的專家。而它的大型競爭對手也是如此：Cerberus有一個名為Cerberus Operations and Advisory Co.的管理咨詢公司，KKR有個名為Capstone的類似機構，而L Catterton的這種機構名為Vault。這些機構都有著運營方面的專家，包括許多前零售業高管，以及投資銀行家和管理咨詢師。

當零售商一切順利時，這些特種團隊就可以帶來巨大的價值。以達樂公司2009年的首次公開募股為例，KKR派駐了一個包括前藥店首席執行官和前星巴克（Starbucks）高管的團隊。在KKR的指導下，公司推出了更多利潤更大的自有品牌產品，取消了重復產品，進入了新的區域市場，他們的利潤也開始大幅提升。

另一個例子是Restoration Hardware。私人股權投資公司L Catterton與其他投資者在2008年以1.75億美元將其私有化，提高了它電子商務能力，撤出了數十家舉步維艱的商場。而市場給了公司豐厚的回報：Restoration Hardware在2012年回歸股市時，估值達到了5.2億美元。對四年的努力而言，這個結果并不壞。

還有Burlington Stores，它之前名為Burlington Coat Factory，是貝恩史上獲利最多的一次投資。在貝恩專家的指導下，Burlington大幅提高了從供應商那里購買當季商品的效率，從而更好地與T.J. Maxx競爭，給百貨公司領域造成了更多的傷害。

私人股權投資公司的投資者會無情地提出客觀的觀點，評估哪些有用，哪些沒用。安永（EY）的合伙人安納德·拉古拉曼表示：“私人股本的好處在于它能帶來資金，做出取消經營品種和關閉門店之類的艱難決策。”許多私人股本的投資并不依賴巨大的轉型：他們往往會瞄準那些在同類商品中僅次于最佳的公司——例如BJ的Wholesale Club，就名列好市多（Costco）和山姆會員店（Sam’s Club）之后——但他們又不需要昂貴的徹底變革。這種情況下，一些調整就可以帶來巨大的變化。

當貝恩投資Canada Goose時，科頓知道貝恩資本需要謹慎行事。他最不希望的就是搞砸了Canada Goose的成功公式。此外，科頓也向Canada Goose的首席執行官瑞斯保證，貝恩資本會尊重公司的價值觀。

盡管瑞斯迫切地希望在貝恩資本的資金和支持下大展拳腳，但他還是希望對方保證讓自己控制這家由祖父建立的公司。而確保它依然是個加拿大品牌，也是協議的必要條件之一。Canada Goose和貝恩都想避免耗盡這個品牌的價值，或更糟的，讓它貶值。瑞斯表示：“對我來說，他們認同我們的核心信念十分重要。”

不過雙方都認為貝恩資本有推動Goose增長的潛力。一旦交易實現，私人股權投資公司就會派遣十余名身經百戰的零售業專家幫助指導公司。貝恩的團隊幫助Canada Goose解決了供應鏈上的挑戰來應對需求的暴增，增加了批發客戶的滿意度。盡管對于老牌連鎖店而言，選擇獨立店面可能是個平淡無奇的任務，但對于家族經營的Canada Goose而言，這確實一個重要而不熟悉的工作——而貝恩在這方面可以提供專業的意見。

貝恩推動著Canada Goose與消費者更直接地聯系。2014年，Canada Goose的主要對手盟可睞（Moncler）有80%的銷售額都來自自己的門店或網站，這些都是利潤更高的渠道。而Canada Goose相反，幾乎所有商品都是通過批發供應商，如高端的百貨商城Barneys New York和Saks Fifth Avenue來銷售的。由于貝恩資本力推電子商務和Canada Goose門店，該比例在這一財年至今已經降低到了64%，也是Canada Goose利潤提升的重要原因。

貝恩也幫助公司砍掉了那些利潤不高的產品，減少了外套的種類，剩下的都是那些生產速度更快的衣服，還擴張了Canada Goose的產品，尤其是增加了針織品，例如650美元的針織衫。加入Canada Goose董事會的科頓表示：“他們的問題不在于不知道自己能做什么，而在于不知道自己應該做什么。”雖然Canada Goose的價格很高，超過了樂斯菲斯（North Face）等品牌，但他們比盟可睞更便宜，后者比起Canada Goose更注重時尚而非功能性。

