????高盛（Goldman Sachs）本應警惕持有黃金的厄瓜多爾人。

????本月初，厄瓜多爾宣布與高盛進行了466,000根金條的掉期交易。以當前價格計算，這些黃金價值近6億美元。作為回報，高盛支付給厄瓜多爾“高安全性和高流動性的金融工具”，可能是現金或類現金形式。

????而厄瓜多爾得以保有這些黃金。根據交易約定，從現在起三年后，雙方將進行反向掉期。厄瓜多爾將拿回自己的黃金。而高盛將按2017年的金價，獲得這466,000根金條的價款。

????一個國家與華爾街進行黃金掉期交易有很多原因。它可能急需現金，但不想表現出來。厄瓜多爾的赤字預計今年將達到50億美元的創紀錄水平。世界各國都在國庫中存有大量黃金，以便證明自己的經濟或貨幣擁有償付能力。問題是，大量的黃金并不能為你的國民購買產品，也不能購買服務，至少不能直接購買。你需要現金來完成購買。

????你可以賣出黃金來獲得現金。但出售黃金會讓你的債權人、貿易伙伴和國民不安。 厄瓜多爾當然不想這么做。因此，厄瓜多爾只是將黃金進行掉期操作。這里看不出什么問題。

????但厄瓜多爾在談到為何進行此項掉期交易時，給出的理由可不是這個。不是，這個國家表示，它這么做的原因是，它找到了一條賺錢的新途徑。

????“黃金在國庫里不產生任何回報，還產生儲存費用。現在變成了可以創造利潤的生產資產，”厄瓜多爾央行在宣布此項交易的一份聲明中表示。“這些介入黃金市場的交易代表了央行一項全新的長期性策略的開始，即通過購買、出售和金融操作，積極參與黃金市場，創造新的金融投資機會。”

????聽起來不錯，當然，前提是你得了解華爾街近年來的掉期交易歷史。美國很多城市至今仍然深陷2005年和2006年時與華爾街銀行簽訂的利率掉期協議，這些協議在金融危機期間毀于一旦。底特律不得不支付數億美元來解除它與大銀行簽訂的這些災難性掉期協議，加速推動了這個城市的破產。但華爾街最臭名昭著的掉期交易是高盛與希臘簽署的交易，幫助這個負債累累的國家將債務問題掩蓋了近10年。這筆交易最終讓希臘人付出了近10億美元，為高盛帶來了巨額收入。

????這個慘痛的教訓讓很多政府對華爾街承諾的“金融操作”將創造新的投資“機會”產生了質疑。

????去年，手頭有點緊的委內瑞拉考慮過進行一項類似的黃金掉期交易，交易對手也是高盛。但最終，委內瑞拉認定這是一筆糟糕的交易，選擇了退出。

????但厄瓜多爾不這么認為。厄瓜多爾宣布這筆交易的當天，這個國家表示，它將從交易中獲益1,600萬至2,000萬美元。華爾街，請接招吧。厄瓜多爾政府贏過一次。

????問題是，厄瓜多爾最終如何能在這筆黃金掉期交易中真正賺到這2,000萬美元尚不十分清晰。黃金掉期與抵押貸款十分接近。高盛基本上是把錢借給厄瓜多爾三年，并將厄瓜多爾的黃金作為抵押品。通常，大家要為類似這樣的貸款支付利息或費用。委內瑞拉表示，這筆18億美元的黃金掉期交易七年的融資成本是8億美元。基于此，厄瓜多爾可能會為這項掉期向高盛支付1億多美元。除此之外，如果黃金價格在未來3年內上漲，厄瓜多爾最終可能需支付給高盛更多的錢。

????但有幾種途徑厄瓜多爾可以最終從這筆交易中賺到2,000萬美元。厄瓜多爾可能賭未來3年金價下跌20%。另一種途徑是，厄瓜多爾可以將此次掉期交易獲得的現金投資于未來3年可以獲得20%回報的其他投資，但鑒于普通債券的收益率僅為1.8%，這可絕對不是件容易的事。

