自從巴黎和圣貝納迪諾先后遭受恐怖襲擊后，美國(guó)總統(tǒng)大選的核心議題就從經(jīng)濟(jì)問題轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)榉纯趾蛧?guó)際關(guān)系議題。

由于中東地區(qū)的地緣政治對(duì)石油開采的依存度很高，因而，經(jīng)濟(jì)與恐怖主義、包括與ISIS崛起之間的關(guān)系，要比乍看上去深刻得多。

在最近美國(guó)共和黨的黨內(nèi)候選人辯論期間，前阿肯色州州長(zhǎng)麥克?赫卡比認(rèn)為，要想在中東地區(qū)打敗美國(guó)的敵人們，能源開采行業(yè)可謂是一個(gè)關(guān)鍵因素。“在能源方面，我們不僅要挑戰(zhàn)俄羅斯，還要挑戰(zhàn)伊朗和沙特。”

此外他還表示：“我們還需要開采我們的天然氣和生物能，向全世界出口能源，讓俄羅斯、伊朗和沙特沒錢制造和購(gòu)買武器，讓美國(guó)成為全世界最大的能源出口國(guó)。”

他的邏輯是可以理解的。如果美國(guó)的能源業(yè)能在全球市場(chǎng)上攫取一定份額，必將在一定程度上削弱伊朗和俄羅斯等國(guó)的實(shí)力。但仔細(xì)推敲便可發(fā)現(xiàn)，赫卡比的這一論點(diǎn)是似是而非的。的確，液壓破裂技術(shù)的進(jìn)步，導(dǎo)致了美國(guó)能源供給的大幅提高，這是導(dǎo)致2014年末以來國(guó)際油價(jià)突然下跌的主要原因之一。但考慮到ISIS的蔓延之勢(shì)，很難說中東現(xiàn)在對(duì)于美國(guó)來說已經(jīng)變得更安全了。

After the terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, the presidential race has shifted its focus, understandably, from the economy to terrorism and international relations.

But given how the the geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East are so dependent on the business of oil extraction, economics and terrorism, including the rise of ISIS, may be more connected than they may seem at first blush.

Indeed, during last week’s undercard Republican debate, former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee argued that a key to defeating American adversaries in the Middle East is the energy extraction industry. “We ought to be challenging not only Russia but the Iranians and the Saudis on the point of energy,” he said. Huckabee continued:

We need to be going after our natural gas and biofuels and become the energy exporter to the world, and take the weaponry out of the hands of the Russians, the Iranians, and the Saudis by taking their money away, and let America become the number one energy exporter to the entire world.

There’s some understandable logic here. If America’s energy industry is able to take global market share, that will chip away at the main source of power for countries like Iran and Russia. But upon closer examination, the argument reveals itself as specious. In fact, the huge increase in American supply as the result of advances in fracking technology has been one of the driving forces behind the sudden fall in oil prices that began in late 2014. And it’s hard to argue, given ISIS, that the Middle East has become any safer for the U.S.

實(shí)際上，國(guó)際油價(jià)的下跌與ISIS的崛起有著相當(dāng)奇怪的關(guān)聯(lián)。2014年初，ISIS占據(jù)了敘利亞和伊拉克的幾座主要城市，同時(shí)全球石油庫(kù)存開始激增。雖然ISIS的崛起和中東地區(qū)的總體失穩(wěn)是多種復(fù)雜力量搏弈的結(jié)果，但其中一個(gè)主要因素，無疑是各方都想通過控制該地區(qū)的石油來發(fā)揮影響力。

我們甚至可以說，由于美國(guó)在2015年成功將單日石油產(chǎn)量翻番至930萬桶，導(dǎo)致這個(gè)矛盾在該地區(qū)更加激化了，從而使ISIS獲得了在該地區(qū)站穩(wěn)腳跟的機(jī)會(huì)。

