今年3月我曾指出，就利用中國叫車市場而言，Uber的位置很不利。該公司每年在中國虧損10億美元，還要和本地企業滴滴出行（原為滴滴快的）爭奪市場份額，后者處于盈利狀態而且人脈廣泛。因此，上周一聽說Uber在兩年虧損逾20億美元之后同意將中國業務轉讓給滴滴時，我并不感到意外。

轉讓中國業務后，Uber將獲得滴滴20%的股份以及10億美元的權益投資。雖然財務和運營方面的其他細節尚未完全公布，但Uber中國被滴滴納入旗下清楚地表明Uber已經放棄了征服中國叫車市場的宏偉目標。

Uber首席執行官特拉維斯?卡蘭尼克此前曾表示，他并不擔心Uber在中國的虧損以及緩慢起步。但Uber的股東持相反意見。Uber在中國遇到的困難似乎沒完沒了，這讓股東們越發不安，因而對卡蘭尼克施壓，要求他減少損失并將注意力轉向別處。

Uber的慘敗印證了通用電氣CEO杰弗里·伊梅爾特2012年說過的話：“中國市場很大，但很艱難。”確實，中國在文化、政治和經濟上都和美國不同，是一個極為復雜的市場。亞馬遜、谷歌、eBay、雅虎和Facebook等大型美國科技公司都在開拓中國市場時遇到了困難。盡管卡拉尼克在公開場合說過相反的話，但Uber的經歷表明它也不例外。

在《全球視野：企業如何避免全球化陷阱》這本書中，我以美國公司為例，描述了西方企業在中國遇到的普遍問題。和西方國家相比，中國的基礎設施、金融市場和銀行系統都不夠發達。因此，西方企業很難像在自己的國家那樣經營其中國業務。西方經理人發現，中國的政治結構、法律體系以及監管規則既復雜又令人困惑。同時，中國人把私人關系和做生意混為一體，美國公司對此很陌生，因為它們習慣于把和客戶以及員工的關系更多地作為商業往來處理。最后，中國消費者的口味和西方消費者截然不同，這讓外國公司感到很難調整自己的產品和服務來滿足中國消費者的特定需要。

可惜的是，Uber未能逾越這些障礙，慘痛教訓讓它明白，在中國擴張業務所蘊含的風險甚至能讓精心布置的商業計劃遭遇滑鐵盧。要在中國這樣的市場取得成功，企業制定的方案就得在風險和預期回報之間求得平衡。對許多西方企業來說，中國的風險遠高于其價值，而且有許多西方公司干脆選擇敬而遠之。對那些迫切希望進入中國市場的企業來說，關鍵在于謹慎行事。

Uber明白緩慢推進以及對關系進行投資的重要性。卡蘭尼克經常到中國來，目的就是培養政治人脈并建立龐大的司機網絡。但對涉足中國市場的西方公司來說，找到合適的本地業務伙伴也很關鍵。中國公司一般都能更好地把握文化、經濟和政治環境，而且可以幫助外國企業應付它們面臨的所有風險。

Uber的失誤就在這里，它想獨自面對這個有風險而又復雜的市場。從一開始就和滴滴這樣的公司合作或許能在一定程度上降低Uber的成本，甚至有可能避免被迫成為中國公司小合伙人的尷尬場面。（財富中文網）

作者是紐約大學斯特恩商學院國際管理學副教授。

譯者：Charlie

校對：詹妮

Back in March, I suggested that Uber was poorly positioned to capitalize on China’s ride-hailing market. Uber was losing $1 billion a year in China and battling a profitable and well-connected local competitor in Didi Chuxing (formerly Didi Kuaidi) for market share. Therefore, I was unsurprised to learn last Monday that after two years and more than $2 billion in cash losses, Uber agreed to sell its Chinese business to Didi.

In exchange for its China operations, Uber will receive a 20% minority stake in Didi and a $1 billion equity investment from the Chinese firm. Although additional financial and operational details are still emerging, the sale of Uber China to Didi is a clear indication that Uber has given up on its ambition to conquer the Chinese ride-sharing market.

Uber CEO Travis Kalanick had previously suggested that he was not worried about the company’s losses and slow start in China, yet Uber’s shareholders felt otherwise. Increasingly troubled by Uber’s seemingly interminable difficulties in China, they pressured Kalanick to cut his losses and move on.

Uber’s extraordinary failure reinforces General Electric -0.03% CEO Jeffrey Immelt’s statement from 2012: “China is big, but it is hard.” Indeed, China is an incredibly complex market that differs culturally, politically, and economically from the United States. Large U.S. technology companies like Amazon 0.11% , Google -0.06% , eBay -0.76% , Yahoo 0.64% , and Facebook 0.09% have struggled to make inroads in China. And despite Kalanick’s public statements otherwise, Uber’s experience demonstrates that it was no exception.

In my book, Global Vision: How Companies Can Overcome the Pitfalls of Globalization, I describe many of the struggles that American companies specifically, and Western companies generally, have experienced in China. China’s infrastructure, financial markets, and banking system are underdeveloped relative to those in the West, making it difficult for Western firms to operate in China as they do at home. Western managers find China’s political structure, legal system, and regulatory rules complex and vexing. Also, the Chinese practice of intermingling personal and business relationships is foreign to U.S. companies accustomed to more transactional relationships with their customers and employees. Finally, Chinese consumer tastes are so different from Westerners’ that foreign companies find it challenging to adapt their products and services to meet the specific needs of Chinese customers.

Unfortunately, Uber was not able to overcome these obstacles, learning the hard way that the risks inherent in expanding to China can sink even the best-laid business plans. To succeed in countries like China, companies need to develop strategies that balance these risks with anticipated rewards. For many Western firms, China presents far greater risk than it is worth, and many rightly elect to stay out. However, for those companies that feel compelled to enter the Chinese market, a measured approach is key.

Uber understood the importance of proceeding slowly and investing in relationships. Kalanick made frequent visits to China to cultivate political relationships and develop an extensive network of drivers. However, for Western companies expanding to China, it is often also critical to align with the right local business partners. Local companies typically have a better handle on the cultural, economic, and political environment, and can help foreign firms navigate the full set of risks they face.

This is where Uber erred: It tried to tackle a risky and complex market alone. Partnering with a company like Didi from the outset might have saved Uber some costly pain, and the embarrassment of having to accept a role as junior partner in a Chinese company.