????連續占據媒體頭條近兩周之后，許多人渴望彈丸之地的塞浦路斯島不久之后即從全球金融媒體的視線中悄然淡出，恢復從前的隱秘。要達到這種狀態，針對塞浦路斯的最新救助方案必須要行得通。然而，這個方案的前景面臨高度不確定性——確立了歐元區穩定局面的主要因素逐步發生了轉移；同時也加劇了人們對歐洲其他小型經濟體狀況以及更廣泛的區域經濟和金融穩定性等問題的擔憂。

????正如大多數讀者所知，歐盟和國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）官員最初為塞浦路斯制定的救助計劃出現了重大失誤。意識到這一政策失誤，經過一番罕見的（并且是毫不掩飾的）推諉責任表演之后，他們在本周一又手忙腳亂地制定了一個新的救助計劃。從技術層面上說，新計劃更具有可行性，但真要執行起來還是會遭遇種種考驗。

????第二輪救助方案恢復了受保銀行存款（即低于10萬歐元的存款額）享有的慣常保障，避免了對銀行系統存款“一刀切”的征稅計劃，轉而選擇了更為明智的針對特定存款實體的征稅方式。同時，在資本結構上，新方案提出的責任分擔分配更符合常識，包括讓債券持有人和其他優先債權人承擔嚴重虧損。

????鑒于塞浦路斯當前的嚴重局勢，加之官方債權人不愿作出承諾讓納稅人再次承擔新一輪大規模融資的負擔，新的救助方案顯示了另外一個顯著且極不尋常的特征——即對非受保銀行存款統一實行比例相當高的扣減。部分初步跡象表明，在某間問題最為嚴重的銀行，這些存款的扣減率可能高達80%，另一間銀行的扣減率則為40%。

????至于官員們需要兩輪磋商來制定出對某個國家的救助方案，這種事情并非聞所未聞。這種情形在過去已出現若干次，包括1995年對墨西哥以及1999年對韓國的救助。這次的不同尋常之處在于，第二輪方案緊隨第一輪，接踵而至。究其原因，除了設計不足之外，還有普遍的救助疲勞以及越來越嚴重的協調問題等等，凸顯了必須予以密切監控的四大不確定性。

????第一，隨著政府重新開放銀行業務（定于28日重開），塞浦路斯救援計劃將迎來考驗。保持救助計劃實施過程的有序、透明和持續性至關重要。不過說白了，在銀行擠兌風潮和不斷擴大的街頭抗議不斷沖擊人們視覺的情況下，這個搖搖欲墜的救助方案最終可能還是行不通。

????這樣就涉及到第二種不確定性：政府是否能夠保持一整套資產管制措施，阻止人們將資金撤離塞浦路斯；同時，還不能讓普遍存在的物資匱乏、囤積居奇以及黑市交易扼殺了原本就在苦苦掙扎的經濟，這一點同樣至關重要。

????要設計和實施一系列功能完善的資本管制措施是有難度的。重要的是，塞浦路斯政府還需傳遞這么一個信息：這些管制措施只是暫時性的、可以撤銷的。作為單一貨幣歐元區的一份子， 塞浦路斯無法通過貨幣貶值來重新調整價格，以便激勵、限制伴隨資本管制措施的必然漏損。

????Many are hoping that, after dominating the headlines for almost two weeks now, the tiny island of Cyprus will soon return to virtual obscurity in the global financial media. For this to happen, the latest country rescue package needs to hold. Yet prospects are highly uncertain -- confirming a gradual shift in power in Europe and fueling concerns for the wellbeing of other small European economies, as well as the broader economic and financial stability of the region.

????As most readers know, officials from Europe and the IMF badly bungled the first attempt at rescuing Cyprus. Realizing the policy slippage, and after a rather unusual (and quite public) blame game, they scrambled and came up on Monday with a new package. While technically more plausible, it faces considerable implementation challenges.

????The second rescue restored the usual safeguards enjoyed by insured bank deposits (i.e., those below EUR 100,000). It eschewed a rather blunt generalized approach to the banking system, opting instead for a more sensible entity-specific one. And it incorporated more common sense in allocating burden sharing on the capital structure, including imposing severe losses on bond holders and other senior creditors.

????In light of the severity of the Cypriot situation, and given official creditors' hesitation to commit their taxpayers to another large financing, the new rescue involved another notable, and highly unusual feature -- that of very significant haircuts on uninsured bank deposits. Partial initial indications suggest that these could be as high as 80% for the most problematic bank, and 40% for another.

????It is not unheard of for officials to need two rounds to rescue a country. Indeed, it was the case for several cases in the past, including Mexico in 1995 and Korea in 1999. What is unusual is that, this time around, the second round came so quickly after the first. The reasons for this speak to more than inadequate design, generalized bailout fatigue, and mounting coordination problems. They also highlight four areas of major uncertainties that warrant close monitoring.

????The first test for the Cypriot rescue will come as soon as the government reopens the country's banks (currently scheduled for tomorrow). It is critical that this process be orderly, transparent and sustained. Put bluntly, the already shaky rescue package will not survive persistent images of bank runs and widening street protests.

????This speaks to the second uncertainty: whether the government is able to maintain a set of capital controls that dissuades people from pulling their money out of the country while at the same time, and this is critical, not totally choking an already-struggling economy via widespread shortages, hoarding, and black markets.

????Well-functioning capital controls are difficult to design and implement. Importantly, the Cypriot government needs to convey that these controls are both temporary and reversible. And this is very hard to do when, being part of the single currency eurozone, it cannot depreciate its currency as a means of realigning price incentives and limiting the inevitable leakages that accompany capital controls.