幾乎每個看過兒童讀物的人都知道龜兔賽跑的故事。在故事里，自大的兔子放了一通狠話之后，一溜煙把兩棲的烏龜對手甩在身后。然而，兔子到達終點前信心爆棚地睡了一覺，步伐遲緩的烏龜最終贏得比賽，成了緩慢堅定最終勝利的代表。

現(xiàn)在可以用一些現(xiàn)代元素重新解讀下故事。讓優(yōu)步當(dāng)兔子，這是一位傲慢的領(lǐng)跑者，也是拼車世界的主宰，但因一些煩心事元氣大傷，比如解雇高管，公司存在性別歧視以及涉嫌侵犯專利。誰是烏龜呢？自然是Lyft——雖說步子沒那么慢，但至少Lyft沒有競爭對手那么自負，行事也更加小心。

到目前為止，兔子，也就是優(yōu)步依然遙遙領(lǐng)先，類似童話的結(jié)局要再等幾年才能出現(xiàn)。不過，如果說拼車市場千年老二Lyft會有什么機會的話，那就是現(xiàn)在。

今年優(yōu)步遭遇各種磕磕絆絆，簡直就像火車事故一樣慘烈。前工程師公開宣稱優(yōu)步內(nèi)部充滿性別歧視，再比如谷歌母公司Alphabet旗下的自動駕駛汽車初創(chuàng)企業(yè)Waymo起訴優(yōu)步侵犯知識產(chǎn)權(quán)，6月底聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人兼首席執(zhí)行官特拉維斯·卡蘭尼克令人震驚的辭職成了這出戲的高潮（卡蘭尼克仍留在董事會，但優(yōu)步直到7月中旬仍未任命新的CEO）。種種壞消息的背景則是媒體一直報道稱優(yōu)步對員工和消費者冷酷無情，而且藐視當(dāng)?shù)胤伞?

Just about everyone who has ever read a children's book knows the fable of the tortoise and the hare. That’s the one about the footrace in which the cocky hare sprints ahead, leaving his reptilian rival behind in a cloud of dust and trash talk—and then takes an overconfident nap before reaching the finish line, allowing the plodding tortoise to win in a blaze of slow-but-steady glory.

Now imagine the story with a few modern twists. The bunny-proxy is Uber, the brash front-runner that dominates the world of ride sharing—but has hamstrung itself with debilitating distractions like executive firings and allegations of systemic sexism and patent infringement. The tortoise? That’d be Lyft—which, if it isn’t exactly plodding, is at least less braggadocious and more cautious than its competitor.

For now, the hare—er, Uber—remains very much in the lead, and any fairy-tale ending is years away. Still, if ever there was a chance for Lyft, the perennially distant No. 2 in the ride-sharing duopoly, to pull ahead of Uber, this would be it.

Uber’s stumbles have been a can’t-look-away train wreck this year. They’ve ranged from a former engineer going public with claims of a sexist work environment, to the proceedings in a lawsuit filed by Waymo, the driverless-tech arm of Google parent Alphabet, accusing Uber of infringing on its IP. And they culminated with the stunning resignation of cofounder and chief executive officer Travis Kalanick in late June. (Kalanick remains on the board; as of mid-July Uber had yet to appoint a new CEO.) All this has played out against a media backdrop in which Uber has been depicted as ruthless with employees and customers and contemptuous of local laws.

兔子身上疾風(fēng)暴雨般的壞消息卻推動了烏龜前進。通過信用卡數(shù)據(jù)追蹤消費趨勢的TXN Solutions稱，2015年6月至今，優(yōu)步在美國拼車市場的份額已從90%降至75%。最大單月跌幅出現(xiàn)在今年1月，當(dāng)時一些紐約出租車司機集體罷工，抗議特朗普總統(tǒng)之前提出的入境禁令。剛開始，該區(qū)域內(nèi)優(yōu)步車輛啟動了“提價”功能，原因是拼車需求增多；隨后優(yōu)步宣布關(guān)閉提價并下調(diào)費率，批評人士指責(zé)優(yōu)步坑了罷工的司機。雖然優(yōu)步表示外界誤解了措施本意，但結(jié)果是市場份額當(dāng)月下跌了4個百分點（Lyft對入境禁令如何反應(yīng)？該公司的幾位創(chuàng)始人承諾,將向美國公民自由聯(lián)盟捐款100萬美元）。同時，今年2月以來Lyft的市場份額從21%增至25%。也有其他公司稱Lyft的市場份額已經(jīng)達到30%。

落后者迅速增長，領(lǐng)先者優(yōu)步則不斷下滑，在硅谷內(nèi)外也產(chǎn)生巨大的潛在影響。對跑在領(lǐng)先者優(yōu)步來說，時間點簡直不能更糟。

科技圈里的投資人以及各種親朋好友，要么投了優(yōu)步要么就投了Lyft。優(yōu)步通過股票和債務(wù)籌集了大約140億美元資金，風(fēng)投公司、私募基金和高凈值個人參投方超過70個，其估值也達到690億美元，成為歷史上估值最高的初創(chuàng)公司。Lyft同樣動作迅速——融資額為26億美元，出資人名單也一樣吸引眼球，其中包括今年5月籌款6億美元的一輪融資，Lyft的估值隨后達到75億美元。

兩家公司的投資人都熱切盼望著回報。但對優(yōu)步來說，最近的事件或許讓回報的“終點線”又遠了一些。加拿大皇家銀行資本市場分析師馬克·馬哈尼說：“優(yōu)步的混亂程度幾乎前所未有。我估計即便優(yōu)步打算過上市，日期也只能大大延后。”其他人相信，隨著優(yōu)步陷入混亂，對未來成長非常重要的投資人和合作伙伴可能不會繼續(xù)支持。一位不希望表露身份的高管指出：“如今局勢徹底扭轉(zhuǎn)只需最后一根稻草。我們內(nèi)部討論時都認為，2020年以后優(yōu)步不再是主要參與者。”

