????過去考慮分拆的另一個原因是擔心英國將制定嚴厲的法律法規，強迫所有英國銀行剝離投行部門。據一位了解情況的人士稱，近月來有多個團隊進駐巴克萊對分拆方式進行評估，并把未來將發生何種情況告知了各個部門負責人。但隨著政府一個特別委員會否決了全面分拆，對于分拆的擔憂有所消退。特別委員會要求銀行將它們的商業銀行業務“單獨圈開”，不受投資銀行業務的任何影響。

????那么，如果巴克萊真的分拆了投行業務，又會怎樣？這與2008年雷曼兄弟分崩離析前的情況驚人的相似。像雷曼兄弟一樣，該行大部分利潤將來自兜售固定收益產品。但巴克萊的投資銀行部門，或稱為“雷曼二代”，并不是通過代理美國國債經濟業務大賺其錢。“雷曼二代”的強項是固定收益衍生品——不錯，就是金融危機期間惹來太多麻煩的、那些天書一樣的投資產品。

????巴克萊在上周提交給美國聯邦儲備委員會（Federal Reserve）的“生前遺囑”中，將該行在美國的首項“核心業務”列為“固定收益證券化產品”，并自稱是固定收益證券化產品的“主要提供商”，例如機構住宅按揭抵押證券（RMBS）、資產抵押證券（ABS）、商業按揭抵押證券（commercial mortgage-backed securities）、待宣布按揭證券和住宅信貸（非機構RMBS和次貸）。不錯，這里提到了次貸。

????雖然證券化產品并不一定壞，但它們已證明是燙手山芋。雷曼大量持有，最終栽倒于此。相對于同時擁有商業銀行和投資銀行業務的更大規模的銀行，雷曼規模較小。政府允許這家銀行倒閉，是希望其沖擊僅限華爾街，不要影響到整個銀行體系。這個想法顯然落空了。

????由此，不禁要問假如今天“雷曼二代”陷入困境，美國或英國政府會出手相助嗎？很可能不會。但假如巴克萊的投資銀行瀕于倒閉，即便它仍與商業銀行捆綁在一起，保管兩國政府都會出手干預。鑒于當前歐洲麻煩纏身、美國正在進行總統大選，這些政府最不希望看到的事情恐怕就是災難性的銀行擠兌了。

????是的，我們是在談論“道德風險”，不管你信不信，道德風險的確存在。只要看看這些具有“系統重要性”的大銀行提交給美聯儲的“生前遺囑”，無一計劃悄然離世。所有銀行都表示，將出售一些資產來填補資產負債表的缺口，但當市場處于恐慌情緒中時，很難這樣做。因此，如果這些具有系統重要性的金融機構陷入危機，政府將必須介入。正是這種暗中保護，使得2008年美國銀行體系沒有出現全面崩潰。雷曼死而復生可能讓一些銀行家和交易員喜出望外，但至少現在看來，它要靠自身力量走出來仍有很大風險。

????譯者：早稻米

????It had also mulled a split on concerns that the UK would be instituting tough regulations forcing all British banks to spin off their investment banking divisions. There have been teams of people roving around Barclays for months evaluating how a split up would work and informing department heads as to what would happen, according to a person with knowledge of the matter. The concern has waned in the last few months, though, as a special government panel decided against a total split. It instead will require banks to "ringfence" their commercial bank from any fallout from the investment bank.

????But what if Barclay's investment bank were spun off? It would look eerily similar to what Lehman Brothers looked like before it crashed and burned in 2008. Like Lehman, it will derive the lion's share of its profits from peddling fixed income products. But the investment banking division, or "Lehman II," doesn't rake in the dough brokering Treasury bills, though. No, Lehman II is a fixed income derivative powerhouse – yes, the same such alphabet soup that caused so much trouble during the financial crisis.

????According to Barclays' "living will," which was presented to the Federal Reserve last week, the bank lists as its first "core business line" in the U.S. "fixed income securitized products." It goes on to say that the bank is a "major provider" of fixed income securitized products, listing examples such as agency residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), asset-backed securities (ABS), commercial mortgage-backed securities, mortgage to-be-announced securities and residential credit (non-agency RMBS and subprime). Yes, they said subprime.

????While securitized products aren't necessarily evil, they have proven to be quite a hot potato. Levered to the heap, Lehman got caught holding it and was mortally wounded. Lehman was relatively small compared to the bigger banks that had both commercial and investment banking. The government allowed the bank to fail thinking that the fallout would just impact Wall Street, not Main Street. That turned out to be a bad assumption.

????That begs the question: If Lehman II found itself in trouble today, would the U.S. or UK governments intervene to save it? Probably not. But if Barclays' investment bank was on the verge of collapse, while it was still paired with the commercial bank, you can bet that both governments would intervene. The last thing either of the two governments want now, with the troubles in Europe and the U.S. presidential election, is some cataclysmic bank run.

????Yes, we are talking about "moral hazard" and believe it or not, it is alive and well. A glance over the living wills submitted to the Fed by the "systemically important" banks show that they have no real plan to fail gently. They all said they would sell some assets to cover the shortfalls in their balance sheet, but that's hard to do when the market is panicking. That means the government will have to step in if there is ever a flicker of trouble at systemically important institution. This latent protection is why the U.S. banking system didn't implode in 2008. So while the thought of Lehman rising from the dead again might make some bankers and traders that bleed green happy campers, it seems, at least for the time being, to be too risky to be out on its own.