????對高盛來說，挑戰(zhàn)在于：雖然11%的凈資產(chǎn)收益率目前尚可接受，但一旦美國利率上調(diào)，這就遠遠不夠了。當美國國債回到4%或5%的歷史標準收益率水平，高評級的公司債券也又多上漲了幾個百分點，那時投資者就會希望能從高盛這些投資銀行獲得更好的回報。高盛的利潤主要來自于交易，這一塊仍很容易遭遇急遽下滑。例如在2011年，高盛的凈資產(chǎn)收益率就僅有3.6%。相比之下，隨著利率上調(diào)，其他大銀行基本可以確保利潤和凈資產(chǎn)收益率大幅增長。如果加息，他們將可以在低成本存款和抵押貸款、以及公司貸款利率的息差擴大中獲得豐厚利潤。

????如果高盛的收益率能夠上漲，將大大提振市場的信心。但是事實卻恰恰相反。高盛很難找到利潤豐厚的領域進行再投資。實際上，該公司承認自2011年以來回購了高達122億美元的股份。不過，仍然有相當一部分收入投入到各項業(yè)務上，這些新鮮的投資產(chǎn)生的回報差強人意。自2005年以來，其普通股的基數(shù)從235億美元增加到744億美元，增幅為510億美元。但是這八年里，高盛的盈利僅增加了32.5億美元。所以，新增股本的回報僅為6.4%。

????最近的情況同樣讓人擔心。從2013年6月到2014年6月這12個月里，高盛的股本增加了16億美元，而同期，該公司的盈利則從84億美元跌至76億美元。由于股本增加而利潤下滑，其凈資產(chǎn)收益率從11.8%跌到了10.6%。

????高盛的主營交易業(yè)務令疲弱的回報雪上加霜。目前，高盛從客戶手中購買的庫存股約為3,500億美元，該公司力求以最大的利潤率轉(zhuǎn)售。2008年至2010年，高盛的交易賬戶平均回報為3.8%。但是自2011年以來，利潤率嚴重縮水到1.2%至1.3%。

????問題很簡單：庫存的“周轉(zhuǎn)”無法達到以前的水平，因為對沖基金、共同基金和其他客戶的交易均已放緩。息差也無法達到金融危機之后的水平。

????要重現(xiàn)往昔的輝煌，高盛需要大幅提升其交易賬戶的回報。這是推升凈資產(chǎn)收益率，從而在未來加息的環(huán)境中搶占優(yōu)勢的關鍵。

????在2013年的股東委托書中，高盛設定了12%的凈資產(chǎn)收益率目標，以能夠完全支付公司的長期薪酬方案。這一比例僅略微高于之前的10%，對于高盛強硬的管理層來說，這個目標可以說是非常卑微。但是，即便是12%，對于高盛來說也不容易。

????“12%的目標仍然是很低的。”戴維斯說，“我認為應該是14%到16%。”他相信高盛可以達到目標。“如果某項業(yè)務達不到15%的凈資產(chǎn)收益率，他們可能就會放棄這塊。這可能需要好幾年的時間才能理順。但是，如果其他人能找到出路，那么他們也能。”

????事實上，如果利率上調(diào)，投資者會涌向債券市場，交易可能會暴增。這一趨勢正是高盛所急需的：增加周轉(zhuǎn)率，并且大型的證券投資組合利潤上揚。高盛的支持者們還提出，美國新的銀行資本充足率要求，導致大銀行已退出固定收益、外匯和大宗商品交易。所以，高盛可能會發(fā)現(xiàn)它在這些領域可以“一覽眾山小”。

????這種情況完全有可能發(fā)生。另外的一個變數(shù)是，高盛占據(jù)優(yōu)勢的債券交易業(yè)務可能會重蹈股票交易的覆轍。股票交易業(yè)務曾經(jīng)極為賺錢，但是現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)淪為在電子平臺執(zhí)行的低利潤率商品化交易。新的銀行規(guī)定要求衍生品也進行電子交易。如果不透明的債券市場的競爭因此有增無減，高盛將難以保住過去的一流盈利能力。但是，如果固定收益市場盛景再現(xiàn)，尤其是高盛如果能殺出重圍，成為債券交易界無可匹敵的霸主，那么這將是一條引領其走向偉大復興的道路。這就好比洋基隊在世界職業(yè)棒球大賽（World Series）中再一次揚眉吐氣。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