所有風(fēng)險因素中，投資人的錢甚至都不是最重要的。從買車到拼車已成為汽車行業(yè)歷史上商業(yè)模式最大的顛覆之一。不過拼車市場的領(lǐng)先者也會在另一場更重要的轉(zhuǎn)型中發(fā)揮核心作用，即轉(zhuǎn)向自動駕駛汽車。技術(shù)進步、經(jīng)濟趨勢以及安全和環(huán)境方面的顧慮正合力把無人駕駛車輛推向主流，而拼車服務(wù)有可能是相當(dāng)多人接觸到無人駕駛車的途徑。優(yōu)步-Lyft之爭的勝者可能會重新定義城市藍圖、交通政策、乃至人們的互動方式，從而真正成為無處不在的大型消費品牌。

Lyft和優(yōu)步都在投資開發(fā)自動駕駛汽車。直到最近，優(yōu)步一直搶占先機，尤其在自主技術(shù)研發(fā)，開展合作以及啟動自動駕駛試點項目等方面。但最近Lyft開始奮起直追——2016年初Lyft跟通用汽車簽訂了第一份無人駕駛汽車合作協(xié)議，最近又和麻省理工出身的自動駕駛初創(chuàng)公司NuTonomy簽署了協(xié)議（與兩家公司合作的試點項目預(yù)計將在今明兩年啟動）。今年5月有消息稱Lyft又多了個合作伙伴，而且是因為打官司而成了優(yōu)步肉中刺的Waymo。Waymo首席執(zhí)行官約翰·克拉夫切克說：“跟Lyft的合作輕松又簡單。”

本周晚些時候，Lyft將披露迄今為止邁向自動駕駛最大的一步——開發(fā)一整套技術(shù)，既包括硬件也包括軟件，方便汽車廠商出產(chǎn)的車輛改造成無人駕駛汽車，而且可以輕松融入Lyft的乘客網(wǎng)絡(luò)。有了這項新技術(shù)，Lyft向潛在合作伙伴推介時又多了一個賣點：我們有希望獲勝，而且我們會提供工具協(xié)助你一起贏。

同樣，優(yōu)步很快發(fā)現(xiàn)自動駕駛是自己愿景的核心（這幾年它一直在開發(fā)上述多項技術(shù)。）同時，雖然最近受到非議，但優(yōu)步依然在非常健康地成長。公司發(fā)言人在發(fā)送給《財富》雜志的電子郵件中表示：“我們公司比以往更加強大，而且我們正在集中精神開發(fā)市場上最好、最富有創(chuàng)意的產(chǎn)品。”（優(yōu)步拒絕了高層接受采訪并留下記錄的請求。）

超越優(yōu)步并非易事。但無人駕駛技術(shù)有可能把Lyft提升到跟優(yōu)步并駕齊驅(qū)的位置，甚至更高，更不用說可以讓Lyft盈利了（據(jù)說2016年Lyft實現(xiàn)收入約7億美元，虧損6億美元左右；優(yōu)步公布的數(shù)據(jù)是虧損28億美元，收入約65億美元）。在今后的無人駕駛領(lǐng)域，兩強有共存的空間嗎？也許。但在這場壓力很大的競賽中，贏家得到的可遠不止說大話的權(quán)力。

Lyft首席執(zhí)行官洛根·格林和總裁約翰·齊默已經(jīng)公事了10多年。語調(diào)輕柔的格林負責(zé)Lyft的產(chǎn)品和工程團隊；齊默更有活力，他是Lyft的公共形象（也負責(zé)營銷和政府關(guān)系等部門）。他們的同事、Lyft負責(zé)消費者體驗的副總裁瑪麗·溫菲爾德說：“我喜歡把他們看作公司的大腦和心臟。”

仲夏的一個下午，我終于見到了工作中的二人組。在距舊金山海邊棒球場幾步之遙的Lyft總部，格林和齊默與我對坐在會議室的兩端。他倆給人的感覺幾乎是形影不離。兩人都住在附近的伯克利市，只相距兩個街區(qū)，大多數(shù)情況下一起拼車上班（最近，在從中國出差回來的航班上，他們一起看了音樂喜劇片《完美音調(diào)》）。兩個人都是33歲，已婚，有年幼的子女。雖然一個出生在美國西海岸，另一個出生在東海岸，但他們的生活已經(jīng)并行了很長一段時間。

The stormy news has put a wind at the tortoise’s back. Since June 2015, Uber’s share of the U.S. ride-hailing market has declined from 90% to 75%, according to TXN Solutions, a firm that uses credit card data to track consumer trends. The steepest single-month decline came in January, when some New York taxi drivers stopped working to protest President Trump’s original travel ban. First, Uber’s “surge pricing" kicked in in the area, because there was more demand for rides; then, when Uber announced it was turning surge pricing off and lowering its fees, critics attacked it for undercutting the striking drivers. Uber has said that its actions were misunderstood, but its market share dropped four percentage points that month alone. (Lyft’s response to the ban? Its founders pledged to donate $1 million to the American Civil Liberties Union.) Meanwhile, since February, Lyft’s market share has increased to 25% from 21%. Other firms have put Lyft’s share as high as 30%

The underdog’s growth and Uber’s deceleration have massive potential ramifications in and out of Silicon Valley. And for the front-runner, the timing could hardly be worse.

Pretty much every tech investor and their mother has put money in one or the other service. Uber has raised about $14 billion in equity and debt financing from more than 70 venture capital firms, private equity funds, and high-net-worth individuals, attaining a valuation of $69 billion, which makes it the most valuable tech startup ever. Lyft, meanwhile, is no slouch: It has raised $2.6 billion from an equally impressive “who’s who” list, including $600 million in May in a funding round that gave it a valuation of $7.5 billion.

Investors on both sides will soon be itching for a return—and for Uber, recent events may have pushed that finish line farther away. “The amount of dislocation at Uber is almost unprecedented,” says Mark Mahaney, an analyst with RBC Capital Markets. “I would assume that Uber has materially pushed back whatever IPO date they had.” Others believe that Uber’s dysfunction may deprive it of the future investors and corporate partners it needs to keep growing. “All it takes is one more issue before momentum is completely shifted,” says one automotive executive, who did not want himself or his company to be identified. “We’ve had internal discussions, and we don’t think Uber is a major player after 2020.”

