????按照NRA的要求，核電站得到了徹底翻新，其中包括加固基本設計方案，用新技術來防止堆芯損壞和壓力容器失效，以及花大價錢增設后備設施，比如單價約15億美元（92億元人民幣）的遠程控制中心。作出這些調(diào)整的目的是為了燃起消費者和投資者的信心。

????智囊機構日本能源經(jīng)濟研究所（Institute of Energy Economics）總裁兼董事長豐田正和認為，沒有核能，日本很快就會維持不下去。他在報告中建議，到2030年，核能在日本能源體系中的比重應該達到四分之一左右，以便優(yōu)化能源結構。豐田正和說：“除了節(jié)能，四種能源類型，即核能、可再生能源、化石能源和熱電聯(lián)產(chǎn)應當很均衡地組合起來，以多元化方式來確保能源安全。”

????他強調(diào)，這次必須由獨立機構來保證日本安全使用核能。

????實際情況表明，福島事故發(fā)生前，日本政府的指導方針和控制手段不僅不足以應對某些類型的自然災害和人為事故，還會讓情況變得更糟。以前的規(guī)定是核電站要能抗震源在正下方的6.5級地震。然而，建筑物和冷卻系統(tǒng)的設計標準并不能抵御福島三重災害中出現(xiàn)的那種強震和大海嘯。

????據(jù)反應堆工程師本山圭太介紹，包括福島核電站在內(nèi)，對反應堆設計人員的要求只是“自愿”對設計進行調(diào)整。4年前，本山圭太還在東芝（Toshiba）工作，而福島核電站中有兩座反應堆正是由東芝承建。他說：“只有政府以及我們?yōu)槠湓O計反應堆的公司給了我們一些指導意見。這些指導意見認為，地震引發(fā)核電站事故的可能性非常小。他們只要求設計公司“自愿”采取措施，比如讓反應堆壓力容器達到抗震標準。”

????天普大學日本分校（Temple University Japan）亞洲研究部門主任杰夫?金斯敦認為，這種“但愿風險別來找我”的想法表明日本核電企業(yè)有多么的愚蠢。金斯敦指出，更嚴格的法規(guī)要靠更嚴密的監(jiān)督以及積極的配合，而問題就在于日本核電工業(yè)與監(jiān)管部門一直未能實現(xiàn)分離。

????NRA的工作人員基本上都來自前核電監(jiān)管部門原子力安全保安院（NISA）。金斯敦說：“福島事故所帶來的教訓已經(jīng)得到了一定程度的消化。但那些來自NISA的員工曾在風行一時的安全檢查中避免眼神交流?！?/p>

????除了制度失效外，還有另外一個問題，那就是日本能否讓核電企業(yè)與監(jiān)管部的密切關系成為歷史。以前，這種密切關系所帶來的副作用有篡改和虛構數(shù)據(jù)，故意欺騙安全檢查人員以及隱瞞問題，比如反應堆中不受控制的臨界事故以及緊急停機等。和發(fā)電站本身不同的是，實際情況可能證明，日本核電公司的不透明文化比較難以改造。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

????譯者：Charlie

????Following the NRA's demands, power stations are undergoing extensive retrofitting. That includes a strengthening of the basic design, new technologies to prevent core damage and containment failure, as well as the addition of extra costly backups such as remote control centers each at a cost of around $1.5 billion -- changes calculated to inspire confidence in consumers and investors alike.

????CEO & Chairman of the Institute of Energy Economics think tank, Masakazu Toyoda can't see how Japan can continue in the short run without nuclear power. He suggests in a report that his country should have about a quarter of its energy from nuclear by 2030 for an optimum energy mix. "In addition to energy conservation, four types of energy, that is, nuclear energy, renewable energy, fossil energy and cogeneration should be combined in a well-balanced and diverse way to assure energy security," he says.

????He emphasizes that this time Japan's nuclear power safety must be guaranteed by an independent body.

????Pre-Fukushima government guidelines and controls turned out worse than inadequate for some types of natural disasters and man-made accidents. Past rules called for plants to be able to withstand a magnitude 6.5-class earthquake with the epicenter directly under the plant. However, buildings and cooling systems were not designed to withstand certain massive earthquakes and tsunamis as witnessed in the Fukushima triple disaster.

????Designers working on reactors like those at Fukushima were under instructions to make only "voluntary" design adjustments according to reactor engineer Dr Masashi Goto, who until four years ago worked for Toshiba which built two of the reactors at Fukushima. "We had only guidelines from the government and the companies we were designing reactors for, which suggested the chance of an accident owing to earthquakes would be minimal. They asked the companies involved in designing only to make "voluntary" efforts to make the reactor's containment vessel quake-proof, for example," he says.

????This "wishing of risk away" demonstrates the folly to which Japan's nuclear complex has been particularly prone, says Jeff Kingston, Director of Asian Studies, of Temple University Japan. He points out that stricter rules depend on stricter monitoring and robust compliance. The problem, he claims, is that the separation of industry and watchdog agencies has not been achieved.

????The new NRA is staffed largely by employees from the previous nuclear authority NISA. "To some degree the lessons of Fukushima have been absorbed, but those former NISA employees were part of the averted eyes approach to safety monitoring that has prevailed," he says.

????Aside from institutional failures, there is another question: Can Japan put its close relationship between the nuclear complex and authorities behind it? In the past, side effects of that relationship have included data falsification and fabrication, deliberately duping safety inspectors, and failure to report problems such as uncontrolled criticality incidents at reactors and emergency shutdowns. Unlike the plants themselves, the culture of opacity ingrained in Japan's nuclear nexus could prove harder to re-engineer.