我敢說，沒有哪類創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的投資，能比電子商務(wù)公司更難于實(shí)現(xiàn)投資大撤退了，尤其是當(dāng)這些投資價(jià)值10億美元以上的時(shí)候。事實(shí)證明，和亞馬遜競爭并非易事，志向遠(yuǎn)大的創(chuàng)業(yè)者們必須要有越來越別出心裁的戰(zhàn)略，才能使自己有別于電商巨頭。問題在于，和一切時(shí)尚一樣，每次電子商務(wù)模式的新招數(shù)最終都會過時(shí)。

你恐怕還記得2012年的訂閱式電子商務(wù)大潮吧，我把它們稱之為“填盒子模式”。這是個(gè)聰明的辦法：向訂戶發(fā)送一箱就連他們自己都不知道想要什么的組合產(chǎn)品，以實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)常性的營業(yè)收入。沒過多久，每家新成立的填盒子創(chuàng)業(yè)公司就令人越來越感到可笑：什么訂購型香水、狗玩具、臘肉，甚至還有金?卡戴姍推銷的細(xì)高跟鞋。投資者很快認(rèn)識到，這種模式差不多就是當(dāng)月果醬會員店在21世紀(jì)的變種。當(dāng)時(shí)，那些商家就是靠每月向會員提供一兩種比較獨(dú)特的果醬來賺錢的，可是，隨后就悄然發(fā)生了合并、關(guān)店、業(yè)務(wù)調(diào)整等大整頓。

訂閱式電子商務(wù)之后，是“內(nèi)容與商務(wù)”，這個(gè)時(shí)尚由盛轉(zhuǎn)衰過快，因此更像是曇花一現(xiàn)，并沒有形成真正的潮流。這個(gè)創(chuàng)意（即將編輯納入商店）沒能給大多數(shù)創(chuàng)業(yè)公司增加利潤。2015年，這類創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的領(lǐng)頭羊Thrillist公司拆分了它的電子商務(wù)和媒體業(yè)務(wù)。創(chuàng)始人本?勒爾向科技網(wǎng)站Recode承認(rèn)，讓這兩種業(yè)務(wù)共享資源“并不是最有成效的作法”。

最近，電子商務(wù)界最熱門的東西要算“ClassPass化”。這是一種將按月付費(fèi)與各種體驗(yàn)相結(jié)合的時(shí)尚，因?yàn)镃lassPass公司的成功而興起。這是一家融資充足的創(chuàng)業(yè)公司，銷售加盟健身房提供的無限健身課程，每月收費(fèi)100美元。

在其帶動(dòng)下，目前已經(jīng)有了吹頭發(fā)的ClassPass（Vive，月費(fèi)65美元），按摩的ClassPass（Zeel公司的Zealot計(jì)劃，月費(fèi)不等），以及現(xiàn)場音樂會的ClassPass（Juekly，月費(fèi)25美元）。也許，把這種新模式說成是潮流還為時(shí)過早，但是，從過去的電子商務(wù)創(chuàng)新來看，它在這個(gè)世界上也存在不了太久。

所有這些新近的電子商務(wù)模式都是衍生自一切零售潮流之母：限時(shí)搶購。1月份，限時(shí)搶購網(wǎng)站Gilt Groupe以令人痛苦的低價(jià)遭到并購，它籌集了2.8億美元，卻只賣了2.5億美元。

實(shí)際上，包括限時(shí)搶購，及其變種——天天低價(jià)在內(nèi)，這個(gè)行業(yè)早就遭受了飽和競爭之苦。模仿者們推高了獲客成本，加快了創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的燒錢速度，還讓購物者陷入了“低價(jià)疲勞”。如今，這種模式終于咽了氣。

但這些創(chuàng)業(yè)公司并不會學(xué)會聚焦于基本面（比如供應(yīng)鏈管理或是客戶服務(wù)），而是會一窩蜂奔向下一個(gè)熱門的戰(zhàn)略。想想看，2012年，當(dāng)Groupon和Gilt明顯不能實(shí)現(xiàn)它們的過高預(yù)期的時(shí)候，其他模仿者便遠(yuǎn)離了這一模式。

令人不解的是，經(jīng)過了這種血洗，很多電子商務(wù)創(chuàng)業(yè)仍然去追逐時(shí)髦的新型商業(yè)模式。不過，解釋起來也簡單：只要亞馬遜存在，電子商務(wù)新潮流就會存在。杰夫?貝佐斯領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的這家電商巨頭在價(jià)格、選擇和服務(wù)方面都已成為贏家，剩下的只有別出心裁了。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：天文

It’s hard to name a category of startups that has struggled to produce big, billion-dollar exits more than e-commerce. Competing with Amazon isn’t easy, it turns out, and aspiring Davids have turned to ever more novel strategies to differentiate themselves from Goliath. The problem? Like anything trendy, each new twist on the e-commerce model eventually goes out of style.

Perhaps you remember the great subscription commerce wave of 2012—as I called it, stuff-in-a-box. It was a clever way to score recurring revenue by sending subscribers a container of curated stuff they didn’t even know they wanted. It didn’t take long for each new stuff-in-a-box startup to feel increasingly ridiculous: subscription perfumes, dog toys, cured meats, even stilettos hawked by Kim Kardashian. Investors quickly realized the model was little more than a 21st-century twist on the Jam of the Month club, and the subsequent shakeout, marked by mergers, shutdowns, and pivots, happened quietly.

After subscription commerce came “content and commerce,” a trend that peaked so fast it’s more of a blip than a full-fledged fad. The idea—tacking an editorial operation onto a store—failed to increase profits for most startups, and last year the leader of the pack, Thrillist, split its e-commerce and media businesses. Founder Ben Lerer conceded to technology website Recode that it was “not the most productive” for the two to share resources.

Lately the hottest thing in e-commerce is “ClassPass for X,” a trend that combines monthly subscription fees with experiences. (Millennials love experiences, I’m told.) It follows the success of ClassPass, a well-funded startup that sells unlimited fitness classes at participating studios for about $100 a month. There is already a ClassPass for hair blowouts (Vive; $65 per month), massages (Zeel’s Zeelot program; cost varies), and live music (Jukely; $25 per month). It’s too soon to call this new model a fad, but if past e-commerce innovations are any indication, it may not be long for this world.

All of these recent e-commerce models are descendants of the mother of all retail fads: flash sales. With the January acquisition of Gilt Groupe at a painfully low price—it raised $280 million but sold for just $250 million—the model has finally croaked. Flash sales (and its cousin, daily deals) suffered from oversaturation. Copycats drove up the price of acquiring customers, which accelerated startups’ burn rates, and prompted shopper “deal fatigue.” When it became clear in 2012 that Groupon and Gilt would not live up to their soaring expectations, copycats pivoted away from the model. But instead of focusing on the fundamentals (supply-chain management, say, or customer service), many of them simply latched onto the next hot strategy.

With such carnage, it’s puzzling that so many e-commerce entrepreneurs continue to chase buzzy new business models. But the explanation is simple: As long as there’s an Amazon, there will be e-commerce fads. The Jeff Bezos–led behemoth has already won on price, selection, and service. All that leaves is novelty.