And yet investor financing isn’t even the biggest prize at stake. The shift from car ownership to car sharing already represents one of the biggest business-model disruptions in the auto industry’s history. But whoever has the lead in ride sharing will also play a central role in an even more consequential transformation: the pivot toward autonomous vehicles. Technological advances, economic imperatives, and safety and environmental concerns are converging to push driverless cars into the mainstream—and ride-sharing services may be the way much of the public gets introduced to them. The winner of the Uber-Lyft contest could help redefine the blueprints of our cities, our transportation policies, and even our modes of interacting with each other—and become a truly huge, ubiquitous consumer brand.

Both Lyft and Uber have invested in autonomous vehicles development. But until recently, Uber had a significant head start in building its own technology, partnering with others and launching self-driving pilots. More recently, though, Lyft has started to catch up. The company inked its first driverless-car partnership, with General Motors, in early 2016, and more recently added another deal, with MIT spinoff NuTonomy (pilots with both companies are expected to start launching this year and the next). In May, it came out that Lyft had another partner —none other than Waymo, the litigious thorn in Uber’s side. “It was an easy and straightforward partnership to make,” says John Krafcik, CEO of Waymo.

And later this week, Lyft will announce its biggest leap yet toward an autonomous future—the development of a suite of technologies, both hardware and software, that will allow any manufacturer to turn its vehicles into driverless machines and to easily integrate with Lyft’s network of passengers. With the new tech, Lyft is offering a new pitch to potential partners: We’re in it to win it, and we’ll give you tools that’ll make it easier for you to win too.

Uber is quick to note that self-driving is core to its mission (it has been developing many of the above technologies for a couple of years now) as well, and that it is still growing at a more-than-healthy clip despite the recent controversies. “Our business is stronger than ever, and we’re keeping our heads down to build the best and most innovative products out there,” a spokesperson said in an email to Fortune. (Uber declined to allow an on-the-record interview with an executive.)

Leapfrogging Uber won’t be easy. But driverless tech could elevate Lyft to parity, or better—not to mention make it profitable. (Lyft reportedly brought in revenue of about $700 million and lost about $600 million in 2016; Uber says it lost $2.8 billion on revenue of about $6.5 billion.) Is there room for two giants to coexist in a driverless future? Perhaps. But in this high-pressure race, the winner gets far more than bragging rights.

Zimmer and Logan Green, Lyft’s CEO, and its president, John Zimmer, have worked together for more than a decade. The soft-spoken Green oversees Lyft’s product and engineering ranks; the more spirited Zimmer is the public face of the company (he also drives divisions like marketing and government relations). Says one Lyft colleague, VP of customer experience Mary Winfield: “I like to think of them as the head and the heart.”

On a midsummer afternoon, I get to see the whole corpus in action. Green and Zimmer sit across from me in a conference room at Lyft’s headquarters, steps away from San Francisco’s waterfront ballpark. The two give the impression of being almost inseparable. They live just two blocks from each other in nearby Berkeley, and carpool in most days. (On a recent flight back from a business trip to China, they watched the musical comedy Pitch Perfect together.) Both are 33 years old, and married with young children. And while they were born on different coasts, their lives have been on parallel tracks for a long time.

格林在洛杉磯長大，覆蓋這座城市的高速公路網(wǎng)總是擁堵不堪。他說：“很多時候我都是坐在行駛的車里，看到每輛車里都只有一個人。”他用了很多時間來思考怎樣改變這種局面，而后在附近的圣芭芭拉大學(xué)校園里建立了一家像Zipcar那樣的租車公司，按小時收費。上學(xué)時，格林和一位朋友去了趟津巴布韋，在那兒他再次得到了啟發(fā)。給予他靈感的是叫做Kombis的微型客車。無數(shù)輛Kombis組成了這個國家非正式“叫車”網(wǎng)絡(luò)的主力軍。回到美國后，他開始籌劃一家拼車-配對服務(wù)公司，目標(biāo)人群是開車回家的學(xué)生。

齊默是紐約人，在康奈爾酒店管理學(xué)院上學(xué)。學(xué)習(xí)做綠色城市的課程讓他開始考慮交通基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施問題，酒店管理作業(yè)則為他的思考提供了方向——圍繞酒店類效率標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，也就是入住率和服務(wù)質(zhì)量來制定交通策略會怎么樣呢？齊默發(fā)現(xiàn)，美國汽車的平均使用時間只有4%，而且通常只坐一個人。他說：“這樣的入住率很可怕，成本還高。我想建立一個更好的‘交通酒店’。”

大學(xué)畢業(yè)后，齊默成了雷曼兄弟的分析師。在那里，他開始為上述想法制定營銷計劃。一天，齊默在Facebook的共同好友頁面看到了一個名叫洛根·格林的人發(fā)的帖子。齊默說：“里面寫道，‘來看看我建立的這個網(wǎng)站Zimride.com’。我心想，他是從哪兒想出這個名字的？”

后來證實，“Zim”是津巴布韋的英文縮寫，而Zimride就是格林的拼車服務(wù)公司。兩個人見了面，而且因為志趣相投而變得親密起來。2008年秋，也就是雷曼兄弟倒閉約一個月前，格林和齊默一起搬到了硅谷，把時間都花在了Zimride上。為了推廣這個名字，兩人有時會打扮成青蛙或河貍，在大學(xué)里轉(zhuǎn)來轉(zhuǎn)去。這樣的游走營銷起了作用——他們簽下了150多名客戶。然而，以大學(xué)為主，而且大多是長途行程限制了這家初創(chuàng)公司的發(fā)展前景。在公司的一次“編程馬拉松”上，格林和齊默有了一個增長潛力更大的衍生想法，那就是Lyft，一個城市短途版的拼車服務(wù)公司。Lyft可以瞄準(zhǔn)所有出行種類，包括大多數(shù)人最常做的短途出行。

Green grew up in Los Angeles, snared in its web of continually gridlocked freeways. “I spent a lot of time sitting in traffic, seeing one person in every car,” he says. He spent a lot of time pondering how to change that—and went on to launch a Zipcar-like, rent-by-the-hour car-rental service on his college campus in nearby Santa Barbara. During school, Green and a friend took a trip to Zimbabwe, where he encountered his next inspiration: Kombis, the myriad minibuses that make up much of that country’s informal “ride-hailing” network. He came back home and began plans for a carpool-matching service, aimed at students driving back home.

