????“倫敦鯨”生生不息。

????美國政府稱，摩根大通（JPMorgan Chase）的60億美元（370.2億元人民幣）交易損失與員工的欺詐行為有關。這樣的判斷將在華爾街引起前所未有的反響，而它的最奇妙之處不在于誰受到了指控，而在于誰沒有受到指控。

????長期擔任首席投資官的艾娜?德魯是促使摩根大通更敢于冒險的人，而且對公司的交易情況了如指掌，但她一項罪名也沒有（為什么不指控她監督不力呢？）。首席執行官杰米?戴蒙也是如此。雖然不清楚具體虧損數額，但戴蒙清楚“倫敦鯨”的交易規模。即便如此，他仍對投資者說“倫敦鯨”事件是“小題大做”。戴蒙還在有問題的賬目上簽了字，但最終摩根大通不得不重述這些賬目。按照《薩班斯-奧克斯利法案》（Sarbanes Oxley Act），高管應該對此負責。摩根大通多名負責風險控制的管理人員也沒有受到牽連。他們批準了對風險模型的調整，讓這筆前景堪憂的交易越變越大。與此同時，摩根大通的賬目則顯示，這家公司正在降低交易風險。

????同樣平安無事的還有摩根大通公司本身。美國證券交易委員會（SEC）表示，該機構的調查仍在進行之中。監管部門也已要求摩根大通加強風險控制。但摩根大通似乎認為美國政府只會小小地懲罰它一下。

????還記得“倫敦鯨”布魯諾?伊克希爾嗎？沒錯，作為這些失敗交易的實際操作者，他同樣逃過了一劫。

????美國司法部和SEC對哈維爾?馬丁-阿塔霍和朱利安?格魯的指控讓我們有機會窺見現如今成為華爾街交易員的奇妙之處，特別是那些掌握著數十億美元最危險資產的交易員。馬丁-阿塔霍是伊克希爾的頂頭上司，格魯則是伊克希爾的下屬，他負責對伊克希爾的投資進行估值并計算盈虧。

????當時，這三個人處于危急關頭，而且面對著從業以來最困難的交易局面，但政府指控書公布的三人之間的詳細對話讓人感到意外。2012年初，他們的損失有擴大的趨勢，但他們中間沒有任何一個人提出通過買賣債券或衍生產品來盡量減少損失，或者說進行交易。實際上，馬丁-阿塔霍似乎希望在盡可能長的時間里繼續持有這筆組合投資，此時其面值已達到1,570億美元（9686.9億元人民幣）。而這樣做并不是交易。

????相反，提交給法院的文件表明，這三名交易員用了大量時間（不知道是不是他們的全部時間）來討論價值和賬面數字。也就是他們持有的哪些資產有價值，以及如何讓損失看起來盡可能的小。最初他們只是進行了細微調整。到了最后，格魯計算的實際損失和他們向上報告的數字之間的差距已高達8億美元（49.36億元人民幣）。關鍵時刻，也就是今年第一季度的最后一天，馬丁-阿塔霍告訴格魯，他希望賬面上的日虧損額只有2億美元（12.34億元人民幣），盡管他們當天的新增虧損都可能比這個數字大得多。格魯按他說的做了，馬丁-阿塔霍隨后又問能不能把損失降到1.5億美元（9.26億元人民幣）。最終，他們報告的日損失額為1.38億美元（8.51億元人民幣）。

????這次事件接近尾聲時，摩根大通負責風險控制的管理人員確實找過馬丁-阿塔霍，而且要求他解釋相關投資的入賬方法。對此，馬丁-阿塔霍的回答大概是：“嘿，我可不是會計。”可以看到，這個借口相當滑稽，因為這幾個家伙似乎一直在做賬，只是他們做的不合法規。

????Long live the Whale.

????The most fascinating thing about the government's charge that JPMorgan Chase employees committed fraud in connection with the bank's $6 billion trading loss, and the one that will have the largest reverberations for Wall Street, is not who is being charged, but who isn't.

????Ina Drew, the long-time head of the chief investment office and the person who pushed the bank to take on more risk and was well aware of the trades, does not stand accused of any wrongdoing. (Why not charge her with failure to supervise?) Nor is JPMorgan's CEO Jamie Dimon, who told investors the issue of the London Whale was "a tempest in a teapot" even after he was alerted to the size of trade, if not an accurate picture of the losses. Dimon also signed off on JPMorgan's faulty books, which eventually had to be restated, something Sarbanes Oxley was supposed to hold executives accountable for. Nor are any of the bank's multiple risk officers who signed off on the change in the risk model that allowed the London Whale's ill-fated trade to get bigger, even as the bank's books appeared to show that JPMorgan was reducing its trading risks.

????Also getting off mostly scot-free is JPMorgan (JPM). The SEC says its investigation is continuing. And regulators have already ordered the bank to improve its risk controls. But it appears JPMorgan is looking at a minor slap on the wrist.

????And remember the London Whale himself, Bruno Iksil, the actual architect of the ill-fated trades? Yeah, he's off the hook as well.

????The Justice Department and the SEC's cases against Javier Martin-Artajo and Julien Grout, the two who are being charged, give an amazing window into what it's like to be a trader these days on Wall Street, especially the ones who are responsible for multi-billion dollar portfolios of the market's riskiest stuff. Martin-Artajo was Iksil's direct boss. Grout worked under Iksil, and was responsible for valuing Iksil's portfolio, computing the gains or losses.

????The conversations detailed in the government's complaints are not what you would expect from three guys in the heat of the market, facing the most difficult trade of their careers. In early 2012, when the losses appeared to be mounting, there was no discussion by any of the three about what bonds or derivatives they might sell or buy to minimize their losses -- also known as trading. In fact, Martin-Artajo seems to be driven by a desire to keep the synthetic portfolio, which had grown by this time to have a notional value of $157 billion, as is for as long as possible. That is not a trade.

????Instead, according to the court filings, the three traders spend a lot of time (all of their time?) talking about valuations and marks. What are the trades they have worth, and how can they make the losses they've got look as small as possible. It starts off as minor tweaking. By the end, Grout is maintaining a spreadsheet showing the traders' actual losses are as much as $800 million more than what they are reporting up the chain. In one telling moment, on the last day of the first quarter, Martin-Artajo tells Grout that he wants to show a daily loss of just $200 million, even though it's likely the portfolio had sunk that day alone much more than that. When Grout does this, Martin-Artajo goes back and asks whether they can get the loss number down to $150 million. The daily loss they end up reporting: $138 million.

????Late in the game a JPMorgan risk officer does catch up with Martin-Artajo and asks him to explain the way the portfolio is marked, to which Artajo responds basically, "Hey, I ain't no accountant." And that you know is a pretty funny excuse because all these guys seem to be doing is accounting, but not actually a legal one.