目前，對(duì)于投資者來(lái)說(shuō)，一個(gè)貨真價(jià)實(shí)的萬(wàn)億級(jí)美元的問(wèn)題就是，“中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)到底有多差？”

作為全球第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體，中國(guó)一直是最近美國(guó)股市表現(xiàn)低迷的推手，原因是投資者擔(dān)心所謂的中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)硬著陸會(huì)把其他地區(qū)帶進(jìn)衰退深淵。

但中國(guó)官方經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)據(jù)常常受到質(zhì)疑。就算我們相信這些數(shù)字，也依然面臨著如何解讀的問(wèn)題。此外，從來(lái)沒(méi)有哪個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體像中國(guó)這樣，對(duì)全世界來(lái)說(shuō)都舉足輕重，而且中國(guó)政府非常愿意動(dòng)用自己的非凡力量來(lái)提高經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率。

換句話說(shuō)，要想了解中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)對(duì)西方有何影響，我們就得正確預(yù)測(cè)今后幾周乃至幾個(gè)月中國(guó)政府的動(dòng)向。在這方面，德意志銀行經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家張智威和曾黎最近發(fā)表了一篇題為《了解中國(guó)尾部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)》的報(bào)告，其中探討了中國(guó)政府應(yīng)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩的政策。

兩人專門(mén)分析了中國(guó)東北的經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)據(jù)，他們認(rèn)為這個(gè)地區(qū)可能已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)了深度衰退。德銀估算，2015年?yáng)|北的名義GDP增速只有1%（考慮通脹的話就算已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)了負(fù)增長(zhǎng)）。同時(shí)，固定資產(chǎn)投資下降了11.6%，而此前10年的平均增幅為25.5%。在東北，占據(jù)主導(dǎo)位置的是傳統(tǒng)重工業(yè)以及大宗商品和能源生產(chǎn)商，這些行業(yè)近年來(lái)的壓力特別大。

雖然經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)急劇萎縮，但消費(fèi)支出和居民收入的跌幅遠(yuǎn)沒(méi)有那么大。此外，東北還是中國(guó)唯一出現(xiàn)信貸加速增長(zhǎng)的地區(qū)。也就是說(shuō)，2015年?yáng)|北各家銀行的放貸增速超過(guò)了上一年。

The multi-trillion dollar question, literally, for investors these days is, “How poorly is the Chinese economy performing?”

The globe’s second largest economy has been a driving factor in the weak performance of U.S. stock markets lately, as investors fear a so-called hard landing in China could drag the rest of the world into recession.

But the official Chinese economic data is notoriously unreliable. Even if we trust the numbers, we’re faced with the problem of how to interpret them. What’s more, there has never been an economy as important to the globe as China’s that has had a government so willing to use its extraordinary power to prop up economic growth.

In other words, understanding how the Chinese economy will affect the West requires that we correctly predict how the Chinese government will behave in the weeks and months ahead. To that end Deutsche Bank analysts Zhiwei Zhang and Li Zeng recently published a report called “Understanding the Tail Risks in China,” which looked at the regional policy response of the Chinese government to a slowing economy.

Zhang and Zeng isolate data from China’s northeast, a region that’s likely already in a deep recession. That segment of the country’s nominal GDP grew just 1% (factoring in inflation it would have been negative) in 2015, according to Deutsche Bank estimates. At the same time, fixed asset investment fell 11.6%, compared with an average growth of 25.5% in the ten years before. The region is dominated by state-owned enterprises involved in traditional heavy industries, or commodity and energy production, sectors that have come under particular stress in recent years.

Despite this sharp drop off in economic activity, the growth in consumer spending and income did not fall anywhere near as much. Furthermore, northeast China was the only region in the country that saw credit growth, i.e., banks making more loans in 2015 than they did the year before.

張智威和曾黎認(rèn)為，大幅下降的企業(yè)活動(dòng)與消費(fèi)行為之間存在著反差，其原因可能是中央政府的直接支持，但“間接支持”也可能發(fā)揮了作用。他們?cè)趫?bào)告中寫(xiě)道：

經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)乏力和強(qiáng)勁信貸增長(zhǎng)之間的巨大反差表明，即便企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)活力不佳，東北地區(qū)的銀行仍然可能通過(guò)貸款延期為疲弱的企業(yè)部門(mén)提供了支撐，這有助于避免失業(yè)和破產(chǎn)。在這種情況下，政府的首要任務(wù)是維持社會(huì)穩(wěn)定，而不是考慮企業(yè)的盈利能力。

不過(guò)，這樣的政府支持只能救一時(shí)之急，并非解決東北地區(qū)結(jié)構(gòu)性問(wèn)題的長(zhǎng)期方案。同時(shí)，此舉大大降低了效率。2015年底，中央政府開(kāi)始公開(kāi)談?wù)摶狻敖┦髽I(yè)”風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的問(wèn)題。這被視為“供應(yīng)側(cè)結(jié)構(gòu)性改革”的關(guān)鍵一步。要判斷政府對(duì)“供應(yīng)側(cè)結(jié)構(gòu)性改革”的認(rèn)真程度，看看2016年?yáng)|北地區(qū)是否還會(huì)得到同樣的信貸支持可能是一個(gè)辦法。

中國(guó)的情況似乎讓西方觀察人士非常困惑，這就是原因之一。由于中國(guó)政府在促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)方面的能力和意愿都遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)西方國(guó)家的政府，預(yù)測(cè)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)前景的難度也就大得多。

不過(guò)，除非中國(guó)彌補(bǔ)了經(jīng)濟(jì)中的基本缺陷，比如對(duì)投資、出口和債務(wù)的過(guò)度依賴，否則，就還得靠政府的刺激措施來(lái)避免就業(yè)大滑坡和社會(huì)不穩(wěn)定局面。同時(shí)，中國(guó)政府這樣做的時(shí)間越長(zhǎng)，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的失衡問(wèn)題就越嚴(yán)重。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：Charlie

校對(duì)：詹妮

As Zhang and Zeng argue that the discrepancy between the huge drop off in business activity and consumer behavior is likely the result of direct central government support, but also “indirect support,” from the folks in Beijing. They write:

The sharp contrast between weak economic activities and strong credit growth shows that banks in the northeast likely supported, through renewed lending, the weak corporate sector regardless of economic viability, which helped to avoid unemployment and bankruptcy. In this case, it is the government’s priority of maintaining social stability that overrode profitability considerations.

Such government support, however, can only be a short-term remedy rather than long-term solution to the structural challenges facing the northeastern region, and it comes with dear efficiency costs. The central government started to talk openly about addressing the risk of “zombie companies” in late 2015. This is regarded as a key part of the “supply side reforms.” One way to judge how serious the government is about the “supply side reforms” is perhaps to see if such credit support to the northeastern region will be contained in 2016.

This is another reason why western observers seem so confused by what they’re seeing out of China. Because the government there has so much more ability and willingness to stimulate the economy than governments in the West do, it’s that much more difficult to predict China’s future performance.

But until China addresses the fundamental flaws in its economy, i.e. it’s over reliance on investment, exports, and debt, it will have to continue to rely on government stimulus to avoid a collapse in employment and the social unrest that would likely be the result. And the longer it does that, the greater the growing imbalances in its economy will get.