既然共和黨的參議員已經(jīng)同意朝著1.5萬億美元巨幅減稅的方向邁出第一步，我們不妨看看，在沒有引入一個(gè)大膽新平臺的情況下，美國財(cái)政赤字的災(zāi)難軌跡將怎樣使未來的國庫收入陷入危機(jī)。

此時(shí)此刻，我們正在大步奔向聯(lián)邦政府遭遇1萬億美元虧空的那一天——也就是起始于2020年10月1日的2021財(cái)年。這個(gè)數(shù)字理應(yīng)引發(fā)報(bào)警器尖叫，選民恐慌，以及財(cái)政縮緊。“然而不論民主黨還是共和黨都對財(cái)政赤字漠不關(guān)心，選民們似乎也并不在意，”偏保守立場的曼哈頓學(xué)院的布萊恩?理德爾說。

人們本應(yīng)該非常關(guān)注財(cái)政赤字，因?yàn)槌嘧忠坏┩黄迫f億美元，就意味著財(cái)政狀況已偏離正常軌道太遠(yuǎn)。

要理解為何國庫虧空在短短36個(gè)月里能夠翻倍，達(dá)到13位數(shù)之高，就必須把美國國會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室（Congressional Budget Office）的預(yù)測報(bào)告和很有可能出現(xiàn)的支出增長結(jié)合起來看——國會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室被禁止將后者納入其預(yù)測報(bào)告。今年6月，國會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室在《預(yù)算與經(jīng)濟(jì)展望報(bào)告更新版》里公布了根據(jù)當(dāng)前法規(guī)作出的最新十年預(yù)測。其假設(shè)前提是，今天的法規(guī)適用于未來的收入、支出和赤字，即使這些法規(guī)很在實(shí)際中可能會(huì)變化。其實(shí)很多這些法規(guī)是肯定會(huì)變的，而且是朝著使赤字進(jìn)一步惡化的方向改變。

國會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室的收入展望驚人地樂觀。它預(yù)測道，由于收入增加，美國家庭不斷達(dá)到更高的納稅檔次，因此個(gè)人所得稅占財(cái)政收入的比重將大幅增加，其增量完全能夠彌補(bǔ)工資稅貢獻(xiàn)比例下降造成的損失。老年醫(yī)保基金Medicare及社保基金的收入增長將不及GDP增長，這與個(gè)人所得稅強(qiáng)勁增長的本質(zhì)原因是一樣的：隨著人們收入增加，越來越多的美國人收入將達(dá)到社保和老年醫(yī)保繳費(fèi)基數(shù)的上限，也就是說繳費(fèi)金額超過上限后不再增加。國會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室預(yù)計(jì)企業(yè)稅占財(cái)政收入的比例將基本持平。在此背景下，財(cái)政收入將大幅增加，從占GDP的17.3%——比50年來的平均值17.4%只低一丁點(diǎn)兒——升高到2027年占GDP的18.4%。

財(cái)政支出的爆發(fā)式增長將遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過收入的強(qiáng)勢增長——這是官方給出的預(yù)測。國會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室預(yù)計(jì)，赤字將在2018年從7390億美元減少到5810億美元，因?yàn)槊绹习傩蘸芸赡軙?huì)把賬面資本收益推遲到次年，寄希望于稅改能降低股票交易或房地產(chǎn)交易的稅率。然而在國會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室的作出官方預(yù)測中，財(cái)政虧空將從2018年開始迅猛抬頭。根據(jù)《財(cái)富》的估算，實(shí)際情況很可能糟糕得多。

原因何在？自從國會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室必須在預(yù)測中假設(shè)現(xiàn)行法規(guī)在未來仍然適用，其預(yù)測就一直認(rèn)為，由于國會(huì)的減支要求，可支配開支占財(cái)政收入的比例將大幅下降。該機(jī)構(gòu)預(yù)測，國防開支將減少到只占GDP的2.7%，成為1930年以來的最低水平，而國防之外——用于教育、國際援助和醫(yī)療衛(wèi)生等用途的開支，都將低于國民消費(fèi)指數(shù)。總體而言，國會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室預(yù)計(jì)，可支配開支在未來十年將從占GDP的6.3%大幅下降到占GDP的5.4%。理德爾說：“這不大可能。國會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室的預(yù)測太樂觀了。”

