????僅僅兩年半的時(shí)間里，埃及開(kāi)始了第三次基本上無(wú)計(jì)劃的政府過(guò)渡。第四次可能將在數(shù)月后爆發(fā)（希望屆時(shí)的規(guī)劃能夠更加有序）。

????無(wú)論從字面理解，還是從形勢(shì)判斷，這場(chǎng)政府過(guò)渡對(duì)埃及這個(gè)有著悠久和自豪歷史的國(guó)家而言都是一個(gè)棘手的復(fù)雜階段，而它影響的遠(yuǎn)不止既渴望擷取改革豐碩果實(shí)、又不愿陷入國(guó)內(nèi)沖突的8,500萬(wàn)埃及人。

????未來(lái)幾周，埃及人將要花大力氣舉行總統(tǒng)和議會(huì)選舉、修改憲法、鞏固國(guó)家制度。事實(shí)上，這些都是迫切需要進(jìn)行的工作。要持久有序地脫離軍隊(duì)控制、恢復(fù)民主統(tǒng)治，所有這些工作都是必要的，但還不夠。

????這一次，為了提高統(tǒng)治過(guò)渡的成功率，埃及武裝力量（現(xiàn)掌控埃及）和政治家們（再次成為統(tǒng)治權(quán)切換的接收方）可能會(huì)欣然考慮以下9點(diǎn)建議。這些見(jiàn)解是根據(jù)埃及的新舊歷史和國(guó)際經(jīng)驗(yàn)而提出的。

????孤立地看，在還未到來(lái)的另一場(chǎng)微妙和極具危險(xiǎn)性的過(guò)渡中，這里的每一條見(jiàn)解都將給埃及帶來(lái)潛在的利益。而這些見(jiàn)解的潛在累積效應(yīng)更重要。實(shí)際上，這些見(jiàn)解的集合效果遠(yuǎn)大于單個(gè)的累加，而今天的埃及正需要利用所有可能的資源，以成功駕馭這個(gè)仍然充滿(mǎn)挑戰(zhàn)、不確定性以及潛在危險(xiǎn)的短期前景。

????統(tǒng)治公信力不能再靠上天賜予，它需要每天努力地爭(zhēng)取。

????古埃及時(shí)期，執(zhí)政精英們面對(duì)的真正困難是如何獲得權(quán)力。一旦擁有了權(quán)力，整個(gè)國(guó)家機(jī)器（以及當(dāng)時(shí)繁榮昌盛的特權(quán)階級(jí)和裙帶資本主義）會(huì)從根本上進(jìn)入維持現(xiàn)狀的狀態(tài)，無(wú)論執(zhí)政者們表現(xiàn)如何都將一如既往地運(yùn)作。

????但今非昔比。

????如今，埃及的統(tǒng)治者們，不論是平民還是軍隊(duì)，都需要極頻繁地努力去爭(zhēng)取、維護(hù)大多數(shù)公民的信任。他們現(xiàn)在面對(duì)的公民曾在壓迫以及恐怖文化下生活了太久，現(xiàn)在終于有資格、有權(quán)力去影響國(guó)家的命運(yùn)。事實(shí)上，民眾當(dāng)家作主的感覺(jué)在埃及很少能如此清晰可見(jiàn)。

????Egypt is navigating its third, largely unplanned government transition in just two and a half years. A fourth one is likely to be months away (and hopefully better planned).

????Almost by definition, and certainly by force of circumstances, this is an inherently tricky phase in the country's proud and long history; and its consequences extend well beyond the 85 million Egyptians eager both to harvest the fruits of their inspiring revolution and to avoid a slide into civil conflict.

????In the coming weeks, a lot of effort will be focused on -- indeed, should urgently be devoted to -- holding presidential and parliamentary elections, revising the constitution, and strengthening the country's institutions. All this is all necessary for a durable and orderly transition away from military and back to democratic rule; but it is not sufficient.

????To enhance the probability of success this time around, Egypt's armed forces (now in charge of the country) and the politicians (again set to receive the governing handoff) may wish to consider the following nine insights. These are drawn from the country's history, old and recent, as well as international experience.

????On a standalone basis, each insight would offer Egypt potential benefits during yet another delicate and potentially precarious transition. Their would-be cumulative impact is even more important. Indeed, the collective gain could well be much larger than the sum of the individual parts. And today's Egypt needs to secure every possible advantage to successfully navigate what is still a challenging, uncertain and potentially hazardous short-term outlook.

????Governance credibility is no longer bestowed; it needs to be earned every single day.

????In the old Egypt, the really hard part for governing elites was to gain power. Once achieved, the whole apparatus of state (and the vested interests and crony capitalism that flourished then) was essentially wired to maintain the status quo, and do so regardless of performance.

????Not so in the new Egypt.

????Today, the country's rulers -- whether civilian or military -- need to earn and retain the trust of the majority of citizens on a high frequency basis. They are now dealing with citizens who, having lived for far too long under repression and a culture of fear, are empowered and entitled to influence their country's destiny. Indeed, the feeling of popular ownership has rarely been so visible and pronounced.