Zimmer, a New York native, studied at Cornell’s School of Hotel Administration. A class called Green Cities got him pondering transportation infrastructure, and his hotel-management coursework informed his thinking: What if you built a transportation strategy around hospitality-like efficiencies, a.k.a. occupancy rates, and great service? The average American car is used only 4% of the time, Zimmer notes, typically with only one seat occupied. “It’s a horrible occupancy rate at a high cost,” he says. “I wanted to create a better ‘transportation hotel.’?”

After college, Zimmer became an analyst at Lehman Brothers, where he started working on a marketing plan for that idea. One day, while perusing Facebook, he ran across a post by a guy named Logan Green on a mutual friend’s page. “It said, ‘Check out this website I’m starting, Zimride.com,’?” says Zimmer. “I was like, ‘Where did he come up with this name?’?”

“Zim” was short for Zimbabwe, it turned out, and Zimride was Green’s carpool service. The two met and bonded over their mutual passion, and in the fall of 2008, about a month before Lehman’s collapse, both moved to Silicon Valley to devote their time to Zimride. To spread the word, the duo would sometimes dress as frogs or beavers and parade around universities. The guerrilla marketing worked—upwards of 150 clients signed up—but focusing on colleges and mostly long-distance trips limited the startup’s prospects. At a company “hackathon,” Green and Zimmer came up with a spinoff idea with greater growth potential: Lyft, an urban, short-rides variation on the carpool. Lyft could target all kinds of rides, including the shorter trips most people make more frequently.

2012年，兩人把Zimride轉(zhuǎn)讓給了Enterprise Holdings，但未披露交易金額。一起工作了五年后，他們把全部注意力轉(zhuǎn)到了Lyft身上。

當(dāng)時優(yōu)步已經(jīng)經(jīng)營了四年，只是和如今大多數(shù)人所知的優(yōu)步還有些差別。優(yōu)步最初的愿景是把乘客和“黑色高級轎車”聯(lián)系在一起。如果說Lyft的哲學(xué)受到了Zimride公用理想主義的影響，優(yōu)步的哲學(xué)則更像技術(shù)人士自由論，即

用技術(shù)來優(yōu)化交通是一種更好的做法，這不是因為它可以減少上路汽車的數(shù)量，而是因為向大眾提供的現(xiàn)行方案根本就很糟糕。

的確，優(yōu)步用戶乘坐的是專業(yè)司機駕駛的較高檔汽車，Lyft則從一開始就利用駕車人的現(xiàn)有車輛，無論是高檔車還是破車。Lyft鼓勵乘客坐在前排，跟司機頂拳，并向車主幾個用于貼在保險杠上的毛茸茸的“粉色胡子”（去年Lyft放棄了這個傻傻的裝飾物，轉(zhuǎn)而采用可以附著在儀表盤上的LED彩燈）。

超越優(yōu)步并非易事，但無人駕駛技術(shù)有可能給Lyft帶來平等的競爭環(huán)境，更不用說讓它盈利了。

實際情況表明，多數(shù)消費者想要的模式是車輛共享。Lyft成立于2012年；不久之后，優(yōu)步也推出了自己的拼車功能，從而使所有有車一族都成了司機。這種模式很快成為優(yōu)步的主導(dǎo)服務(wù)，一個強有力的對手出現(xiàn)了。

這是一場很大程度上一邊倒的競爭。網(wǎng)絡(luò)完善、資金充足的優(yōu)步在多個城市、國家和地區(qū)大力進行推廣，并且選擇了“快速部署，隨后道歉”的策略。成為拼車行話中默認動詞的是優(yōu)步，而不是Lyft。（“我剛優(yōu)步過來。”）如今優(yōu)步的業(yè)務(wù)已經(jīng)遍及全球600多座城市，Lyft則只進入了350座城市，而且都是美國城市。創(chuàng)立至今，Lyft一共做了4億單；而在差不多相同的時間里，優(yōu)步做了50億單。

當(dāng)然，亞軍想超越冠軍一直是眾所周知的心態(tài)。遠在2017年優(yōu)步丑聞纏身之前，公眾情緒就已經(jīng)向Lyft傾斜。在開拓新市場方面，優(yōu)步采用了“焦土政策”，也就是把當(dāng)?shù)卣暈檎系K，而不是合作伙伴或征得同意的對象。這種做法讓優(yōu)步的律師一直有事可做而且有錢可賺，也給憤怒的維權(quán)人士和社論作者帶來了幾乎差不多的工作量。雖然優(yōu)步把自己的版圖延伸到了77個國家和地區(qū)，而且擴大了收入渠道，但它也給自己帶來了惹人注意的爭論和挫折。最終，這家公司實際上放棄了在俄羅斯和中國市場的開拓，采取了將自身業(yè)務(wù)和更大、更成功的對手進行合并等措施。

By 2012, the duo had sold Zimride to Enterprise Holdings for an undisclosed amount. After five years of working together, they turned their full attention to Lyft.

By then, Uber had been in business for four years—though it wasn’t the Uber most know today. The company’s original mission was to connect passengers with “premium black cars.” If Lyft’s philosophy was colored by Zimride’s communal idealism, Uber’s was more tech-bro libertarian: Using technology to optimize transportation is better not because it will get cars off the street, but because the status quo offered to the masses inherently sucks.