科威特海灣科技大學(xué)國(guó)際關(guān)系學(xué)副教授穆罕默德?努魯扎曼研究了中東政治在ISIS的崛起中所起的作用。他認(rèn)為，卡塔爾等國(guó)之所以一開始就扮演了“阿拉伯之春”運(yùn)動(dòng)的推手角色，部分原因就是為了推翻卡扎菲這樣的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，從而在利比亞等產(chǎn)油國(guó)安插更適合本國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)利益的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。而后卡扎菲時(shí)代的利比亞也的確向卡塔爾的油氣行業(yè)打開了大門，使它在開發(fā)本國(guó)油氣資源上扮演了更重要角色。

In fact, the decline in the price of oil and the rise of ISIS correlate strongly. In early 2014, ISIS began capturing major cities in Syria and Iraq at the same time that global stockpiles of oil began increasing unsustainably. And though the rise of ISIS and general instability in the Middle East is the result of multifarious, complex forces, the desire to exert power through controlling the flow of oil from that region is undoubtedly a major factor.

One could even argue that the the United States success in nearly doubling its production of oil to 9.3 million barrels per day in 2015 has helped to exacerbate the very same tensions that have given ISIS an opportunity to gain a foothold in the region.

Dr. Mohammed Nuruzzaman, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Gulf University for Science and Thechology and Quwait, has studied the role of Middle East politics in the rise of ISIS. He argues that countries like Qatar initially pounced on the Arab Spring movement in part as a means to topple leaders like Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi with the hope of installing leaders more congenial to its own economic interests. A post-Gaddafi Libya opened the door for the Qatari oil and gas industries to take a larger role in developing that countries resources.

隨著“阿拉伯之春”在敘利亞的蔓延，卡塔爾和沙特阿拉伯也將敘利亞的內(nèi)亂視為推翻阿薩德政權(quán)的良機(jī)——原因在于，阿薩德本人是一個(gè)阿拉維派穆斯林，但他領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下的敘利亞人民大多數(shù)是和卡塔爾人和沙特人一樣的遜尼派——此外，他們還可以借機(jī)削弱敵對(duì)能源出口國(guó)伊朗和俄羅斯的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益，而這兩個(gè)國(guó)家恰好一直長(zhǎng)期支持著阿薩德政權(quán)。

正如《外交》雜志所指出的，卷入敘利亞內(nèi)戰(zhàn)的主要交戰(zhàn)方——伊朗、沙特、卡塔爾、俄羅斯和美國(guó)，無一不是能源出口國(guó)，并且這五國(guó)都非常關(guān)注中東地區(qū)未來的能源開采，也非常關(guān)注中東石油將如何運(yùn)至對(duì)油氣需求極大的歐洲市場(chǎng)。據(jù)該雜志描述，一直以來，卡塔爾都在尋找一種廉價(jià)的方式，試圖將該國(guó)的天然氣運(yùn)到歐洲，而這個(gè)目標(biāo)將使它與俄羅斯形成直接競(jìng)爭(zhēng)：

“2009年，卡塔爾提議修建一座天然氣管道，經(jīng)沙特阿拉伯、約旦、敘利亞至土耳其，該項(xiàng)目預(yù)計(jì)耗資幾十億美元，將大大降低長(zhǎng)期的天然氣運(yùn)輸成本。但敘利亞總統(tǒng)巴沙爾?阿薩德拒絕簽署這項(xiàng)協(xié)議，原因是俄羅斯不想看到它在歐洲天然氣市場(chǎng)的地位受到挑戰(zhàn)，而給阿薩德施加了很大壓力。