盡管有一些成功的案例，但別再期待私人股本再一次蜂擁涌入零售業了。根據Dealogic的數據，2018年至今，私人股本收購零售商的金額比疲軟的2016和2017年還要更少，這種表現上一次出現還要追溯到21世紀初。

各類零售商都必須讓投資者相信他們可以在網絡的沖擊下泰然自若。沃頓商學院（Wharton）的金融學教授大衛·維塞爾斯表示：“電子商務帶來的顛覆還沒有消失，除非可以通過迅速調整輕松地增加利潤，否則私人股本會避免涉足零售業。”

與此同時，首次公開募股市場也對零售品牌表現冷淡。所以，只有最有前途的公司才能勉強通過考驗。過去幾年里，這些公司包括Canada Goose、Floor & Décor和At Home，他們都在上市后股價飆升。相比之下，大肆炒作的時尚品牌J. Jill在首次公開募股之后表現慘淡——仿佛是在提醒投資者零售業的風險。上市指數型基金管理公司Renaissance Capital的負責人凱思琳·史密斯表示：“首次公開募股對于不會被亞馬遜影響的零售商而言是有用的。”

隨著私人股本的回撤，零售市場的動態也在變化。許多零售商可能只需要相對較小的調整就能繁榮起來，而控股收購公司本來可以提供這樣的指導。但私人股本的高管表示，像Sycamore去年收購Staples 這樣70億美元的大額交易的年代已經結束了——至少現在如此。我們應該期待零售商出于戰略考慮收購其他零售商。【想想沃爾瑪（Walmart）收購Jet.com和Bonobos。】與此同時，隨著私人股本尋求止損，他們的投資組合中幾乎肯定會有一些可以搶救的公司被放任死去了。

零售行業的觀察家都同意，私人股本不會拋棄這個行業。他們只是會更加謹慎。貝恩的科頓表示：“歷史有正面影響也有負面影響。我們目前經歷的是（零售業）最騷動、變革最劇烈的時期。”這意味著零售商如果無法從競爭中脫穎而出、挫敗對手，就會面臨更大風險。不過，這也意味著更多的機遇。（財富中文網）

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The classic playbook for private equity is to buy a company using an ample dose of borrowed money, then unlock value either by getting more efficient operationally or selling off units, or both. Typically, the PE investors will look to unload the company after three to five years via a public offering (with the proceeds often used to pay down debt) or a sale. The debt involved acts as a lever that boosts returns when things go well, but it can be an albatross when things are going south. The borrowing can also help finance the large management fees and dividends that often represent a big chunk of a buyout firm’s returns.

An unsentimental view of this debt-powered approach is that it merely hastens the demise of chains that are doomed to fail. Such was probably the case for some of the recent retail bankruptcies. “Many of them would have gone out of business anyway,” says Erik Gordon, a professor at the University of Michigan’s business school and faculty adviser to the university’s venture capital fund.

Indeed, the retail fails in recent years have been disproportionately concentrated among mall-based apparel chains, such as Wet Seal, American Apparel, and Aéropostale, in a sector in which few companies are thriving, or retailers that were slow to build an online presence, like Sports Authority or outdoor-gear purveyor Gander Mountain.

The sheer number of struggling retailers linked to private equity today, however, reflects a burst of optimism about retail in the PE industry more than a decade ago. Between 2006 and 2008—before the global financial crisis tanked the markets and e-commerce hit critical mass—private equity firms sat on record amounts of money pumped in by gigantic investors like pension funds and wealthy individuals. So they went shopping. The rationale was that buyout firms could make a mint by getting retailers leaner—and that soaring real estate prices limited the risk. Chains could always sell well-located stores to raise cash if needed. The result was a historic retail buyout boom: In 2006 and 2007, PE firms made $108 billion worth of acquisitions involving 300 U.S. retailers of various sizes, according to Dealogic. That’s 10 times the dollar value of PE retail acquisitions made in any other two-year period since the 2001 recession. A decade later, the 2016–17 combined deal volume was a mere $13 billion.

