????剛剛早上八點，當年由西方傳教士創建、目前依然是中國最大的醫療中心的仁濟醫院（Renji Hospital）就已經人滿為患。醫院候診區擠滿了焦急等待就診的患者。首先，他們得在一塊巨大的霓虹廣告牌下面排長隊取號，上面列著了醫生們的科室信息。然后，患者們還要排起蜿蜒的隊伍交費，最后還得排更長的隊伍，等著到油漆脫落的診室里就診。中國基礎醫療系統匱乏，這樣的情景日復一日，每天都在上演。中國的醫療服務雖然便宜，但尚處于起步階段：如果你患上任何一種疾病，小到感冒大到癌癥，都必須去急診室接受治療。

????而在距離仁濟醫院急診室不到100碼的一棟現代化大樓里，我們可以瞥見未來中國的醫療服務。這里是貴賓特需門診，也就是所謂的VIP醫院。在VIP大樓里，患者不需要排隊，而是可以坐在舒適的真皮沙發上，看著寬屏電視等著預約的醫生。不同于仁濟醫院普通門診區的嘈雜喧囂，VIP門診區噪聲低到幾乎可以忽略不計。身穿潔白制服的護士會陪同患者走進私人診室。人們在仁濟醫院很難看上的專家，在這里卻可以預約——但要支付預約費用。VIP醫院的醫生每次會診的費用是60美元甚至更高，而這在馬路對面可以看50次醫生。

????為了幫助支付這樣的VIP待遇（和治療），越來越多的中國消費者開始選擇附加健康保險——這純粹是美國人的理念。而諷刺的是，雖然中國對各種理財服務的需求急劇增加，但據麥肯錫公司（McKinsey & Co）統計，外國公司在中國銀行與保險市場所占的份額僅有2%。國有保險公司在中國市場占據著主導地位，以至于因為收入下滑，紐約人壽保險公司（New York Life）在去年不得不放棄自己在中國的合資公司，轉而把它出售給日本的三井住友保險公司（Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance）

????但來自美國康涅狄格州布洛姆菲爾德的信諾集團（Cigna）卻正在悄悄贏得中國消費者的青睞。很大程度上這是因為它顛覆了其他美國保險公司在中國的傳統做法。信諾于2003年進入中國市場，但它選擇的合作伙伴并不是當地的保險公司，而是一家領先的零售——銀行中國招商銀行（China Merchants Bank）。招商銀行以靈活應對消費者的手段而著稱。招商信諾（信諾與招商銀行的合資企業——譯注）并沒有招聘大批成本相對較高的銷售人員，而是進行創意營銷，成立了配備最新數據挖掘技術的電話營銷中心，推出由電影明星代言的電視廣告，同時進行在線和社交媒體營銷，借此逐漸在中國市場站穩了腳跟。銷售人員所產生的巨額日常管理費用令許多公司背上了沉重負擔。去年，招商信諾在中國的收入達到了3.31億美元，比上一年增加了32%（雖然與信諾集團290億美元的總銷售額相比仍微不足道）。經過十年的經營，這家公司剛剛在中國售出了第100萬份保單。僅僅經過三年，公司就實現了收支平衡，目前已經能夠穩定盈利。

????By 8 a.m., Renji Hospital, founded in 1848 by Western missionaries and still one of China's best medical centers, is already in a state of chaos. A veritable sea of patients is crammed into the reception area, waiting impatiently to see a doctor. They first line up under giant neon boards that list physicians' specialties to collect a number on a waiting list, then join another snaking line at a cashier's window, and finally shuffle into even longer queues to wait for a doctor to see them in examination rooms with chipping paint. This scene is played out daily across China, which has a limited primary health care system. Medical services are cheap but rudimentary: If you have any malady, from a bad cold to cancer, you must go to the emergency room to seek medical treatment.

????But in a modern building less than 100 yards from the main Renji emergency ward is a glimpse at China's future. It is the guibin texu, known more commonly by its English translation: VIP hospital. In the VIP building, patients don't line up but wait for appointments on leather sofas, entertained by widescreen TVs. Instead of the shouting heard at Renji's main hospital, the noise level in the VIP section remains an understated murmur. Patients are escorted into private examination rooms by nurses in crisp white uniforms. The specialists who are so very hard to see at Renji are now suddenly available by appointment -- for a price. The physicians at the VIP hospital charge $60 or more for a consultation, 50 times what patients pay across the road.

????To help pay for such VIP treatment (and treatments), a growing number of Chinese consumers are turning to supplemental health insurance -- a thoroughly American concept. The irony is that despite soaring demand for various financial services, foreign firms have just 2% of the banking and insurance market, according to McKinsey & Co. State-owned insurance companies dominate the market to such extent that last year New York Life abandoned its China joint venture, selling out to Japanese firm Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance because of slumping earnings.

????But one U.S. firm, Bloomfield, Conn.-based Cigna (CI), is quietly winning over Chinese consumers, largely by defying conventional wisdom about how an American insurer should operate in China. Cigna entered the China market in 2003, partnering not with a local insurer but with a leading retail lender, China Merchants Bank, which is known for its deft handling of consumers. Rather than deploying an army of relatively expensive salesmen, which has burdened many other firms with a huge overhead, the Cigna joint venture has instead deployed innovative marketing, call centers equipped with the latest data-mining techniques, television commercials featuring a movie star pitchman, and online and social media sales to gain a growing foothold in the Chinese market. Last year Cigna's joint venture in China had revenues of $331 million, up 32% from the year before (though still a small fraction of the company's overall $29 billion in sales). After a decade of operation, the firm just sold its 1 millionth policy in China. The business broke even after just three years and is now solidly in the black.