????既然要阻止內部人士利用非公開信息買賣股票是非常、非常困難的一件事，對此我們能做些什么？首先，預先鎖定售股的高管不應知道實際售股何時發(fā)生。全權委托并不完美，但比其他選擇要好一點

????其次，只允許高管在業(yè)績發(fā)布后（而非之前）售股。股票期權的意義在于將高管的利益與股東利益綁在一起。公司股價下跌時，高管必須共同承擔損失，而不是通過預先賣股、獨善其身。

????其實，有一個法寶可以終結90%的非法高管內幕交易：禁止股票期權，或者向高管支付股票。不幸的是，這可能實現不了。這倒不完全是因為“向高管支付股票對股東更有利”，盡管這種說法廣為所知，但尚未真正得到驗證。股票期權和股票授予計劃不會消失的原因是由于會計。

????根據現行規(guī)定，向高管支付股票在會計上看起來似乎沒有任何成本。股東似乎也享受這一會計假象的好處。但其實這種做法并非毫無成本。除非市場愿意放棄這些所謂的“好處”，總有高管能夠先于他人知道利空消息，提前獲利了結，留下普通股東承受股價下跌的痛苦。

????譯者：早稻米

????So given that preventing insiders from acting on private information is very, very hard, what can we do about it? First off, executives who lock in stock sales in advance shouldn't be able to know when the actual sales will occur. Blind trusts aren't perfect, but they are better than the alternative.

????Second, executives should only be allowed to sell after earnings releases, not before. The point of stock options is to align executives with shareholders. They should be forced to share the pain when their company fumbles, not be able to sidestep it by selling in advance.

????There actually is one silver bullet that would end 90% of all illicit insider trading by executives: Ban stock options, or otherwise paying top executives in stock. Unfortunately, that's probably not going to happen. Not just because of a widely held, but not really proven, belief that executives who are paid in shares are better for shareholders. The reason options and stock grants aren't going away is because of accounting.

????By current rules, paying executives in stock appears on the books to be costless. Shareholders, too, share in the benefit of the accounting illusion. But it's not costless. Until the market is willing to give that up, there will always be executives who are able to cash in by knowing before others that they have screwed up, leaving regular shareholders to take the hit.