Indeed, while Uber users rode in relatively luxurious vehicles behind professional drivers, Lyft utilized drivers’ existing cars from the get-go—whether high-end or hoopty. Lyft encouraged riders to sit up front and exchange fist bumps with their driver, and gave car owners pink, fuzzy mustaches to attach to their bumpers. (Last year, the company ditched the goofy decor elements in favor of multicolored-LED gadgets that attach to dashboards.)

Leapfrogging Uber won't be easy, but driverless tech could even the playing field for Lyft—not to mention make it profitable.

It turned out car sharing was the model more consumers wanted. Lyft launched in 2012; Uber announced its own car-sharing function—letting anyone with a car become a driver—shortly after. That version quickly became Uber’s dominant service, and a fierce rivalry was born.

It’s a rivalry that has been largely lopsided. Well-connected and well-capitalized, Uber aggressively launched in multiple cities and countries, opting for a “move fast, apologize later” strategy. Uber, not Lyft, became the default verb in ride-sharing lingo. (“I’ll just Uber over.”) While Uber’s reach now encompasses more than 600 cities worldwide, Lyft is available in just 350 and only in the U.S. Since its launch, Lyft has completed 400 million total rides; in roughly the same time period Uber has given 5 billion rides.

To be sure, No. 2s have been known to pull ahead of No. 1s. And public sentiment has been tilting Lyft’s way since long before Uber’s scandal-filled 2017. In adding new markets, Uber employed a scorched-earth strategy: Local governments were an impediment, not an entity to partner with or seek approval from. That approach has kept Uber’s lawyers gainfully employed—and generated almost as much work for angry activists and editorial writers. And while Uber expanded its empire to 77 countries, broadening its revenue opportunities, it also exposed itself to high-profile spats and setbacks. The company has wound up essentially giving up on penetrating the markets in both Russia and China, for example, merging its operations with bigger and more successful rivals.

?

當(dāng)然，Lyft可以有遠大目標(biāo)并且依靠自身力量。對于這家規(guī)模小于優(yōu)步的初創(chuàng)公司，一直有人批評它先是讓優(yōu)步在新市場突破監(jiān)管障礙，然后輕而易舉地走進去（并且?guī)е摹按篮雍陀焉频墓P(guān)部門”，網(wǎng)絡(luò)刊物Vox最近如是說），并且利用優(yōu)步打開的缺口（Lyft負責(zé)政府關(guān)系的副總裁喬·歐克帕庫說：“我完全不同意這樣的說法。有些市場是[優(yōu)步]先進入了，有些則是我們。”）

自動駕駛汽車的規(guī)模不斷壯大，而市政負責(zé)人們顯然希望與之建立更好的關(guān)系。洛杉磯市市長埃里克·賈賽提表示：“我們不知道這項技術(shù)究竟會帶來什么樣的未來。我們必須放開思路，但要把重點放在制定有切實目標(biāo)的政策上，以便改善安全性、公共交通、數(shù)據(jù)共享和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。”

在拼車兩巨頭中當(dāng)“好人”可能有助于Lyft的長期發(fā)展的又一原因。無論Lyft是否利用過優(yōu)步建立的關(guān)系，它絕對選擇了少“打仗”——包括和自己的70萬名司機。和優(yōu)步一樣，Lyft也曾遭到司機集體起訴，后者希望被定義為員工，而不是獨立承包商。但最近的調(diào)查顯示，跟Lyft合作的司機比優(yōu)步司機快樂。這并不意外。就在卡蘭尼克呵斥司機的視頻四處傳播時，Lyft的頂拳文化則一直在勸說消費者將駕車人視為同行者，而不是自己雇來的司機，更不用說是撒氣筒了。值得注意的是，Lyft司機平均掙的錢也更多，而且這家公司在建立之初就推出了app內(nèi)打賞功能。優(yōu)步則直到今年夏天才推出了給小費功能。

夏一個炎熱的下午，Lyft在鳳凰城的新“司機中心”充分體現(xiàn)了這種公司-司機關(guān)系的特質(zhì)。很難把距機場10分鐘車程的工業(yè)辦公園區(qū)弄得像怪異的硅谷員工酒吧，但你得讓Lyft試一試。作為Lyft司機會面和尋求幫助的場所，這個新設(shè)立的中心掛的海報上都是體育標(biāo)語——“主宰自己”、“把握道路”。一托盤、一托盤的曲奇餅和一罐罐紫紅色糖果就在眼前。就連椅子也是粉紅色的，它們排的整整齊齊，靜待題為“和Lyft一起上路”的會議開場。

馬上就到5點時，司機們開始入場。有老有少，有些人頭發(fā)灰白，有些人把頭發(fā)染成藍綠色，還有些是光頭。一位最近才搬到鳳凰城的女士說，她根本不知道Tempe在哪，又怎么能把人送到那里呢？

鳳凰城有大約3萬名Lyft司機。今晚，約50名司機前來學(xué)習(xí)怎樣使用Lyft的app。Lyft員工斯蒂芬妮·雷諾茲曾是Lyft司機，戴著粉紅色眼睛，拿著類似色調(diào)的筆記本電腦。她回答著這些司機最關(guān)心的問題——要是有人吐在你車里了怎么辦？（拍照，然后發(fā)送給Lyft。）要是乘客帶著不在服務(wù)范圍內(nèi)的動物怎么辦？（雷諾茲說：“我不會拒絕任何寵物，除非它長得像《狂犬驚魂》里的那條狗。”）

有位司機問了一個比較哲學(xué)的問題：“一名潛在司機為什么會選擇Lyft，而不是優(yōu)步？”雷諾茲迅速回答說：“我不會談?wù)搩?yōu)步。我愛這家公司是因為它主張的那些東西。”

Of course, Lyft can be ambitious and calculating in its own right. The smaller startup has been criticized for letting Uber fight regulatory hurdles in new markets, then waltzing in (with its “dumb mustaches and friendly PR operation,” as online publication Vox recently put it) to take advantage of the openings. (“I wholeheartedly disagree with that narrative,” says Joe Okpaku, VP of government relations at Lyft. “Some markets [Uber] entered first, some we entered first.”)

