????其次，戴蒙面臨的損失遠不止這一項交易。大約5年前，戴蒙設立了這個首席投資辦公室，利用富余現金進行更激進的投資。直到最近，這種做法一直都很奏效。摩根大通首席投資辦公室每年貢獻約5億美元利潤。今年，該部門原本準備為摩根大通貢獻8億美元利潤。雖然戴蒙還沒有說明是否會關閉這個部門，但很可能的是他至少會壓縮其規模。投資者也會提出這種要求。這個過去一直不怎么受關注的部門將成為每個季度的提問焦點，直到該部門顯著縮減、甚至完全消失?？傊疀]人再敢放心大膽地忽略它了。

????而且，這可能還不是摩根大通要縮減的唯一業務。迄今為止，讓摩根大通躋身華爾街上最冒險、盈利能力最強銀行之列的就是該行的衍生品交易業務，規模遠超全球任何其他銀行。摩根大通持有的衍生品合約名義價值達到驚人的1.6萬億美元還多，足以將該行資本金全部抹去近10次。當然，摩根大通表示，其衍生品交易沒有看起來的那么大規?；蚰敲创箫L險。該行稱，考慮到對沖和擔保因素，實際風險敞口僅為660億美元。但我們剛剛已經見識了摩根大通的對沖交易到底有多么出色。

????最后，除了摩根大通在金融危機中的損失小于競爭對手外，戴蒙能問鼎“華爾街之王”的一個原因是即便是在信貸緊縮政策實施之后，他仍能帶領摩根大通取得較高的業績。摩根大通的凈資產回報率（一項關鍵的財務衡量指標）比其他任何銀行都高。去年，該行的凈資產回報率為16%，而高盛僅為9%。但摩根大通能取得如此高回報率的原因之一是該行的資本金水平相對較低。

????如果投資者要求摩根大通將資本金提高到高盛的水平，其凈資產回報率將降至約10%。突然之間，戴蒙就不再那么卓爾不群了。他的表現也就馬馬虎虎。這一點可能對摩根大通構成最沉重的打擊。過去幾年，投資者投資這家公司的部分原因是：投資摩根大通就意味著可以得到戴蒙和他管理風險的能力。我們看來都過于相信“某一個人就能保護一家擁有2萬億資產的銀行免遭失敗”。

????“銀行一直都是個黑匣子，”近期新書《逃亡華爾街》（Exile on Wall Street）的作者、法國農業信貸（Credit Agricole）的分析師邁克爾?梅奧說。“人們不得不依賴高管和體系來管理風險?！毖鹤⒋髅珊湍Ω笸ǖ目煽啃砸呀洿蟛蝗缜啊?/p>

????譯者：早稻米

????Second, Dimon is facing much bigger losses than this one trade. Dimon set up the chief investment office about five years ago to invest the bank's excess cash more aggressively. Up until recently, it has worked. JPMorgan's CIO office has turned in about $500 million in profit a year. This year it was on track to add $800 million to the firm's bottom line. While Dimon has yet to say whether he is shutting down the division, it's likely he will at the least have to scale it back. Investors will demand it. Expect the division, which used to go mostly unnoticed, to be the focus of a barrage of questions each quarter until it is shrunk dramatically or goes away. No one will ever trust to ignore it again.

????And that might not be the only business that JPMorgan has to retreat from. By far what makes JPMorgan the riskiest bank on Wall Street, and one of the most profitable, is the bank's derivative trading book, which is far larger than any other bank in the world. JPMorgan holds derivatives contracts with a notional value of just over $1.6 trillion. That's enough to wipe out the bank's capital nearly 10 times over. Of course, JPMorgan says its derivative bets aren't nearly that big or as risky as they appear. Factor in hedges and collateral, and the bank says its actual exposure is just $66 billion. But we have just seen how well JPMorgan's hedges can work.

????Lastly, one of the reasons that Dimon has been able to claim the crown of King of the Street, besides the fact that his bank had smaller losses in the financial crisis than rivals, is that, even after the credit crunch, he has continued to show better results. JPMorgan's return on equity, a key measure in finance, is higher than any other bank. Last year, the bank's ROE clocked in at 16%, compared to 9% for Goldman Sachs. But one of the reasons that JPMorgan has been able to turn in such high numbers is because the bank has had relatively low levels of capital.

????If investors demand JPMorgan raise its capital level to what Goldman has, the company's ROE would drop to around 10%. All of a sudden, Dimon is no longer leading the pack. He's just average. And that might be the biggest blow to JPMorgan. Part of the reason for investing in the company in the past few years is that Dimon, and his ability to manage risk, comes along with the package. We all seemed to have placed way too much faith in the idea that one individual could protect a bank with $2 trillion in assets from blow-ups.

????"Banks are always black boxes," says Michael Mayo, an analyst at Credit Agricole and author of the recent book Exile on Wall Street. "You have to rely on the executives and the systems in place to manage that risk." Betting on Dimon, and JPMorgan, just became a lot less reliable than it used to be.