商業(yè)領(lǐng)域最重要但最易被忽視的問題
從塞爾基因到聯(lián)合科技,再到瑪氏,所有公司都在狂熱地談?wù)搫?chuàng)新的必要性。不論是開發(fā)新的顛覆性產(chǎn)品還是持續(xù)完善運(yùn)營流程,創(chuàng)新日益成為當(dāng)今世界的主要競(jìng)技場(chǎng)。 因此,高管們(和組織內(nèi)部的其他許多人)經(jīng)常需要在不明確、不確定但又具有戰(zhàn)略重要性的情形下作出決策。這些決策很少接受過全面的整體性分析模型的檢驗(yàn),高管們只是依靠自己的經(jīng)驗(yàn)、直覺和信息不全面的判斷來作出決定。但這通常并不會(huì)阻止高管們投入大量的資源,對(duì)他們所面臨的情況進(jìn)行“分析”。 可悲的是,大多數(shù)分析從一開始便注定失敗,浪費(fèi)了時(shí)間和金錢。 說它失敗,并不是因?yàn)樗罱K沒有改變高管的想法,而是因?yàn)椋鼜淖铋_始便沒有這樣的機(jī)會(huì)。高管們面臨的情況太過復(fù)雜,很難去應(yīng)用某種能帶來明確指導(dǎo)的綜合分析模型。高管們會(huì)以“但這個(gè)模型忽略了(這種情況中某個(gè)支持其直覺的方面)”為理由,拒絕考慮任何模型生成的深刻見解。分析并未成為一個(gè)有效的工具,防止高管出現(xiàn)影響其直覺的各種認(rèn)知偏差,而是變成了“樣板文件”,用來證明高管們已經(jīng)進(jìn)行了盡責(zé)調(diào)查,或者支持他們?cè)缫炎龀龅臎Q定。即使采用更開放的分析方式,它也很少能夠改變高管的想法。 高管們不妨采用一種更有建設(shè)性的替代方法。它允許進(jìn)行支持直覺與判斷的有用分析。對(duì)于某項(xiàng)行動(dòng)方案,高管首先需要承認(rèn)和接受自己的直覺。放棄“保持客觀”的古訓(xùn)——此時(shí)已為時(shí)已晚。當(dāng)你聽到或考慮一種行動(dòng)方案的時(shí)候,雖然你自己并沒有意識(shí)到,但你內(nèi)心早已得出結(jié)論。試圖忽視自己的直覺,只不過是將它壓制了下來。它隨后又會(huì)以潛意識(shí)的形式再次出現(xiàn),比如尋找各種理由,質(zhì)疑與之相反的分析結(jié)果。 通過公開自己的直覺判斷,高管可以針對(duì)能夠真正實(shí)現(xiàn)某些目的的事情進(jìn)行分析。直覺源于高管(以及我們每一個(gè)人)對(duì)這個(gè)世界的各種假設(shè),其中許多為潛意識(shí)。這些假設(shè)則主要來自經(jīng)驗(yàn)。雖然一般而言,經(jīng)驗(yàn)是好事,但也可能帶來反面的效果。 可惜的是,高管并不認(rèn)為假設(shè)是假設(shè);他們認(rèn)為假設(shè)便是事實(shí),因此不需要對(duì)它們有任何質(zhì)疑。這種替代方法的第二步,是將一個(gè)人直覺背后的假設(shè)具體化。然而,由于人們通常認(rèn)為假設(shè)便是事實(shí),要做到這一點(diǎn)并不容易。有許多技巧可以幫助人們區(qū)分事實(shí)與假設(shè),這些技巧往往涉及對(duì)客戶的看法,內(nèi)部執(zhí)行能力或行動(dòng)方案的可維護(hù)性。 在確定直覺背后的假設(shè)之后,下一步便是找出最有可能被證明無效的假設(shè)。方法之一是問自己:“如果我現(xiàn)在知道,盡管我有不同的直覺,但這個(gè)行動(dòng)方案還是注定要失敗,最可能的原因是什么?”這些最關(guān)鍵的假設(shè)可以成為分析的驅(qū)動(dòng)因素,目標(biāo)是驗(yàn)證或反駁那些決定行動(dòng)方案最終能否成功的關(guān)鍵假設(shè)。 在確定了需要進(jìn)行分析的關(guān)鍵假設(shè)后,挑戰(zhàn)并未結(jié)束。正是在這個(gè)環(huán)節(jié),商業(yè)領(lǐng)域最重要但最常被忽視的一個(gè)問題才會(huì)變得至關(guān)重要。不論采用數(shù)據(jù)采集還是前瞻性試點(diǎn)或者試驗(yàn)的方式,分析不僅要指向正確的問題,而且必須能夠讓人改變主意。在這方面,如果分析結(jié)果的消費(fèi)者——即決策者——不接受分析的適當(dāng)性和闡述,即便再成熟、再“正確”的分析也毫無用處。要實(shí)現(xiàn)這一結(jié)果,需要高管配合一線的分析師,保證分析對(duì)最終決策者的意義,也就是說,可以使他們改變主意。其中一種頗為有效的方法是,高管愿意在分析開始之前便堅(jiān)決表明自己的態(tài)度:“如果你進(jìn)行這項(xiàng)分析發(fā)現(xiàn)了這種結(jié)果,我會(huì)愿意承認(rèn)我的直覺可能是錯(cuò)誤的,并考慮改變主意。”這樣一來,不僅可以保證分析是有意義且有影響力的,還可以讓高管不失臉面,更容易改變主意。 如果這聽起來有點(diǎn)像“科學(xué)方法”或“假設(shè)驗(yàn)證”,那是因?yàn)閺母旧隙裕鼈兪窍嗤ǖ摹5捎跀?shù)學(xué)模型很難完全捕獲社會(huì)現(xiàn)象(比如商業(yè))的總體性,因此,直覺/經(jīng)驗(yàn)/判斷將始終發(fā)揮重要作用,填補(bǔ)數(shù)學(xué)模型的空白。我們必須對(duì)“科學(xué)方法”進(jìn)行修改,使其適應(yīng)一個(gè)直覺與判斷發(fā)揮重要作用的世界。 那么,什么可以改變你的想法?(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)) 譯者:劉進(jìn)龍/汪皓 審校:任文科 |
All companies, from Celgene to United Technologies to Mars, are maniacal about the need for innovation. Whether for new, game-changing products or continuous improvement of operational processes, innovation is increasingly the primary grounds for competition in today’s world. As a result, senior executives (and many others throughout organizations) are constantly confronted with the need to make decisions in situations characterized by ambiguity, uncertainty and strategic importance. Rarely are these decisions amenable to all-inclusive holistic analytical modeling, leaving executives to rely on their experience, intuition and partially informed judgment. However, this typically does not prevent them from investing large sums of resources in an attempt to subject the situation to “analysis.” Sadly, most of this analysis is doomed from the start, and hence a waste of time and money. Not that it does not end up changing executives’ minds, but rather that it has no chance to do so from the start. The situations are simply too complex to allow for a comprehensive model that can produce definitive guidance. The insights produced by any model can be easily dismissed with “But that ignores [fill in the blank with whatever ignored aspect of the situation that supports one’s intuition].” Analysis becomes not a tool to protect executives from the many well-documented cognitive biases that can influence intuition, but