There's clearly desire among civic leaders to have better relationships with the growing autonomous-vehicle community. "We don’t know exactly what the future of this technology will bring," says Eric Garcetti, the mayor of Los Angeles. "We have to keep our minds open, but stay focused on creating policies with tangible goals to improve safety, public transportation, data sharing, and infrastructure."

That's one more reason it may help Lyft in the long run to be the "nice guy" in the ride-share duopoly. Whether or not Lyft has ridden Uber’s coattails, it has definitely picked fewer battles—including with its 700,000 drivers. Like Uber, Lyft has been the subject of class-action lawsuits brought by drivers who sought to be classified as employees, not independent contractors. But recent surveys show that Lyft’s drivers are happier with their experience than Uber’s. It’s not surprising. While Uber’s Kalanick was caught on camera berating a driver in a video that went viral, Lyft’s fist-bump ethos has long nudged customers to see drivers as peers rather than chauffeurs—let alone punching bags. Notably, Lyft drivers also make more money, on average, and the company has enabled “in-app” tipping since its launch. Uber, meanwhile, only got around to offering a gratuity-giving feature this summer.

The idiosyncrasies of the company-driver relationship are on full display on a hot summer afternoon at Lyft’s new “driver hub” in Phoenix. It’s hard to make an industrial office park 10 minutes from the airport look like a quirky Silicon Valley employee’s lounge, but you have to hand it to Lyft for trying. The newly opened space, a meeting place for drivers looking for help, is decorated with posters sporting mantras like “Be Your Own Boss” and “The Road Is Your Oyster.” Platters of cookies and jars of magenta-colored candies are on hand. Even the chairs are pink, set out in neat rows for a “Driving With Lyft” session.

Just before 5 p.m., drivers start wandering in. Some are old, some are young. Some have gray hair, some have turquoise, some have none. One recently moved to Phoenix and says she doesn’t know where the hell Tempe is so how is she supposed to drive people there.

Lyft has more than 30,000 drivers in Phoenix, and tonight, about 50 have gathered to learn how to use Lyft’s driver app. Stephanie Reynolds, a Lyft employee and former driver with pink glasses and a similarly hued laptop, answers their most burning questions: What do you do if someone barfs in your car? (Take a picture and send it to Lyft.) What if a passenger has a non–service animal? (“I don’t turn down any pets unless they look like Cujo,” says Reynolds.)

Another driver asks a more philosophical question: “Why would a potential driver choose Lyft over Uber?” Reynolds quickly responds: “I’m not going to talk about Uber. I love this company because of what it stands for.”

如果說Lyft主張和司機建立良好的關(guān)系，那么這個標(biāo)簽也許很快就會面臨挑戰(zhàn)。大多數(shù)Lyft和優(yōu)步司機都是兼職。消費貸款初創(chuàng)公司Earnest提供的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，Lyft和優(yōu)步司機的月均收入分別只有377美元和364美元。但大家知道誰的成本更低嗎？機器人。

優(yōu)步和Lyft司機每單可以拿75%-80%的分成。自動駕駛車輛則不需要分成，更不用說它們差不多所有的時間都在工作。無數(shù)種因素正在推著優(yōu)步和Lyft朝著這個方向邁進，大家知道：公司應(yīng)該賺錢的觀點只是其中之一。

受其特點影響，優(yōu)步向這個目標(biāo)邁進的速度更快，而且更大膽。2015年，優(yōu)步和卡耐基梅隆大學(xué)的機器人科學(xué)系簽訂研究協(xié)議，然后挖走了該系40名頂尖研究員，并以他們?yōu)榛A(chǔ)在匹茲堡建立了先進技術(shù)中心——此舉引起了很大爭議。優(yōu)步并不是單純跟研究方合作，它還想自主開發(fā)自動化系統(tǒng)的各個組成部分，從攝像頭到傳感器，再到軟件和導(dǎo)航。

2016年優(yōu)步又干了件大事，收購了自動駕駛卡車初創(chuàng)公司Otto。這次收購最終給優(yōu)步的計劃帶來了一個超級大麻煩。Otto的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人安東尼·萊萬多夫斯基曾是Waymo的工程師，也一直處于這場著名官司的中心。Waymo指控他竊取了知識產(chǎn)權(quán)并把這些知識產(chǎn)權(quán)帶到了優(yōu)步。這是特別有煽動性的指控，因為優(yōu)步已經(jīng)開始讓萊萬多夫斯基負責(zé)無人駕駛汽車的研究工作。在預(yù)審中，萊萬多夫斯基自始至終都保持沉默，他通過律師說，《美國憲法第五修正案》賦予了他“不能被強迫自證其罪”的權(quán)力。今年5月，優(yōu)步解雇了萊萬多夫斯基，并稱這樣做的原因是后者沒有跟調(diào)查人員合作。大家可以想到，據(jù)說這場鬧劇讓優(yōu)步的自動駕駛汽車團隊運轉(zhuǎn)失靈，人心渙散（優(yōu)步一位發(fā)言人告訴《財富》雜志，雖然一直有人離職，但并未發(fā)生人員大量流失的情況，而且這場官司也沒有影響到優(yōu)步與合作汽車廠商，也就是沃爾沃和戴姆勒的試點項目）。

與之相反，Lyft涉足自動化領(lǐng)域較晚。它和通用汽車簽訂自己的第一份無人駕駛汽車合作協(xié)議的時間比優(yōu)步在匹茲堡的先進技術(shù)中心破土動工幾乎晚了一年。但風(fēng)投人士、Lyft投資人兼董事本·霍洛維茨認為起步晚實際上對Lyft有利。他告訴《財富》雜志，這讓Lyft“可以利用這項技術(shù)的快速進步”，特別是在機器學(xué)習(xí)以及幫助無人駕駛汽車進行自我掌控的LiDAR傳感器方面。

To the extent that Lyft stands for good driver relationships, that identity may soon be challenged. Most Lyft and Uber drivers are part-timers, bringing in an average of just $377 and $364 a month, respectively, according to consumer-lending startup Earnest. But you know who’s cheaper? Robots.