????For Goldman, the challenge is that an 11% ROE may be acceptable for now, but it will be far from adequate once interest rates rise. With treasuries back at their historic norms of 4% or 5%, and highly rated corporate bonds offering a couple of points more, investors will want better things from the likes of Goldman. Its profits, dominated by trading, are still vulnerable to sharp declines. In 2011, for example, Goldman earned a puny ROE of 3.6%. By contrast, the big banks can practically guarantee large increases in profits and ROE as interest rates increase. When that happens, they’ll benefit handsomely from the rising spread between the low-cost deposits and the rates on their mortgages and corporate loans.

????It would bolster confidence if Goldman’s numbers were headed in the right direction. They’re not. Goldman is having difficulty finding profitable places to reinvest its earnings. It has essentially admitted as much by re-purchasing $12.2 billion in its own shares since 2011. But it’s still investing much of its earnings in the businesses, and those fresh investments are garnering sub-par returns. Since 2005, its common equity base has increased from $23.5 billion to $74.4 billion, an increase of $51 billion. But over those eight years, it’s added just $3.25 billion in earnings. So the return on newly added equity is a mere 6.4%.

????Nor is the recent story reassuring. In the 12 months from June 2013 to June 2014, Goldman added $1.6 billion in capital. Its 12-month trailing earnings during that period, however, declined from $8.4 billion to $7.6 billion. So its ROE, driven by higher capital and lower profits, actually dropped from 11.8% to just over 10.6%.

????These sluggish returns have been weighed down by Goldman’s primary franchise, trading. Today, Goldman holds an inventory of around $350 billion in securities that it has purchased from clients, and seeks to resell, at the widest margins possible. From 2008 to 2010, Goldman earned an average of 3.8% on its trading book. But since 2011, the margin has dwindled to a slender 1.2% to 1.3%.

????The problem is basic: That inventory isn’t “turning over” nearly as fast as it used to, because hedge funds, mutual funds, and other clients have slowed the pace of their trading. Nor are spreads nearly as rich as in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

????To return to its glory days, Goldman will need to generate far higher returns on that trading book. That’s the ticket to driving returns on equity to heights that would prove alluring in the coming, rising-rate environment of tomorrow.

????In its 2013 proxy statement, Goldman revealed that it has set a 12% ROE target for a full payout on its long-term compensation plan. That’s an increase from just 10%, a surprisingly modest goal for such a hard-charging management team. But to reach even 12%, Goldman still has a ways to go.

????“The 12% target is still a low bar,” says Davis. “I’m thinking 14% to 16% is where they should be.” He believes Goldman will get there. “If they can’t get to a 15% ROE in a business, they’ll get out of it,” he says. “It will take them a couple of years to get through it. If anyone can figure it out, they can.”

????Indeed, when interest rates rise, trading could explode as investors pile into bonds. That trend would produce what Goldman needs most: A jump in turnover and margins in its big securities portfolio. Goldman fans also argue that because of the new capital requirements, big banks have exited fixed income, currency, and commodities trading. Hence, Goldman could find itself in a more commanding position than at any time in its recent history.

????That scenario is certainly possible. It’s also possible that bond trading, Goldman’s strength, could go the way of market making in equities. Once highly lucrative, stock trading has become a low-margin, commoditized field executed on electronic platforms. New banking regulations mandate that derivatives go electronic as well. If the opaque bond market becomes more, rather than less, competitive, Goldman will fail to restore its once-sovereign profitability. If fixed income booms again—and especially if Goldman emerges as the unchallenged king of bond trading—it will be on the road to a great restoration. Think of it as the Yankees capturing yet another World Series.