德意志銀行如何誤入歧途
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????與大多數同行相比，德意志銀行過于依賴投資銀行業務。近年來，該銀行進一步加大了對該業務的投入。德意志銀行躋身投資銀行業第一梯隊，可追溯到1990年，當時該銀行收購了英國的摩根建富，8年后，又收購了美國的信孚銀行。此后，德意志銀行蓬勃發展，步入頂級投行的行列，與高盛和摩根士丹利比肩，這背后的大功臣是阿克曼以及后來的賈因。 ????德意志銀行最大的優勢在于其固定收益部門，尤其是交易業務。在其最輝煌的時期，德意志銀行的債券業務凈資產收益率高達40％。即便在金融危機過后的2009年，德意志的交易業務仍大獲成功。投資者不顧一切地低價拋售證券，該銀行因此獲得了巨大的“價差”或者說利潤空間。同時，德意志銀行的許多主要競爭對手都縮減債券交易，甚至徹底關停固定收益部門。因此，2009年德意志銀行逆勢而動，賺得盆滿缽滿，并保留了其標志性的固定收益業務。 ????賈因和菲辰決定依靠其盈利的主力——債券交易。這是一個雙管齊下的計劃。首先，他們認為，瑞銀和瑞士信貸等巨頭縮減業務規模，將使德意志銀行占據更有利的市場地位，因為競爭減少將使其市場份額和交易利潤空間雙雙提升。他們還認為，超緊的資本管制將逐步放松，這樣一來，銀行無需大幅增加準備金就能再度擴大交易規模。 ????但上述兩項預測都落了空。 ????更糟糕的是，金融危機前的市場紅火狀況在2009年短暫再現后就一去不復返。過去5年里，固定收益市場一直相對平靜。新規迫使銀行大幅縮減待售債券的庫存。在當前的價格水平下，大多數客戶并不急于出售自己手頭的債券、買入新債券，因此成交量偏低。貝克爾表示：“他們一直在等待自己預測的趨勢出現，但一直沒等到。” ????德意志銀行董事會自頂層宣布變革，并強調將繼續堅持投資銀行業務優先的戰略。該行的零售業務頗具規模，其分支機構的存款總額約2200億美元。但德意志銀行承諾出售Postbank以縮減零售業務的規模。Postbank在德國各地的郵局提供銀行業務，德意志銀行的半數存款來自Postbank。 ????如果運營得當，零售銀行業務前景看好，因為存款為銀行提供了海量幾乎零成本的資金。貸款和證券價格必然上漲，這樣一來，低成本的存款將為銀行帶來極大利潤空間。 ????債券交易的未來則有些難以預料。如今，電子平臺直接撮合富達和先鋒等主要債券持有者，繞過銀行并降低交易成本。股票市場的現代化革命已經使得股票交易的利潤大大下降，如今，債券市場可能面臨一場類似的革命。 ????危機過后，各類業務通常會恢復常態。但也可能有例外，尤其是過時的由銀行主導的債券業務。世界已經發生了變化。它是否會再變回去？這是個問題。對德意志銀行而言，把寶押在指望過去的好日子重現恐怕要竹籃打水一場空。（財富中文網） ????譯者：Hunter ????審校: 夏林 |
????Deutsche Bank relies far more heavily on investment banking than most of its peers. In recent years, it has placed even greater weight on that franchise. Deutsche Bank’s remarkable rise to the summit in investment banking began in 1990, when it purchased Britain’s Morgan Grenfell, followed by the acquisition of Bankers Trust eight years later. Thereafter, the investment bank thrived––Ackerman, followed by Jain, were principal architects of its success––rising to the top echelon alongside Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. ????Deutsche Bank’s greatest strength is its fixed income arm, especially, trading. In its best years, the bank was generating fantastic 40% ROEs in its bond business. Even in 2009, in the wake of the financial crisis, it enjoyed great success in trading. Investors were desperate to exit securities at any price, providing huge “spreads,” or margins, for the bank. At the same time, many of Deutsche Bank’s biggest competitors were reducing their bond trading or closing their fixed income desks altogether. So in 2009, Deutsche Bank profited handsomely by bucking the trend, and it maintained its signature franchise. ????Jain-Fitschen decided to rely on their bastion of profitability, bond trading. Their plan was twofold. First, they believed that the retrenchment of many big players, including UBS and Credit Suisse, would put their bank in a far more powerful position. The idea was that the reduced competition would both raise both their market share and trading margins. They also figured that the ultra-tight capital restrictions would gradually loosen, so that banks could once again expand their trading books without huge increases in reserves. ????Neither of those predictions worked out as planned. ????To make matters worse, the flush, pre-financial crisis time, reprised in 2009, didn’t return. For the past half-decade, fixed income markets have been relatively placid. New regulations have forced the banks to substantially shrink the size of their inventories of bonds for sale. Most customers are in no hurry to sell their bonds and buy new ones at today’s rates, so turnover is low. “They keep waiting for the trends they predicted to happen, and they haven’t happened,” says Becker. ????In announcing the changes at the top, the Deutsche Bank board stressed that it’s adhering to the investment banking-first strategy. The bank does have a substantial retail business, boasting around $220 billion in deposits at its branches. But it pledges to shrink that franchise by selling Postbank, which offers banking services in post offices throughout Germany and accounts for half of Deutsche Bank’s deposits. ????If it’s well run, retail banking has a strong future because deposits provide big pools of money that’s pretty much interest-free. As rates on loans and securities inevitably rise, those cheap deposits become highly profitable. ????The future isn’t nearly as predictable for bond trading. Electronic platforms are now matching big owners, the Fidelities and Vanguards, directly with one another, bypassing the banks and lowering costs in the process. We may be on the brink of a sister revolution to the one that modernized the equity markets and ominously squeezed most of the profit out of stock trading. ????It’s usually safe to bet that, after a crisis, businesses can return to a state of normalcy. But it’s not always so, especially not in the outdated, bank-dominated bond business. The world has changed. The question is whether it will change back. For Deutsche Bank, planning on a reprise of the good old days may be a losing wager. |