與此同時(shí)，伊朗也聞到了機(jī)會(huì)。伊朗也有大量的天然氣儲(chǔ)量，但由于缺乏可以助推出口的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，伊朗提議修建一座由伊朗經(jīng)伊拉克至敘利亞的天然氣管道，使伊朗的天然氣可以經(jīng)拉塔基亞等敘利亞港口出口至地中海。俄羅斯或許是認(rèn)為跟伊朗打交道比較容易（因?yàn)橐晾屎涂ㄋ柌煌瑳]有美軍基地），有把握控制歐洲從伊朗、里海地區(qū)和中亞進(jìn)口的天然氣，因此，俄羅斯顯然沒有對(duì)這個(gè)項(xiàng)目從中作梗。伊朗—伊拉克—敘利亞天然氣管道項(xiàng)目于2011年對(duì)外宣布，各方于2012年簽署了文件。管道的建設(shè)原定于2016年峻工，但‘阿拉伯之春’和敘利亞內(nèi)戰(zhàn)已經(jīng)嚴(yán)重影響了工期。”

As the Arab Spring spread to Syria, Qatar and Saudi Arabia saw the unrest as an opportunity to unseat Bashar al-Assad, an Alowite Muslim leading a country that is majority Sunni (like Qatar and Saudi Arabia), while at the same time undercutting the economic interests of rival energy exporters Iran and Russia, which have long backed the Assad regime.

As Mitchell Orenstein and George Romer point out in Foreign Affairs, the major belligerents in the Syrian civil war—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Russia, and the United States—are all energy exporters concerned with the future of energy extraction and how it will reach an oil-and-gas-hungry European market. They describe how Qatar has long searched for an inexpensive way to ship its natural gas to Europe, a goal that puts it in direct competition with Russia:

In 2009, Qatar proposed to build a pipeline to send its gas northwest via Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria to Turkey, an investment of billions of dollars up front that would reduce transportation costs over the long term. However, Syrian President Bashar al Assad refused to sign the plan; Russia, which did not want to see its position in European gas markets undermined, put him under intense pressure not to.

At the same time, Iran, sensing an opportunity, and lacking export infrastructure for its own massive gas reserves, proposed an alternative Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline that would pump Iranian gas from the same field out via Syrian ports such as Latakia and under the Mediterranean. Moscow apparently blessed this project, possibly believing that Russia would have an easier time dealing with Iran (unlike Qatar, not home to a U.S. base) to control gas imports to Europe from Iran, the Caspian Sea region, and Central Asia. The announcement of the Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline deal came in 2011. The parties signed the documents in July 2012. Construction was slated to be finished in 2016, but the Arab Spring and ensuing chaos in Syria interfered.

現(xiàn)在大家應(yīng)該知道中東這個(gè)大賭局上的籌碼是什么了——通過向歐洲供應(yīng)天然氣而帶來的權(quán)力。這就更能解釋受到經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退拖累的俄羅斯，為什么要在已經(jīng)向?yàn)蹩颂m沖突投入大量資源的情況下，還要在中東開辟第二戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)。同時(shí)，我們也明白了為什么像卡塔爾和沙特這樣的國(guó)家，寧可冒著點(diǎn)燃遜尼派極端主義者怒火的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，也要支持反對(duì)阿薩德的運(yùn)動(dòng)。

這些復(fù)雜的角力，也說明了為什么美國(guó)能源出口行業(yè)的業(yè)績(jī)上漲，反過來卻給美國(guó)在海外造成了麻煩。因?yàn)樵谌蚰茉磧r(jià)格下降的背景下，有些國(guó)家正在拼命搶占能源出口市場(chǎng)份額，希望有朝一日飆升的油氣價(jià)格能給他們的權(quán)力背書。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：樸成奎

When one understands the stakes of the game being played—the power that results from supplying natural gas to Europe—it makes more sense why a recession-racked Russia, already expending resources on the conflict in the Ukraine—would decide to begin fighting a second front in the Middle East. It also makes sense why countries like Qatar and Saudi Arabia would risk stoking the flames of Sunni extremism in their support of anti-Assad movements.

And these dynamics show why the strength of the U.S. energy exploration industry can actually cause headaches for the United States abroad, as countries that could once count on sky-high oil and gas prices to underwrite their power scramble for market share in a world of cheap energy.