????或者，厄瓜多爾再進行另外一項掉期交易，拿從高盛獲得的現金換厄瓜多爾債券。當然，它還必須為此再給高盛付費。但這項掉期將獲得美國3年期利率（約0.85%）與厄瓜多爾利率（7%或8%左右）之間的息差，3年將獲得20%多一點的回報。

????那么，為什么其他人不做厄瓜多爾的掉期交易?我的意思是說，這是穩賺的錢。首先，高盛或其他銀行做這些交易收取的費用必定很高。其次，如果厄瓜多爾違約，你會損失所有的錢，而且你仍舊還得償付掉期。

????而且，厄瓜多爾近年來違約過，差不多算違約吧。5年前，厄瓜多爾忽悠它的債權人認為，它即將對自己的債務進行違約。它告訴銀行和投資者稱，它認為自己不能償付約30億美元的債券。正如大家能夠預料到的一樣，這些債券價格開始暴跌，厄瓜多爾當初借的1美元跌到了約0.30美元。

????這些債券價格暴跌后，厄瓜多爾開始買進，最終買進了90%的暴跌后債券。此舉抹除了債務，為這個國家節約了近20億美元，這也正是這些銀行和投資者在這些債券上損失的錢。

????這可是厄瓜多爾的一筆好買賣。當然，前提是它以后再也不想借錢。如今，厄瓜多爾預計將出現創紀錄的赤字，它不得不借錢。厄瓜多爾最近宣布計劃發售約7億美元的政府債券。

????鑒于厄瓜多爾近年來的行徑，大家可以預料到銀行和投資者都不太愿意購買這些債券。但可以說服投資者認可的一件事情是，它剛剛從高盛獲得了大筆現金。

????當然，如果我是一名潛在的投資者，我可能要問的一個問題是，“對于這樣一個國家，悍然押注6億美元于金價、簽訂復雜的掉期協議且正在啟動尋求‘新金融投資機會'計劃、要把央行變成一個國家對沖基金，我真的愿意借錢給它嗎？”我的意思是，這聽起來風險有點高。

????當然，除非這個國家對沖基金知道如何在這項交易中打贏高盛。然后，我才會出手。（財富中文網）

????譯者: 早稻米

????Goldman Sachs should have been wary of Ecuadorians bearing gold.

????On Tuesday, Ecuador announced that it had swapped 466,000 bars of gold with Goldman. The gold is worth nearly $600 million, based on current prices. Goldman , in return, is giving the Ecuadorians “instruments of high security and liquidity,” which is likely cash or something close to it.

????And Ecuador gets to keep its gold. As part of the deal, three years from now, the two will reverse the swap. Ecuador gets its gold back. And Goldman gets the going price for 466,000 yellow bars in 2017.

????There are a number of reasons a country would do a gold swap with Wall Street. A nation could be desperate for cash, but doesn’t want to seem like it. Ecuador’s deficit is expected to reach a record $5 billion this year. Countries around the world keep piles of gold in their vaults to prove that their economies, and their currencies, are solvent. The problem is piles of gold won’t buy you goods and services for your countrymen, at least not directly. You need cash for that.

????You can get cash by selling your gold. But selling your gold will make your lenders, trading partners, and citizens nervous. And Ecuador really doesn’t want to do that. Instead, Ecuador is just swapping its gold. Nothing to see here.

????But that’s not the reason Ecuador says it is doing the swap. No, it says it’s doing it because it has found a new way to make money.

????“Gold that was not generating any returns in vaults, causing storage costs, now becomes a productive asset that will generate profits,” the Ecuadorian central bank said in a statement when it announced the deal. “These interventions in the gold market represent the beginning of a new and permanent strategy of active participation by the bank, through purchases, sales and financial operations, that will contribute to the creation of new financial investment opportunities.”

