????Libor操縱丑聞引發(fā)的后果迥異于其他銀行業(yè)丑聞。上周二，英國警方在倫敦展開凌晨突襲，逮捕了包括一位花旗集團（Citigroup）前任交易員在內的3人。

????逮捕消息可能對未來的操縱行為有震懾作用，但不能完全消除引發(fā)此類行為的誘因。上上周，英國監(jiān)管機構建議，設定倫敦同業(yè)拆借利率（London Interbank Offered Rates）的過程應有更多銀行參與。而一些學術界人士和前銀行家們建議的高管薪酬方案則可能鼓勵更多的利率操縱行為。

????已有十幾家超大銀行卷入了Libor操縱丑聞，包括美國銀行（Bank of America）、花旗集團和摩根大通（JP Morgan）。這些銀行涉嫌操縱Libor的行為無疑損害了納稅人利益，減少了存款和退休資產的利息，并導致地方投資收入減少了幾十億美元。（這對于有些地區(qū)真是禍不單行。由于金融危機，它們早已受到納稅人基數(shù)下降的沖擊。）Libor風波同時還增加了政府的調查支出——對于美國和英國都是如此。

????Libor丑聞影響廣泛，大多數(shù)銀行也沒有否認指控，但令人奇怪的是現(xiàn)在學術界和前銀行家們還在倡議用債券和利率掉期作為銀行高管們的獎金。

????利率下降，債券價格就會上漲。將債券作為銀行高管們的獎金等于是給了他們操縱利率的直接動力，實現(xiàn)作為薪酬所獲債券的價值增值。

????雖然筆者認為，用債券工具支付獎金的想法是兩年半前一個糟糕的點子，當時我并沒有意識到這場利率欺詐游戲早已在銀行業(yè)中扎根了。

????2010年春天，筆者曾撰文批評這些導向性錯誤的薪酬理論。在這之前幾個月，經濟學家柯能?施耐德和托馬斯·于勒發(fā)布了研究報告，指出銀行業(yè)一直在操縱Libor水平。據(jù)該報告分析，即便沒有獎金方案，銀行家們看來也有足夠的動機來操縱Libor，報告指出“銀行手頭有龐大的組合受到Libor影響，最近（Libor）快速下降給他們帶來了好處。”

????當然，銀行不是Libor操縱的唯一受益者。銀行高管們也受益于此，銀行利潤的增長也推高了他們的獎金。如果一家銀行曾參與Libor操縱，董事會薪酬委員會將發(fā)現(xiàn)，他們向CEO支付的薪酬依據(jù)的是靠欺詐獲得的業(yè)績。

????既然如此，就很難理解為何還有人倡議向銀行高管支付債券作為獎金。但是將債券作為獎金只是企業(yè)領導人不計后果、一味試圖為高管提供薪酬獎勵的一個例子。如果連Libor操縱丑聞都不能終結這些不當?shù)男匠暧媱潱也恢肋€有什么能。

????The Libor manipulation debacle has resulted in something rare in the world of banking scandals. British police arrested three people Tuesday, including one former Citigroup trader, in a predawn raid in London.

????As much as the arrests may serve as a deterrent for future manipulation, it doesn't entirely remove the incentives to repeat such behavior. UK regulators last week recommended that even more banks get involved in the process of setting the London Interbank Offered Rates. And some academics and former bankers are recommending executive pay schemes that could encourage even more rate manipulation.

????The Libor price-fixing?scandal?has engulfed over a dozen?mega-banks, including Bank of America (BAC), Citigroup (C), and JP Morgan (JPM).? And the banks' alleged tampering has hurt taxpayers by lowering interest earned on some savings and retirement assets and decimating billions?in state and municipal investment revenues. (This has come as a double whammy for communities that were already suffering from lower taxpayer bases due to the financial meltdown.) The Libor mess has also ramped up government spending on investigations -- now in both the U.S. and UK.

????Given the widespread impact of the Libor scandal and the fact that most banks aren't denying the charges, it's strange that academics and former bankers are continuing to advocate the use of bonds or interest rate swaps to compensate top banking execs.

????Bond prices rise if interest rates fall. So if you pay a banker in bonds, you are handing him a very direct incentive to manipulate rates in order to boost the value of the bonds he received as pay.

????While I thought the?idea?of paying bonuses with debt instruments was a poor one two-and-a-half years ago, I did not realize back then that the game of interest rate finagling was already well ensconced in the halls of banking.

????In the spring of 2010, several months before I wrote against these misguided pay theories, economists Conan Snider and Thomas Youle had already published?research?that indicated banks had been playing with Libor levels. Even without a bonus scheme to enhance their motivations, bankers appeared to have enough incentive to fiddle with Libor, according to their analysis, which suggested that "banks have large portfolio exposures to the Libor and have recently profited from [its] rapid descent."

????But of course, banks weren't the only ones to benefit from such manipulation. Top bank executives would have benefited as well through increased bonuses tied to any boost in earnings. Board compensation committees will find they paid their CEOs for results obtained through fraud in the case of banks involved in the Libor monkey business.

????Given this, it is hard to fathom why anyone would advocate paying top execs at banks with debt. But bonds-as-bonuses is just one example of business leaders trying to come up with remedies for executive compensation without thinking through the consequences. And if the Libor example can't put a bullet in bad compensation ideas, I'm not sure what can.