????曾經(jīng)有某個時刻，伊克希爾開了小差。政府的指控書顯示，伊克希爾切斷了自己和馬丁-阿塔霍的聯(lián)系，開始向公司里的其他高管報告損失，而且他報告的虧損數(shù)字也超過了馬丁-阿塔霍打算承認(rèn)的水平。伊克希爾還告訴另外兩名交易員，坦白的時候到了。有了這樣的態(tài)度，再加上和政府合作，這似乎就是伊克希爾沒有遭到起訴的原因。

????具有諷刺意味的是，在這三個人中，是格魯首先警告伊克希爾衍生產(chǎn)品交易可能帶來巨額虧損。1月初，格魯曾為公司起草了一份平倉計劃，但這樣做可能帶來5億美元（30.85億元人民幣）的損失。伊克希爾和馬丁-阿塔霍對此婉言謝絕。

????從本質(zhì)上講，政府起訴的是交易員掩蓋損失的行為。而這正是伊克希爾在2011年底的所作所為。如果有許多公司破產(chǎn)，伊克希爾的投資就能賺錢。但當(dāng)時美國經(jīng)濟(jì)正在好轉(zhuǎn)，沒有出現(xiàn)大批公司倒閉的局面。就這樣，伊克希爾的交易活動給公司帶來的成本變得越來越大。

????因此，伊克希爾想了個辦法來保住自己的交易倉位，他像變魔術(shù)一樣讓這筆投資突然顯得有利可圖。他找到的方法是針對一只走勢稍有不同的指數(shù)建立大量對沖倉位，從而讓自己手中緩慢虧損的資產(chǎn)出現(xiàn)正向金流。這種做法非常聰明，但也可能讓公司蒙受的損失大幅度上升。

????摩根大通本不該允許他這樣做。但伊克希爾的上司，包括德魯和承擔(dān)一部分責(zé)任的戴蒙，都認(rèn)可了新的風(fēng)險模型，從而使原本巨大的投資倉位顯得好像比較小，至少風(fēng)險較小。美國參議院調(diào)查交易損失之后，對摩根大通提出譴責(zé)。原因是它沒有將調(diào)整風(fēng)險模型一事告訴投資者，而不是因為它調(diào)整了風(fēng)險模型。摩根大通和其他銀行一直在調(diào)整模型。這是合法行為。

????本次“倫敦鯨”事件的不同之處在于，伊克希爾、德魯以及其他沒有受到指控的摩根大通成員以符合監(jiān)管規(guī)定的方式掩蓋了本公司的投資損失，而另一方面，馬丁-阿塔霍和格魯在這樣做時則撒了謊。兩種做法產(chǎn)生的結(jié)果相同，它們都造成投資者和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)在摩根大通的潛在損失問題上受到了誤導(dǎo)。

????有人可能會問，伊克希爾等人為什么沒有遭到指控？這不是司法部或SEC的過錯。甚至，它實際上也不是伊克希爾的問題。他發(fā)現(xiàn)同事們的行為已經(jīng)從扭曲市場規(guī)則變成了違反法律，而且他不愿意同流合污。這不是什么正義行為，但也沒有錯。

????真正有問題的是我們的金融監(jiān)管機(jī)制，它過于復(fù)雜而且充滿漏洞，它讓金融機(jī)構(gòu)得以隱藏一直存在的巨額損失。這些窟窿都由政府來補(bǔ)，如果局面變得不可收拾，納稅人就得出錢。最后，華爾街的戴蒙們和“鯨”們從這次事件中獲得的訊息是，只要夠聰明，他們就可以繼續(xù)這么干，而且繼續(xù)逍遙自在。太不幸了。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

????譯者：Charlie??

????At some point along the way, Iksil jumps ship. According to the government's case, Iksil breaks with Martin-Artajo and starts reporting larger losses than Martin-Artajo wants to acknowledge to others at the bank. And he tells the other two traders that it's time to come clean. That, along with the fact that Iksil is cooperating with the government, appears to be why Iksil is not being charged.

????Ironically, Grout was the first of the three to warn that Iksil's derivative trades could produce huge losses. In early January, Grout drew up a plan for the bank to get out of the trades, but it would end up creating a $500 million loss. Iksil and Martin-Artajo told him no thanks.

????At the heart of it, the government's case is about traders hiding their losses. And back in late 2011, that's exactly what Iksil did. He had a portfolio of bets that would pay off if a bunch of companies defaulted. But the U.S. economy was improving and that wasn't happening. So Iksil's trades were becoming costly for the bank.

????So Iksil came up with a way to keep the trade on, but make it magically look like it was all of a sudden profitable. He figured out a way by taking on a massive amount of offsetting bets on a slightly different index to make his slowly losing trading into one that was cashflow positive, which was brilliant, but also opened the bank up to a lot more risk.

????That shouldn't have been allowed. But Iksil's superiors -- including Drew, and in part Dimon -- signed off on new risk models that would make the vastly larger portfolio appear like it was actually smaller, at least risk-wise. The Senate's investigation into the trading loss criticized JPMorgan for not telling investors that it changed its risk model, not actually for changing its model. JPMorgan and other banks change their models all the time. It's allowed.

????The difference here is that Iksil and Drew and the others at JPMorgan not facing charges hid the losses in the bank's portfolio in a regulatory compliant kind of way. Martin-Artajo and Grout, on the other hand, did it in a lying kind of way. The end result of both techniques were the same: Investors and regulators were misled as to the size of JPMorgan's potential losses.

????There will be some griping as to why Iksil and other weren't charged as well. But that's not the fault of the Justice Department or the SEC. Or really Iksil's either. He knew when his colleagues had crossed over from bending the rules of the market to breaking the laws of the land, and he wasn't willing to follow. That's not quite righteous, but it isn't wrong either.

????What's really at fault is our still overly complicated, loophole-ridden financial regulations that allow banks to hide the huge risks they take all the time that are subsidized by the government and that taxpayers would have to pay for if they go colossally bad. In the end, the message to Wall Street of Jamie and the Whale is, unfortunately, that you can still do that and stay out of jail, as long as you are clever about it.