instead boilerplate attempts to demonstrate responsible due diligence or to support whatever one has already decided to do. Even when such analysis is entered into in a more open-minded way, it rarely changes anyone’s mind. A far more constructive alternative approach is possible, one that permits useful analysis in support of intuition and judgment. It involves first acknowledging and embracing what your gut is telling you about a particular course of action. Jettison the old “stay objective” maxim. It’s too late. As soon as you hear of or consider a course of action, you have already jumped to a conclusion, even if you are not aware of it. By attempting to ignore your intuition, you are simply driving it underground. It will emerge later, often in still subconscious ways, such as finding all sorts of reasons to dispute analysis that runs contrary to it. By getting intuition out in the open, an executive creates the possibility of targeting analysis at something that might actually accomplish something. Intuition is shaped by all sorts assumptions — many subconscious — that executives (and all of us) make about the world. These assumptions are heavily informed by experience. While experience is generally a good thing, it can also be inhibiting. Unfortunately, assumptions don’t feel like assumptions; they feel like facts, and hence not necessary to challenge. The second step in this alternative approach is to flesh out the assumptions behind one’s intuition. Because assumptions often feel like facts, this can be tricky. Techniques are available to help people identify these facts/assumptions, often related to beliefs about customers, ability to execute internally or the defensibility of the course of action as others respond to it. Once identified, the next step is to find the assumptions most likely to prove invalid. One way to identify these is to ask oneself, “If I knew right now that despite my intuition this course of action was doomed to fail, what would be the most likely reasons?” These most critical assumptions then become the drivers of analysis, targeted at validating — or refuting — the critical assumptions on which the success of the course of action will ultimately hinge. The challenge, however, does not stop with simply identifying the critical assumptions for analysis. It is here where the most important and least asked question in business becomes paramount. Whether comprised of data collection or proactive pilots or experiments, analysis must not only be targeted at the right issues, but actually capable of changing someone’s mind. A sophisticated, “correct” analysis is of no use in this regard if the consumers of the results — the decision-makers — do not buy into the appropriateness and interpretation of the analysis. This requires executives to work with analysts on the front end to make sure that the analysis performed is meaningful to the ultimate decision-makers, in the sense that it might cause them to change their minds. An excellent way to ensure this is for executives to be willing to put a stake in the ground before the analysis is conducted: “If you do this analysis and it shows this, then I am going to be willing to acknowledge that my intuition is possibly wrong and hence consider changing my mind.” Not only does this help ensure that analysis is meaningful and influential, but it makes it much easier for executives to change their minds without losing face. If this smacks of the “scientific method” or “hypothesis testing,” that’s because it is, at a fundamental level. But because the totality of social phenomena, like business, is rarely able to be completely captured in a mathematical model, intuition/experience/judgment must invariably play a role in filling in the gaps. The “scientific method” must be adapted to a world in which intuition and judgment are going to play a significant part. So, what can change your mind? |