A handful of major successes emerged from the cascade of deals in the mid-aughts. Case in point: the $6.9 billion, KKR-led acquisition in 2007 of Dollar General, now the biggest U.S. chain by store count. Dollar General went public again two years later with a hugely successful 2009 offering, and now has a market cap of $26 billion. But a disproportionate number of retailers ended up languishing in PE firms’ portfolios for years.

What went wrong? For all their financial savvy, back in 2006 the big private equity firms proved no better than the retailers themselves in anticipating major changes that would roil retail.

Probably the single biggest disruptive factor has been the consumer’s unexpectedly rapid embrace of e-commerce—taking customers out of stores and forcing retailers who want to survive to ramp up spending on technology. E-commerce generated 13% of total retail sales in 2017, up from 7.9% just five years earlier, according to Department of Commerce data, and 3.2% in 2007. Remove groceries from the equation, and the percentage of online retail sales is much higher. At Neiman Marcus, for instance, e-commerce accounted for fully 34% of sales last quarter.

The seemingly unstoppable ascent of Amazon has forced retailers to deploy better apps, build new state-of-the-art distribution facilities, and reconfigure stores so they can serve as nodes in a distribution network. The move online has simultaneously increased expenses and slashed profit margins across the industry.

That in turn has piled on extra pressure for retailers in private equity portfolios. Carrying a ton of debt while trying to fundamentally -revamp your business is a precarious balancing act. “If you don’t have money to invest online, invest in your store, invest in your people, invest in price, you’re in deep trouble,” says Charlie O’Shea, a senior Moody’s analyst.

The imperative to make their numbers has led many retailers to play it safe, focusing on sure bets and cost savings. That in turn has led to poor service and a lack of merchandise distinctiveness at many struggling chains. All of which is a formula for failure. As Joel Bines, cohead of AlixPartners’ retail practice, puts it: “When it’s not about the customer anymore, you’re dead.”

It’s east to scapegoat private equity for retail’s woes. But it’s important to remember that some of the most successful retailers of the past few years are, or were, owned by PE firms and came out much better for it. That group includes the aforementioned Dollar General; discounter Burlington Stores; and At Home, a big-box retailer thriving in one of retail’s hottest areas—home goods.

What do these successful chains have in common? They’re in corners of the retail world that have thus far remained relatively impervious to Amazon. The “off-price” segment—as represented by the Ross Stores and Marshalls of the world—barely gets 1% of sales online, but it has been physical retail’s biggest success story for the past decade. Dollar stores, meanwhile, have thrived thanks to their bargain-basement prices and their proximity to shoppers.

Having an Amazon buffer is huge. But successful retailers in 2018, says Bain’s Cotton, must also convey with absolute clarity to the consumer what value they offer.

That’s one area where private equity can help because the buyout firms bring expertise galore. Bain, for example, has in-house experts focused on everything from optimizing supply-chain operations to choosing store locations. And the same is true of its big rivals: Cerberus has an in-house management consulting unit called Cerberus Operations and Advisory Co., KKR has a similar group named Capstone, and L Catterton’s unit is known as Vault. These organizations are packed with operational experts, including more than a few former retail executives, as well as investment bankers and management consultants.

When things are going right for a retailer, these SWAT teams can add huge value. Leading up to Dollar General’s 2009 IPO, for example, KKR installed a management team that included a former drugstore CEO and a Starbucks senior exec. And profits soared after the company, under KKR’s guidance, added more private-label products with their higher margins, stripped out duplicative items, and expanded into new geographic markets.

Another example is Restoration Hardware. PE firm L Catterton took it private for $175 million in 2008 with other investors, pushing it to build up its e-commerce capacity and to pull out of dozens of faltering malls. The markets rewarded the firm richly: Restoration Hardware returned to the stock market in 2012 with a $520 million valuation. Not bad for four years’ work.

Then there’s Burlington Stores, formerly known as Burlington Coat Factory and one of Bain’s biggest home runs ever. Under the guidance of Bain’s experts, Burlington became much more efficient in buying in-season merchandise from vendors, helping it better compete with T.J. Maxx and inflicting further pain on department stores.

