????格拉塞克指出，交易業(yè)務(wù)約占高盛收入的一半。另外，直接投資對(duì)這家公司收入的貢獻(xiàn)率為17%，而部分直接投資的渠道是高盛的私募基金和對(duì)沖基金。預(yù)計(jì)《沃爾克規(guī)則》將大幅壓縮投行向此類投資載體投入資金的規(guī)模。我的同事丹?普利麥克已經(jīng)詳細(xì)解釋了為什么高盛退出這些投資領(lǐng)域的速度比其他投行慢。總之，格拉塞克的觀點(diǎn)是，《沃爾克規(guī)則》有可能讓高盛在這方面的收入減少25%，約占這家公司全部收入的17%。

????但高盛受到的影響可能不止于此。和其他公司不同的是，高盛從未按業(yè)務(wù)類型對(duì)自身利潤進(jìn)行過分解。一般來說，交易業(yè)務(wù)的利潤率往往會(huì)高于其他業(yè)務(wù)。因此，如果這類收入下降17%，由此造成的實(shí)際利潤跌幅有可能更大，比如，可能達(dá)到20%。

????權(quán)益回報(bào)率是金融公司的關(guān)鍵指標(biāo)之一，高盛一直無法讓自己的權(quán)益回報(bào)率回到金融危機(jī)之前的水平，其他投行也是如此。上個(gè)季度，高盛的權(quán)益回報(bào)率剛剛超過10%。受《沃爾克規(guī)則》影響，明年這個(gè)數(shù)字可能下降到7%，遠(yuǎn)低于金融危機(jī)前高盛經(jīng)常公布的水平，也就是20%。

????野村證券（Nomura）分析師格倫?肖爾說：“問題在于高盛的方向性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是否超過其他投行，以及它能否繼續(xù)開展此類業(yè)務(wù)。這是個(gè)涉及到公平的問題。”

????有一個(gè)方案：每個(gè)季度，各家公司都公布自己的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)價(jià)值。這項(xiàng)數(shù)據(jù)的作用是追蹤各家投行在日常交易過程中可能蒙受的損失。高盛的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)價(jià)值低于幾年前，但仍高于大多數(shù)競(jìng)爭對(duì)手。上個(gè)季度，高盛的平均風(fēng)險(xiǎn)價(jià)值為8000萬美元。而高盛最主要競(jìng)爭對(duì)手的平均風(fēng)險(xiǎn)價(jià)值為6500萬美元，也就是說高盛交易業(yè)務(wù)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)要高于摩根士丹利、摩根大通等公司。

????實(shí)際情況也許不是這樣。許多人都認(rèn)為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)價(jià)值并不是可靠的數(shù)據(jù)，而且金融公司可以靈活決定如何在報(bào)表中公布這項(xiàng)數(shù)據(jù)。高盛披露的經(jīng)營信息不足以打消這些疑問。不過，鑒于《沃爾克規(guī)則》再次蓄勢(shì)待發(fā)，我們也許很快就會(huì)找到答案。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

????譯者：Charlie??

????But the impact could be larger than that. Unlike other firms, Goldman does not break out the profits it gets from its various lines of business. Typically, trading revenue tends to be more profitable than other lines of business. So, a 17% drop in revenue coming from that business could lead to a bigger drop when it comes to the actual bottom line, say 20%.

????Like other banks, Goldman has struggled to get its return on equity, a key metric for financial firms, back to where it was before the financial crisis. Last quarter, Goldman's ROE was just over 10%. The hit from Volcker could take Goldman's ROE down to 7% next year, well below the 20% it used to regularly report before the financial crisis.

????"The question is whether Goldman takes on more directional risk than others, and whether they will still be able to do it," says Glenn Schorr, an analyst at Nomura. "It's a fair question."

????One answer: Every quarter, firms report a figure called value at risk, which is supposed to track how much money a bank stands to lose trading each day. Goldman's VAR is down from what it was a few years ago. But it is still higher than most of its rivals. In the most recent quarter, Goldman's VAR averaged $80 million. That compares to an average of $68.5 million at Goldman's closest rivals, suggesting that Goldman is conducting riskier trading than Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan, and others.

????That might not be the case. Many say VAR isn't a reliable stat, and firms have leeway in how they report it. Goldman doesn't disclose enough about its business to figure all this out. But with the Volcker Rule now back on track, we may soon find out.