在白宮今年春季公布的2018財(cái)年預(yù)算中，美國總裁特朗普提出了雄心勃勃的可支配支出的計(jì)劃，包括國防開支增加4840億美元，以及增加2000億美元用于重建美國陳舊的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。而更現(xiàn)實(shí)的預(yù)測是，可支配支出將隨著GDP的增長而增長。在這種情況下，國會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室預(yù)測2021年將遭遇的8790億美元赤字——已經(jīng)比2016年的水平擴(kuò)大了50%——實(shí)際上還會(huì)高很多。如果調(diào)高可支配支出，再加上額外負(fù)債需要負(fù)擔(dān)的利息，那么2021年的財(cái)政虧空還要增加1500億美元，使總額遠(yuǎn)超1萬億美元。“這不但合理，而且很可能發(fā)生，”理德爾說。

實(shí)際情況更加狼狽。在修改后的預(yù)測中，2027年赤字將高達(dá)1.7萬億美元，比CBO已經(jīng)給出的示警預(yù)測還高16%，而美國總體負(fù)債將高達(dá)2.9萬億美元，達(dá)到GDP的104%，那時(shí)整個(gè)國家將深陷泥沼，就像中世紀(jì)制圖人說的——“惡龍來了。”

越過萬億美元紅線是不是會(huì)引發(fā)民眾對財(cái)政支出的強(qiáng)烈反對？要知道，美國赤字在2009年達(dá)到1.4億美元，2012年也超過了1萬億美元。理德爾說：“奧巴馬政府早期出現(xiàn)的赤字造成了人們的懈怠心理，使民眾對赤字的反應(yīng)變得遲鈍。”這是不幸的，因?yàn)榻裉斓那闆r與金融危機(jī)恢復(fù)期完全不同。這些巨大的差距根深蒂固而且還會(huì)不斷惡化。

萬億美元赤字的真正意義在于，一旦它們盤踞不去，一場財(cái)政災(zāi)難幾乎無可避免。如果虧空不太大，政府還有空間來控制各種福利費(fèi)用的增長，不至于造成很大的痛苦。相較于大幅砍減費(fèi)用，老百姓更容易接受溫和的措施。然而如果赤字和債務(wù)變得無法控制，前者恐怕是唯一的出路。

那么共和黨的減稅提案呢？它的支持者一定會(huì)說，減免的稅收大部分會(huì)以拉動(dòng)增長從而增加稅利的形式返回國庫。在福利改革同時(shí)進(jìn)行的情況下，簡化稅目和降低企業(yè)稅率是正確的。“福利改革比稅改更重要，”理德爾說。

如果不能嚴(yán)格控制養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)和醫(yī)療保險(xiǎn)，那么增長越高，稅改的紅利就會(huì)越多地被赤字、債務(wù)和利率削平，甚至比《財(cái)富》預(yù)測的情況更加危險(xiǎn)。這是因?yàn)闇p稅提案只能使未來的虧空擴(kuò)大，而共和黨人似乎毫不擔(dān)心。幾十年前，標(biāo)新立異的佩羅特兩次以獨(dú)立候選人的身份參選總統(tǒng)，多次批評巨額政赤字。如果通往萬億美元赤字的高歌猛進(jìn)之路將造成新一輪的恐慌和惡意，逆耳的批評聲未嘗不是一件好事。 （財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：童明

Now that Senate Republicans have agreed on the first step towards a gigantic, $1.5 trillion tax cut, it's instructive to examine the disastrous trajectory of America's deficits without an audacious new platform putting future revenues at risk.

Right now, we're headed for federal shortfalls topping $1 trillion by fiscal 2021, a period starting October 1, 2020. That number should trigger screeching alarms, terrify voters, and prompt calls for a draconian slowdown in spending. "But neither the Democrats nor the Republicans care about deficits," says Brian Riedl of the conservative-leaning Manhattan Institute. "And it's not clear the voters do, either."

They all should care plenty, because the arrival of $1 trillion deficits means fiscal sanity has become a bridge too far.