Uber and Lyft each pay drivers between 75% and 80% of the total fee for each ride. Autonomous vehicles require no such cut, not to mention that they can be utilized nearly 100% of the time. This is the direction in which Uber and Lyft are being pushed by forces too numerous to count—not least the idea that businesses should, you know, earn profits.

Characteristically, Uber raced toward this reality faster and more aggressively. In 2015, the company struck a research pact with Carnegie Mellon’s robotics department, then made the controversial move of poaching 40 of its top researchers, setting up an Advanced Technologies Center with the looted talent in Pittsburgh. Rather than simply partner with researchers, Uber wanted to develop the building blocks of autonomous systems, from cameras and sensors to software and mapping, by itself.

In 2016 Uber made another big move, buying a self-driving truck startup called Otto. That acquisition wound up throwing a big-rig-sized wrench in Uber’s plans. Otto’s cofounder, Anthony Levandowski, is a former Waymo engineer, and has been at the center of the high-profile lawsuit. Waymo alleges that he stole IP and took it to Uber—a particularly incendiary allegation, because Uber had put Levandowski in charge of its driverless-car research efforts. Throughout pretrial proceedings, Levandowski has stayed mum-—invoking, through his attorney, his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. In May, Uber fired him, saying it had done so for failing to cooperate with investigators. The brouhaha, as you’d expect, has reportedly created dysfunction and distraction in Uber’s autonomous-vehicle ranks. (An Uber spokesperson tells Fortune that while there have been departures, there hasn’t been an exodus, and the lawsuit hasn’t impacted pilot programs with its automaker partners, Volvo and Daimler.)

Lyft, in contrast, was late to the autonomous party—it inked its first driverless-car partnership, with GM, almost a year after Uber broke ground in Pittsburgh. But Ben Horowitz, the venture capitalist who’s a Lyft investor and board member, argues being late actually works in Lyft’s favor: He tells Fortune it has positioned the company to be “able to capitalize on rapid advances in the technology,” specifically in the machine learning and lidar sensors that help driverless cars pilot themselves.

Lyft看到了機會以及迅速行動的必要性。在這方面，本周Lyft將發(fā)布在它看來可能成為殺手锏的app，或者說開發(fā)出一整套技術(shù)，從而使所有汽車廠商都能為Lyft的拼車網(wǎng)絡(luò)推出自動駕駛車隊。雖然到目前為止Lyft對這項合作的貢獻基本上限于把其他公司的技術(shù)和它的司機網(wǎng)絡(luò)連接起來，但這項工作的目標(biāo)很高——為未來的汽車開發(fā)并提供“五臟六腑”和“大腦”（還有臉面，或者說界面）。大家可以把它想象為裝在盒子里的自動駕駛汽車，所有東西都在里面，只差真正把車組裝起來。

Lyft產(chǎn)品總監(jiān)塔加特·馬西森說：“以前Lyft從未制造過汽車，以后也不會。”但它正在探索自動化開發(fā)的所有其他領(lǐng)域。Lyft希望自己的推介能吸引合作伙伴——它將為司機和乘客提供導(dǎo)航軟件和實體界面，以及自動駕駛的其他關(guān)鍵零部件，這樣汽車廠商就不必自己去開發(fā)這些部分了。

Lyft并未說明究竟會在什么時候提供這套技術(shù)，或者其中的組成部分到底是何面貌。但他們確實提到了一個吸引人的要素，那就是該公司粉紅胡子的技術(shù)等價物，或者說一個讓“機器人開車”的體驗變得更友好的用戶界面，它可以向乘客展示車輛傳感器“看到”和“想到”的東西。除了在屏幕上展示車輛攝像頭拍攝的實時畫面，這個系統(tǒng)還將具備語音功能，作用是解釋車輛正在做什么以及為何要這樣做。（想象一下，一個讓人放心的聲音用聊天的語氣對你說：“嘿，我看到了一輛自行車。”）顯而易見，Lyft希望自己可以把車變得人性化，并讓乘客了解車輛的“心思”。

Lyft的管理層相信，對用戶體驗的關(guān)注可能有助于他們趕超優(yōu)步。齊默指出，總的來說優(yōu)步和Lyft一樣可靠，對消費者的收費也別無二致，“那么接下來就完全要看品牌和體驗了”。用齊默最喜歡的表達方式來說就是，假設(shè)自己在紐約的人行道上，和你距離相同而且價格一樣的酒店有兩家。你會選哪一家呢？也許是跟你頂拳的那一家？

如果Lyft押對了方向，那么使用無人駕駛拼車服務(wù)的消費者更重視的就是看到讓人信任的品牌，而不是誰制造了傳感器和軟件。同時，這種信任進而有可能幫助Lyft吸引更多汽車制造合作伙伴。

但司機或許不那么熱心。自動駕駛方面的進展將大大提高Lyft當(dāng)“好人”的難度。高盛的報告認為，成熟后，無人駕駛技術(shù)每年會“消滅”30多萬個就業(yè)機會。許多司機擔(dān)心，技術(shù)會在拼車市場撕開一道口子，就連不需要福利的兼職車輛也能借此為很多人造福。

Lyft的兩位創(chuàng)始人認為，在可預(yù)見的時間內(nèi)，司機數(shù)量將繼續(xù)增多。他們指出，向自動化的轉(zhuǎn)移不會一蹴而就。同時，到2030年拼車行業(yè)預(yù)計將增長八倍，對司機的需求也將水漲船高。

這種需求會減少嗎？會在什么時候減少呢？Lyft的兩位創(chuàng)始人討論這種可能性時，他們的烏托邦理想就顯露了出來。心里住著一位酒店老板的齊默說，自動駕駛汽車將成為“有輪子的房屋，實際上你需要的是招待，它是輪子上的電影院嗎？還是輪子上的辦公室，或者星巴克？乘客可能需要為這樣的服務(wù)額外付費，而且我們希望可以創(chuàng)造出很多就業(yè)機會”。