Private equity investors can bring a ruthlessly objective point of view to evaluating what’s working—and what’s not. “PE is good in that it can bring capital and make tough decisions like dropping business lines and closing stores,” says Anand Raghuraman, a partner at EY. Many PE deals don’t hinge on a big turnaround: Firms will often target a company that’s just below No. 1 in its category—like, say, BJ’s Wholesale Club, which ranks below Costco and Sam’s Club—but also doesn’t require an expensive overhaul. In that kind of scenario, a bit of fine-tuning can make all the difference.

When Bain made its investment in Canada Goose, Cotton knew that his firm needed to tread carefully. The last thing he wanted to do was mess with the company’s successful formula. Plus, Cotton had pledged to Canada Goose CEO Reiss that the firm would respect his company’s values.

And while Reiss was eager to see what he could do with Bain’s capital and support, the CEO had sought reassurances that he’d stay in control of the company founded by his grandfather. Remaining a Made-in-Canada brand, too, was a sine qua non condition for a deal. Both Canada Goose and Bain wanted to avoid exhausting the brand or, worse yet, cheapening it. “It was really important to me that they believe in our core beliefs,” says Reiss.

But both sides saw the potential for Bain to kick-start Goose’s growth. Once the deal was inked, the PE firm deployed more than a dozen of its battle-hardened retail veterans to help guide the company. Bain’s team helped Canada Goose navigate the supply-chain challenges of meeting booming demand and keeping its wholesale clients happy. While matters such as selecting the right locations for Canada Goose stand-alone stores might have been a prosaic consideration for a more established chain, it was a crucial and an unfamiliar exercise for the family-run business—and one for which Bain was able to offer expertise.

Bain pushed Canada Goose to connect with customers more directly. In 2014, Canada Goose’s closest rival, Moncler, got 80% of sales from its own stores or website, which are more profitable avenues. In contrast, Canada Goose sold virtually all of its merchandise via wholesalers like high-end department stores Barneys New York and Saks Fifth Avenue. That is down to 64% of sales so far this fiscal year, thanks to Bain’s push for better e-commerce and Canada Goose stores, and a big reason that Canada Goose’s profit margins are way up.

The Bain team also helped the company pull back on items that were less profitable, narrowed the coat assortment to ones that are quicker to make, and expanded the Canada Goose assortment, notably adding knitwear, like $650 sweaters. “Their problem wasn’t knowing what they could do but what they should do,” says Cotton, who sits on Canada Goose’s board. And while Canada Goose prices are high, above those of say, the North Face, they are below those of Moncler, whose focus is more on fashion than function compared with Canada Goose.

Despite some success stories, no one should expect another feverish private equity surge into retail. And indeed so far in 2018, according to Dealogic data, private equity acquisitions of retailers are below even the anemic pace of 2016 and 2017, and are more on par with levels last seen in the early 2000s.

Retailers of all stripes still have to convince investors that they can now hold their own online. “The e-commerce shakeout is not done yet, and unless there is an easy win in terms of quick fixes that improve margins, PE will avoid retail,” says Wharton finance professor David Wessels.

The IPO market, meanwhile, has cooled to retail brands, so only the most promising companies can squeeze through. In the past couple of years, that group has included Canada Goose, Floor & Decor, and At Home, which have all soared since going public. Shares of much-hyped fashion brand J. Jill, by contrast, have swooned post-IPO—as if to remind investors of retail’s ongoing perils. “The IPOs that are working are by the retailers that aren’t going to get Amazoned,” says Kathleen Smith, principal of IPO ETF manager Renaissance Capital.

As PE pulls back, retail market dynamics are shifting. There are plenty of retailers that might prosper with relatively minor fixes, and that could benefit from the guidance a buyout firm can offer. But the days of $7 billion megadeals, like Sycamore’s buyout of Staples last year, are over—at least for now, say private equity executives. Instead, expect more strategic acquisitions of retailers by other retailers. (Think Walmart buying Jet.com and Bonobos, or Coach parent Tapestry buying Kate Spade.) At the same time, there will almost certainly be salvageable companies in PE portfolios that are allowed to die as firms look to cut their losses and move on.

Private equity won’t abandon the retail sector, agree industry observers. It will just be more cautious going forward. “There’s a right and a wrong side to history,” says Bain’s Cotton. “What we’re living through at the moment is the most tumultuous and transformative period ever [for retail].” That means more risk in retail for companies unable to really stand out from the competition and outflank rivals. Then again, it also means more opportunities.