“誰會是下一個接盤俠？”

這話似乎正盤旋在中國手機神話小米的頭上。這家從上一輪融資后估值100億美元躥升到450億美元的新秀公司，正在遭受估值過高的質疑。

無獨有偶，這種困惑也在美國科技界。這不禁讓人想起2000年的互聯網泡沫。當時，新興企業向老牌公司發起沖擊，并且享有比對方更高的估值。當然，它們的估值水平最終得到了驗證——物有所值的生存了下來，價格虛高的則消失殆盡。而現在，類似情況再次出現，一系列資本交易為非上市和上市公司賦予了“真實”價值。

彭博社援引分析稱，“小米的估值似乎并不是基于任何已知或已被接受的估值方法，大肆宣傳和希望似乎是小米估值的兩大主要推動力。”該報道顯示，小米2014年的營收為120億美元，450億美元估值對應的市銷率為3.75倍，已超過了蘋果的2.9倍。

更多的估值案例是，在線旅游公司Expedia近期同意收購從事短租業務的HomeAway，收購價格接近40億美元，這比2月份我采訪HomeAway首席執行官布賴恩·沙普爾斯時該公司的估值高了10億美元。當時，沙普爾斯的全部注意力都在競爭對手Airbnb身上；如今，后者在私募市場上的估值已經翻了一番，達到200億美元。

人們普遍認為Airbnb的業務非常棒，我對此毫不懷疑。但說到HomeAway和Airbnb的估值，我確信前者的價值實實在在，而后者的價值純屬假想。HomeAway的價值點在于，它不斷地讓自己的經營模式向Airbnb靠攏，這對Expedia來說顯然有吸引力。投資銀行Jefferies的分析師布賴恩·皮茨猜測，Expedia或許還會收購類似的非旅游類公司，比如點評網站Yelp、外賣訂餐網站GrubHub和團購網站Groupon。如果Expedia及其競爭對手Priceline等公司開始收購那些運氣不佳的非上市企業，情況就會變得更有意思。

就像Salesforce.com首席執行官馬克·貝尼奧夫在《財富》全球論壇上所說，公開市場正在多個方面逐步加強約束并提高清晰度。動視暴雪（Activision Blizzard ACTI）游戲公司收購《糖果傳奇》制作公司King Digital Entertainment的價格低于后者的首發價，對于以熱門產品為動力的公司來說，熱門降溫后的情形就是如此。

同樣的，移動支付公司Square聘請的投行人士大概預先調查了Square股票的需求情況，他們設定的首發價低于上一輪私募的定價水平。這將觸發一項補償機制，為上一輪接受了Square 60億美元高估值（目前這個數字約為40億美元）的投資者配發更多股份，而是他們當時接受這種估值時約定的前提條件。這實際上表明此前的估值有誤，也是為什么我稱之為“假想估值”（Hypothetical Valuation）。

另一個假想估值事例出現在《福布斯》傳媒去年的一樁私募交易中。《福布斯》傳媒是《財富》雜志的競爭對手，它目前正在起訴這次交易的投資者。事情似乎是這樣，福布斯傳媒為收購方提供了一些資金，但那些“粗魯的家伙”沒有還貸，他們現在覺得雙方當初約定的收購價不合理。

真相總會浮出水面，而且通常是在公開市場上。不然的話，它就會在法庭上顯露真容。（財富中文網）

譯者：Charlie

校對：詹妮

"Who will be the next one?"

There is a ton of confusion these days about valuations of technology companies. It is all very reminiscent of the dot-com bubble of 2000, when upstarts commanded bigger valuations than the incumbents they were attacking. The valuations worked themselves out, of course: The worthy survived, and the unworthy didn’t.

A similar process is playing out now, with a bevy of transactions that are putting “real” valuations on private and public companies. Recently Expedia agreed to buy HomeAway, the vacation-home listings company. Expedia will pay almost $4 billion, which is a billion more than HomeAway was worth when I interviewed its CEO, Brian Sharples, in February. Sharples was preoccupied at the time with Airbnb, whose private-market valuation has since doubled to $20 billion.

The conventional wisdom is that Airbnb has a marvelous business, and I have no reason to doubt it. Here’s what I know for sure about HomeAway’s valuation compared with Airbnb’s: The former company’s value is real, the latter’s is merely hypothetical. For what it’s worth, HomeAway has been tweaking its business model to be more like Airbnb, which is clearly attractive to Expedia. Brian Pitz, an analyst with Jefferies, speculates that Expedia also might snap up similar non-specifically-travel companies including Yelp, GrubHub, and Groupon. It will be even more interesting if companies like Expedia and its rival Priceline begin buying down-on-their-luck private companies.

As Marc Benioff, CEO of Salesforce.com, noted at the Fortune Global Forum, the public markets instill discipline and clarity in many ways. Activision Blizzard ACTI is buying Candy Crush maker King Digital Entertainment for less than its IPO price, which is what happens to a hit-driven business when its hit slows.

As well, Square’s investment bankers, presumably having surveyed demand for its shares, plan to price the payment company’s IPO below its last private-market funding round. That would trigger a “ratchet” that would distribute additional shares to those investors, who agreed to Square’s last, lofty valuation of $6 billion (versus about $4 billion now) only on those terms. That effectively puts the lie to the former valuation, which is why I’ve called these hypothetical.

Yet another example of a theoretical valuation is what Fortune competitor Forbes Media got last year (in a private deal) from investors it is now suing. Forbes, it seems, lent its buyers some of the money for the deal, and the rude fellows haven’t made good on the loan, calling into question the value they agreed to in the first place.

The truth will out. And they typically will out in the public markets—and if not there, in court.