????美國最大的銀行摩根大通（JPMorgan Chase）正在經(jīng)受監(jiān)管機構(gòu)史無前例的大審查，同時面臨包括營銷欺詐、賄賂、操縱市場和風險管理重大失誤等多項指控。或許，摩根大通現(xiàn)在是時候考慮一下變通戰(zhàn)略，盡力做到讓監(jiān)管機構(gòu)滿意，同時推動市值提升并為未來打下一個穩(wěn)固的基礎(chǔ)。

????目前摩根大通正在考慮出售一些類似學生貸款這樣的非核心資產(chǎn)，但這絲毫不會讓監(jiān)管機構(gòu)感到滿意，也不會增加價值。這家銀行的CEO杰米?戴蒙需要認識到的一點是：真正的問題并不在于它管理的資產(chǎn)規(guī)模，而是業(yè)務(wù)部門程度不同的風險。

????要解決這一問題，摩根大通應(yīng)考慮將業(yè)務(wù)重組分為三大塊，每塊業(yè)務(wù)都分拆成一個獨立的公司，由現(xiàn)有股東以及通過IPO參與進來的新股東共同持有。這三塊業(yè)務(wù)將由摩根大通現(xiàn)有五個部門的各項業(yè)務(wù)組成，分別為：

????? 傳統(tǒng)銀行（由存款業(yè)務(wù)，消費、企業(yè)和按揭貸款業(yè)務(wù)構(gòu)成）

????? 投資銀行和資產(chǎn)管理（由咨詢服務(wù)、籌資、做市和伴隨交易、個人及機構(gòu)資產(chǎn)管理構(gòu)成）

????? 自營交易（由部門自有資本進行的所有交易活動，相對于做市相關(guān)交易活動）

????這三塊業(yè)務(wù)的風險/回報特點迥異，對銀行資產(chǎn)負債表有著非常不同的需求。傳統(tǒng)銀行業(yè)務(wù)需要計提較高的貸款準備金，相對不受市場波動影響，提供可預期的低回報（低風險/低回報)；投資銀行和資產(chǎn)管理業(yè)務(wù)所需的自有資本不多（臨時做市需求除外），提供高回報，但容易受市況波動影響（中等風險/高回報）；而自營交易業(yè)務(wù)需要大量資本，高風險，但如果押注正確，可以提供超高回報（高風險/高回報）。

????這三塊業(yè)務(wù)如果分別上市交易，就可以根據(jù)它們各自的風險和回報特點進行估值，生成更準確的估值。更重要的是，將傳統(tǒng)銀行、投資銀行和自營交易分拆成立為三家獨立自負盈虧的公司有望極大地滿足政府監(jiān)管機構(gòu)，而且在我看來，還能促進更佳的風險管理。另外，三家公司的估值之和可能還會高于整一家公司，因為分拆后業(yè)務(wù)之間不再有利益輸送，每項業(yè)務(wù)都是自負盈虧。

????盡管利潤創(chuàng)紀錄，但摩根大通的估值一直以來都低于同行，當前股價動態(tài)市盈率約為8.3倍，明顯低于美國銀行（Bank of America）、富國銀行（Well Fargo）等其他大銀行10.2倍或更高的市盈率。這當然是因為摩根大通面臨諸多法律難題，還有一邊倒的負面輿論。另一個可能的因素是戴蒙與美國監(jiān)管機構(gòu)關(guān)系進展，特別是在多德-弗蘭克（Dodd-Frank）法案這個問題上。

????敏銳的觀察者會意識到，這樣的一分為三正是1934年格拉斯-斯蒂格爾法案（Glass-Steagall Act of 1934）的再現(xiàn)。格拉斯-斯蒂格爾法案強制分離投資銀行和商業(yè)銀行業(yè)務(wù)，以期控制銀行內(nèi)部風險，這正是2008年之后的市場環(huán)境所需要的。摩根大通可能是美國最大的銀行，它或許比其他銀行更好地抵御了此次金融危機，但這不能讓它免受當前現(xiàn)實狀況的影響，行動是當務(wù)之急。

????As the nation's largest bank undergoes an unprecedented onslaught of regulatory scrutiny and fends off charges or investigations of fraudulent marketing practices, bribery, market manipulation, and gross mismanagement of risk, perhaps it is time for JPMorgan Chase to consider strategic alternatives that could satisfy regulators, increase its market value, and lay a secure foundation for the future.

????While the bank is currently contemplating offloading some non-core assets, such as its student loan business, that will do little to appease regulators or add value. What the bank's CEO Jamie Dimon needs to realize is that the real problem does not lie in the actual sizeof the assets it manages, but in the varying risk profiles across its divisions.

????To address this, JPM should consider reorganizing its business into three broad divisions and spinning off each of the divisions into a separate company, shares of which would be held both by existing shareholders as well as new ones through IPOs. The three divisions, which would comprise parts of the existing five divisions of the bank, should be:

????? Traditional Banking (consisting of deposits and consumer, corporate, and mortgage lending)

????Investment Banking and Asset Management (consisting of advisory services, capital raising, market-making and accompanying trading, and asset management for individuals and institutions)

????? Proprietary Trading (consisting of all trading activities with the division's own capital as opposed to the trading activities involved in market making)

????These three business lines have very distinct risk profiles, very distinct returns, and very different demands on a bank's balance sheet. Traditional banking requires high capital reserves against loans but is relatively immune to market volatility and provides predictable, if modest, returns (LOW RISK/LOW REWARD); investment banking and asset management require little proprietary capital (except temporarily for market making) and provide high returns but can fluctuate somewhat in response to market conditions (MODEST RISK/HIGH REWARD); and proprietary trading requires vast amounts of capital and is highly risky but can provide oversize returns if the bets are good (HIGH RISK/HIGH REWARD).

????Each of these divisions then, if traded separately in the market, can be valued based on their appetite for risk and desire for returns, yielding more accurate valuations. More importantly, separating out traditional banking, investment banking, and proprietary trading into standalone companies with their own balance sheets will go a long way in assuaging government regulators and, in my assessment, promoting better risk management. This in turn is likely to lead to a higher valuation for the sum of the parts compared to the whole because of a lack of profit-bleed between the businesses and greater accountability within each publicly traded division.

????JPMorgan (JPM) has long been undervalued relative to its peers, trading currently in the range of 8.3 times forward P/E versus 10.2 or more for other large banks like Bank of America (BAC) and Well Fargo (WFC), despite its record profits. That is no doubt due to the many legal troubles that the bank is facing, not to mention the bad press that the bank has sustained, and even perhaps due to the antagonistic relationship that Dimon has had with US regulators, particularly over Dodd-Frank.

????A sharp observer will recognize that such a spin-off into three divisions would be a voluntary re-creation of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1934, which mandated the separation of investment and commercial banking with the aim of controlling risk within banks, but that is precisely what is needed in the post-2008 environment. JPM may be the nation's largest bank and it may have weathered the financial crisis better than others, but that does not make it immune to the reality it is facing now, and action is imperative.