????Sounds good, unless of course you know anything about the recent history of Wall Street’s swap deals. Cities around the country have been trying to get out of interest rate swaps they signed with Wall Street banks back in 2005 and 2006 that blew up during the financial crisis. Detroit has had to pay hundreds of millions of dollars to unwind the disastrous swaps it inked with big banks, helping propel that city into bankruptcy. But Wall Street’s most notorious swap deal is the one Goldman did with Greece, which helped that debt-strapped country hide its problems for nearly a decade. That deal ended up costing the Greeks about $1 billion and created a huge payday for Goldman.

????That fiasco led many governments to grow skeptical of “financial operations” that Wall Street promises will create new investment “opportunities.”

????Last year, Venezuela, also somewhat cash-strapped, considered doing a similar gold swap, also with Goldman. But that nation eventually concluded that it was a bad deal and backed out.

????Ecuador, though, thinks otherwise. On the day the country announced the deal, Ecuador also said it expects to make $16 million to $20 million on the trade. Take that, Wall Street. Main Street, albeit in Ecuador, wins for once.

????The problem is it’s not quite clear how Ecuador could actually end up making $20 million on its gold swap. A gold swap is pretty close to a collateralized loan. Goldman is essentially lending Ecuador money for three years, and taking its gold as collateral. Typically, you pay interest or a fee for a loan like that. Venezuela said its $1.8 billion gold swap was going to cost $800 million in financing over seven years. Based on that, Ecuador could be paying Goldman a little over $100 million for its swap. On top of that, Ecuador would end up owing Goldman even more money if the price of gold rises over the next three years.

????But there are a few ways Ecuador could end up making $20 million on the deal. Ecuador could be betting that the price of gold will fall 20% over the next three years. Another way would be for Ecuador to take the cash it gets from the swap and invest it elsewhere in something that will make 20% over the next three years, not an easy task given that the average bond is yielding just 1.8%.

????Or Ecuador could have done another swap, this time with the dollars it received from Goldman for Ecuadorian bonds. It would, of course, have to pay Goldman another fee for that. But that swap would pay the spread between U.S. three-year interest rates at about 0.85%, and Ecuadorian interest rates, which are around 7% or 8%, or a little over 20% during the three years.

????So, then, why isn’t everyone doing Ecuadorian swaps? I mean, it’s guaranteed money. For one, the fee that Goldman or anyone else charges to do these deals must be pretty high. Also, if Ecuador defaults, you lose all your money, and you still have to repay the swap.

????And Ecuador has recently defaulted, sort of. Five years ago, Ecuador tricked its lenders into thinking it was going to default on its debt. It told banks and investors that it didn’t think it would be able to repay about $3 billion in bonds. Those bonds, as you would expect, plunged in value to about $0.30 for every dollar Ecuador had borrowed.

????Once the bonds plunged in value, Ecuador started buying them, eventually snapping up 90% of the much cheaper bonds. The move wiped out the debt and saved the country nearly $2 billion, which was also how much the banks and investors lost on those bonds.

????This was a great trade for Ecuador. Unless, of course, it ever wanted to borrow again. Now that Ecuador is projecting a record deficit, it has to. Ecuador recently announced plans to sell about $700 million in government bonds.

????You would expect banks and investors to be reluctant to purchase those bonds, given Ecuador’s recent history. One thing, though, that could persuade investors to buy in is if Ecuador can show that it just got a bunch of cash from Goldman.

????Of course, one thing I might ask if I were a potential investor is, “Do I really want to be lending to a country that is making $600 million bets on the price of gold, writing complicated swaps, and generally embarking on a plan to pursue ‘new financial investment opportunities,’ essentially turning its central bank into a nationalized hedge fund?” I mean, that sounds kind of risky.

????Unless, of course, that nationalized hedge fund knows how to out-trade Goldman Sachs. Then I’m in.