在最早實施的一批試點項目中，自動駕駛汽車已經(jīng)在加州、亞利桑那和賓夕法尼亞上路，但只能在測試區(qū)域行駛。監(jiān)管部門目前還要求這些車輛配備人類駕駛員，以便在出現(xiàn)意外時控制車輛。但大多數(shù)業(yè)內(nèi)人士都認為，純粹的自動駕駛汽車得到廣泛應(yīng)用的時間將遠早于公眾的預(yù)期。

對Lyft和優(yōu)步來說，這場革新是一個重大轉(zhuǎn)折點。優(yōu)步前CEO卡蘭尼克有句名言，那就是向自動化轉(zhuǎn)移對優(yōu)步能否生存下去至關(guān)重要。當(dāng)然，那是在去年，他還沒有遇到另一個更加生死攸關(guān)的考驗，也就是挽救優(yōu)步的聲譽。

Lyft面臨的是另一種挑戰(zhàn)。這家長期處于下風(fēng)的公司制定出了一種戰(zhàn)術(shù)，這也是多年來其他位居次席者一直使用的戰(zhàn)術(shù)，那就是當(dāng)好人，做好事。但如果Lyft借助目前的勢頭持續(xù)實現(xiàn)超過預(yù)期的增長，或者說，嗯，像優(yōu)步那樣的增長，它維持好人光環(huán)的難度也許就會變大。

但Lyft的理想主義二人組并未對此感到煩惱。齊默說：“我覺得想贏的心態(tài)跟我們的愿景一點兒也不抵觸。”在汽車自動行駛的世界，烏龜跑贏兔子似乎并不那么牽強。

本文將刊登在2017年8月1日出版的《財富》雜志上，題目是《#擊敗優(yōu)步》。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：Charlie

審稿：夏林

Lyft sees its opportunity, and the need to move fast. To that end, the company this week will announce what it thinks could be its killer app: the development of a “full stack” of technology that will enable any auto manufacturer to roll out self-driving fleets on Lyft’s ride-sharing network. While Lyft’s contribution to its partnerships, until now, has mostly involved connecting other companies’ tech to its network of drivers, this ambitious undertaking aims to develop and supply the guts and brains (and face, or interface) of future vehicles. Think of it as a self-driving car in a box that contains everything but the actual car.

“Lyft has never built a car, and we never will,” says Taggart Matthiesen, Lyft’s director of product. But it is exploring all other areas of autonomous development. And it hopes its pitch to partners will be an enticing one: It will offer mapping software, physical interfaces for drivers and passengers, and other key components of autonomous driving, so manufacturers don’t have to create all those building blocks themselves.

Lyft isn’t yet disclosing exactly when the stack will be available, or exactly what its components will look like. But one compelling ingredient they do discuss is the technological equivalent of its pink mustache—a user interface aimed at making the experience of being “robo-driven” friendlier, by showing passengers what the car’s sensors are “seeing” and “thinking.” In addition to a screen that will show real-time footage from the car’s cameras, the system will include a voice function that explains what the vehicle is doing and why. (Imagine a soothing, conversational voice telling you, “Hey, I see a bike.”) Obvious as that may sound, Lyft’s hope is that it can humanize the car and let passengers peer inside its mind.

Lyft execs believe this focus on user experience could help it push ahead of Uber. All things considered, Uber and Lyft are equally reliable and charge customers identical prices, Zimmer notes, “So now it’s all about the brand and experience.” Put in terms Zimmer loves best: Imagine you’re on a sidewalk in New York and two hotels are the same distance from you and the same price. Which do you choose? Maybe the one that gives you fist bumps?

If Lyft’s bet is right, customers dabbling in driverless ride-hailing will care more about seeing a trusted brand than about who makes the sensors or software—and that trust, in turn, could help Lyft attract more automaking partners.

Its drivers, though, might be less enthused. Progress on the autonomous side will make it a lot harder for Lyft to play the nice guy. According to a report from Goldman Sachs, once it matures, driverless technology will eliminate upwards of 300,000 jobs a year. And many drivers fear that the tech will cut a swath through ride sharing, where even a part-time gig without benefits is beneficial to many.

Lyft’s founders contend that driver growth will continue for the foreseeable future. The shift to autonomous won’t happen overnight, they note. And with the ride-sharing industry expected to grow eightfold by 2030, the need for drivers will keep ballooning with it.

If and when it tapers off? As the founders discuss the possibility, their utopianism surfaces. Self-driving cars will be “rooms on wheels,” says Zimmer, the hotelier-at-heart. “You’ll actually need folks as hosts. Is it a movie theater on wheels? Or an office on wheels, or a Starbucks on wheels? Passengers could pay a premium for these types of services, and our hope is that we can create many more jobs.”

Already cars are driving themselves in California, Arizona and Pennsylvania, in some of the earliest pilot launches. Autonomous vehicles are restricted to specific test areas. Regulators also currently require that they have actual human drivers in them—to take the wheel if things go wrong. But most insiders agree that fully self-driving vehicles will be in wide use much sooner than the public expects.

For Lyft and Uber, this evolution represents a massive turning point. Kalanick, Uber’s former CEO, famously called the move to autonomous crucial to his company’s ability to survive. Of course, that was last year, before he was faced with an even bigger existential quandary: rescuing his company’s reputation.

Lyft’s challenge is different. Long the underdog, it has thrived on a tactic that other No. 2s have used over the years: being the nice guys and the do-gooders. But if the company rides its current momentum to sustained, faster-than-before growth—growth that’s, well, Uber-like—its halo may be harder to maintain.

That doesn’t faze Lyft’s idealistic duo. Says Zimmer: “I don’t think that wanting to win is at all in contradiction with our mission.” And in a world where cars drive themselves, a tortoise beating a hare doesn’t seem all that farfetched.?

Correction: An earlier version of this article inaccurately described Uber's handling of its "surge pricing" in New York City during protests in January over President Trump's travel ban.

A version of this article appears in the Aug. 1, 2017 issue of Fortune with the headline "#DefeatUber."