To see how shortfalls double to 13 figures in just thirty-six months, it's crucial in incorporate both the official CBO projections and likely spending increases that the CBO is barred from including in its forecasts. In June, the CBO released its "An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook," unveiling its latest projections for the next decade. The CBO is obliged to make its predictions under "current law." Hence it assumes that the rules in place today govern future outlays, revenues and deficits, even if those rules are likely to change. In fact, many rules are certain to change, and mostly in the deficit-deepening direction.

The CBO's outlook for revenues is surprisingly strong. It forecasts that receipts from the individual income tax will grow strongly as a share of national income, as increasing incomes push families into ever-higher brackets. That trend more than offsets a decline in the contribution from payroll taxes. Receipts from Medicare and Social Security duties will lag GDP for essentially the same reason that income taxes will outperform: As their pay rises, more and more Americans will reach the taxable limits for Social Security and Medicare, capping their payments. The CBO expects corporate taxes to remain flat a percentage of national income. All told, revenues are expected to rise strongly, from 17.3% of GDP, a tad below the 50-year average of 17.4%, to 18.4% by 2027.

An explosion in spending will far outstrip that robust trend in revenues––and that's just the official scenario. The CBO projects that deficits will drop in fiscal 2018 from $739 billion to $581 billion, as folks delay booking capital gains until next year in hopes that tax reform will curb levies on sales of stocks or homes. But shortfalls surge starting in 2018 in the CBO's official forecasts. And by Fortune's estimates, the real numbers will be far worse.

Here's why. Since the CBO is obliged to project that the today's fiscal laws remain in place, it's forecasting that the Congress's sequester requirements dramatically shrink discretionary spending as a share of national income. The agency foresees that outlays for defense will fall to 2.7% of GDP, the lowest levels since the 1930s, and that non-defense spending for the likes of education, foreign aid, and HHS trails the CPI. Overall, the CBO reckons that discretionary outlays will drop steeply from 6.3% to 5.4% of GDP over the next decade. "It won't happen," says Riedl. "The CBO scenario is extraordinarily rosy."

In White House budget for FY 2018 released this spring, President Trump proposed ambitious initiatives in the discretionary realm, including $484 billion increase in defense spending, as well as an extra $200 billion for rebuilding America's crumbing infrastructure. It's far more realistic to forecast that discretionary outlays will wax with GDP. So if that happens, the CBO's projected deficit of $879 billion in 2021, already 50% above 2016 levels, will be a lot higher. Adjusting discretionary spending upwards, and counting interest on the extra debt, will add approximately $150 billion to the shortfall in 2021, pushing the total figure well over $1 trillion. "That scenario is not only plausible, but probable," says Riedl.

It gets a lot worse. In our revised projections, the deficit would reach $1.7 trillion by 2027, 16% above the CBO's already-alarming estimate, and America's debt would stand at $2.9 trillion, 104% of GDP, putting the nation in the area that Medieval cartographers labeled, "Here be dragons."

Will crossing the trillion mark prompt an outcry for spending restraint? Keep in mind that the U.S. deficit hit $1.4 trillion in 2009, and exceeded a trillion as recently as 2012. "The deficits of the early Obama years created a sense of complacency, they took away the sticker shock," says Riedl. That's unfortunate, because today's situation is totally different from the aftermath of the financial crisis. These gargantuan gaps are ingrained and growing on autopilot.

The real significance of trillion dollar deficits is that once they're allowed to take hold, avoiding a fiscal disaster becomes far more difficult. When shortfalls are lower, politicians have more room to curb the rise in spending on entitlements without causing severe pain. That's a lot more palatable to voters than demanding the steep cuts, the only solution when deficits and debt are raging out of control.

What about the Republicans' proposal for tax relief? Naturally, its proponents argue that the cuts will mainly pay for themselves by recharging growth and swelling tax receipts. Tax simplification and corporate rate reductions are the way to go––when coupled with entitlement reform. "Entitlement reform is more important than tax reform," says Riedl.

Without reining in Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, the danger is that the higher growth that should flow from tax reform is blunted by deficits, debt, and interest rates that are even more towering than Fortune's menacing projections. That's because the proposed tax cuts at best will add to future shortfalls, a situation that doesn't seem to bother the Republican a whit. Decades ago, a maverick named Ross Perot became a political player assailing ruinous deficits. It wouldn't be a bad thing if the march toward a trillion caused another round of fear and loathing.