????正如此前傳聞的一樣，F(xiàn)acebook于上周三上午正式推出一個(gè)名叫“Instant Articles”（意為“即時(shí)文章”）的試驗(yàn)項(xiàng)目。該項(xiàng)目是Facebook聯(lián)合《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》、《衛(wèi)報(bào)》、BuzzFeed網(wǎng)站和《國(guó)家地理雜志》等媒體共同推出的。根據(jù)協(xié)議，這些合作媒體的文章將全文出現(xiàn)在Facebook的移動(dòng)應(yīng)用內(nèi)，也就是說(shuō)，用戶可以在Facebook上直接閱讀全文，而不是像以往一樣只能閱讀摘要，或通過(guò)一個(gè)鏈接轉(zhuǎn)到原網(wǎng)頁(yè)。

????乍一看，這個(gè)項(xiàng)目顯然是一次直白的價(jià)值交換。Facebook為它的14億用戶爭(zhēng)取到了高質(zhì)量的內(nèi)容，出版商們也通過(guò)Facebook獲得了大量受眾——另外他們還能從Facebook基于相關(guān)內(nèi)容獲得的廣告收入分成。（據(jù)報(bào)道，如果Facebook圍繞相關(guān)內(nèi)容銷售廣告的話，出版商可以獲得70%的廣告收入。）所以這是一次皆大歡喜的合作，對(duì)吧？

????這顯然就是Facebook用來(lái)吸引合作伙伴的套路——Facebook高風(fēng)亮節(jié)地為出版商提供了更多的讀者，同時(shí)雙方開(kāi)開(kāi)心心地交換了利益。但如果一個(gè)企業(yè)達(dá)到了Facebook這樣的規(guī)模和實(shí)力，哪怕是最簡(jiǎn)單的安排也可能充滿潛在的危險(xiǎn)，沒(méi)有例外。為什么呢？因?yàn)樵谶@場(chǎng)特殊的牌局中，所有的好牌都握在一個(gè)玩家的手里。

????正如哥倫比亞大學(xué)艾米利?貝爾在Twitter上指出的，這個(gè)“開(kāi)掛”了的玩家就是Facebook。

????“出版商+Facebook”模式的主要問(wèn)題是理論上的：你能否一邊做新聞，一邊成為一個(gè)商業(yè)權(quán)力架構(gòu)的組成部分？

????— emily bell (@emilybell)，2015年5月13日。

????像《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》這樣的出版商之所以要進(jìn)行這樣的合作，首要原因是它們?cè)谝苿?dòng)領(lǐng)域大大滯后。科技分析師本?湯普森指出，F(xiàn)acebook有一句話說(shuō)得很對(duì)：大多數(shù)新聞網(wǎng)站的載入速度過(guò)慢，網(wǎng)站本身也設(shè)計(jì)得一塌糊涂，這使得這些網(wǎng)頁(yè)上的大多數(shù)廣告百無(wú)一用。而Facebook對(duì)移動(dòng)的理解是無(wú)人能比的，它的載入速度更快，界面看起來(lái)更舒服，也更吸引廣告商，這在某種程度上也是由于Facebook擁有報(bào)刊媒體普遍都不具備的市場(chǎng)定位能力。

????這就是為什么Facebook拋出的橄欖枝如此吸引人。另外，出版商們不僅能保持部分乃至全部的廣告收入，還能從Facebook那里獲得用戶對(duì)內(nèi)容的反饋數(shù)據(jù)，這對(duì)出版商來(lái)說(shuō)無(wú)疑也是非常有用的。

????此次合作之所以有那么一絲浮士德式交易的味道，也是因?yàn)镕acebook從中撈取的好處要大于出版商。或許有人會(huì)問(wèn)，既然Facebook把廣告收入都拱手讓人了，它還能獲得什么好處？其實(shí)Facebook并不在乎圍繞這些新聞內(nèi)容的廣告收入（不過(guò)我認(rèn)為大多數(shù)合作媒體只能獲得70%的廣告收入，因?yàn)镕acebook比它們更擅長(zhǎng)銷售廣告）。Facebook的真正目標(biāo)是深化和鞏固它對(duì)用戶群的吸引力。

????就這個(gè)意義而言，新聞內(nèi)容只是Facebook為達(dá)成目標(biāo)而采用的一個(gè)手段。蘊(yùn)含的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是，如果這種合作達(dá)不到預(yù)期效果，F(xiàn)acebook就會(huì)對(duì)它失去興趣，不愿意再花大力氣推廣它。但與此同時(shí)，F(xiàn)acebook作為幾百萬(wàn)甚至幾十億網(wǎng)民看新聞的“默認(rèn)客戶端”這一地位早已深入人心。換句話說(shuō)，一旦Facebook成了“地主”，誰(shuí)是給它耕地的“長(zhǎng)工”已經(jīng)不重要了。

????As has been rumored for some time, Facebook launched a trial project called “Instant Articles” on Wednesday morning—a partnership with nine news organizations, including The New York Times, The Guardian, BuzzFeed,and National Geographic. Under the terms of the deal, entire news stories from those partners will appear insideFacebook’s mobile app and be able to be read there, as opposed to the traditional practice of news publishers posting an excerpt and a link to their website.

????At first blush, this sounds like a pretty straightforward exchange of value. Facebook gets what will hopefully be engaging content for its 1.4 billion or so users, and publishers get the reach that the social network provides—plus keep any revenue from advertising that they sell around that content. (if Facebook sells the ads, then publishers reportedly get to keep 70% of the proceeds.) So everybody wins, right?

????That’s certainly the way Facebook is trying to sell the partnership: as a mutual exchange of goods, driven by the company’s desire to help publishers make their articles look as good as possible and reach more readers. But whenever you have an entity with the size and power of Facebook, even the simplest of arrangements becomes fraught with peril, and this is no exception. Why? Because a single player holds all of the cards in this particular game.

????And that player is Facebook, as Columbia University’s Emily Bell noted on Twitter:

????Main problem for publishers + FB remains theoretical: can you both be journalistic + be part of a commercial power structure?

????— emily bell (@emilybell) May 13, 2015

????The main reason why publishers like the Times have entered into this partnership in the first place is that they are falling behind when it comes to mobile. As technology analyst Ben Thompson points out, Facebook is quite right when it says that most news sites load too slowly and look terrible, rendering the ads on those pages largely useless. Facebook, however, understands mobile like no one else: everything loads faster, looks nicer and is more appealing to advertisers, in part because Facebook can do the kind of targeting that newspapers aren’t equipped to do.

????This is what makes the social behemoth’s offer so appealing. Plus, publishers get to keep some or all of the ad revenue, and they also get data about what users are doing with their content, which is always useful.

????The part of this deal that makes it a classic Faustian bargain is that Facebook arguably gets more from the arrangement than publishers do. How could that be, when it is giving away all the revenue? Because Facebook doesn’t really care about the revenue from ads around news content (although I expect most partners will take the 70% deal, if not now then later, because Facebook is better at selling ads). What Facebook wants is to deepen and strengthen its hold on users.

????In that sense, news content is just a means to an end. And the risk is that if it stops being an effective means to that end, then Facebook will lose interest in promoting it. But in the meantime, Facebook will have solidified its status as the default place where millions or possibly even billions of people go to get their news. In other words, it will still own the land, and who farms which specific patch of that land is irrelevant.