????這個小組立即奉命撤出，沒能打開反應堆的泄壓閥。直到下午2點30分，也就是地震發(fā)生差不多24小時后，1號反應堆才開始著手泄壓。

????在一個小時后的3點36分，氫氣大爆炸震動了廢墟中的核電站。

????接下來的三天里又發(fā)生了兩次氫氣爆炸，一次發(fā)生在3號反應堆，一次發(fā)生在海嘯時就已關閉的4號反應堆。

????在事故剛剛發(fā)生的那幾天，絕望籠罩著福島，沒有哪項行動、哪個決策能夠扭轉(zhuǎn)局面。不過吉田通過抗命繼續(xù)向反應堆噴水的決定是十分重要的。最終海上自衛(wèi)隊、警察和消防部門帶著多架高壓水槍和消防車趕到現(xiàn)場，向反應堆噴灑海水，成功地阻止了事態(tài)的進一步惡化。

????福島的工作有點摸著石頭過河的意味，這是因為他們的確是毫無頭緒。當?shù)谝慌孕l(wèi)隊人員到達福島第一核電站時，他們甚至連一張現(xiàn)場的地圖都沒有。

????不過菅直人對《財富》表示，他覺得從3月17日起，“我們正在建立起一道防線，我們正在向敵人發(fā)起反擊。”輻射水平雖然仍然很高，但卻沒有繼續(xù)增長下去。又過了幾天，福島第一核電站終于恢復了一些電力。

????但是這還遠遠不能讓菅直人或其他任何人感到如釋重負。去年7月19日，東京電力公司表示，公司相信反應堆內(nèi)的溫度已經(jīng)穩(wěn)定了下來——這是朝著“冷停堆”方向邁出的重要一步。菅直人說，當想到“最壞的日子已經(jīng)過去”時，他終于可以松一口氣了。

????船橋委員會的報告指出了一個諷刺性的細節(jié)：日本政府從來沒有令國民對多久才能控制住癱瘓的核電站這種問題有一個現(xiàn)實的認識。隨著福島繼續(xù)向外排放放射性物質(zhì)，政府也沒有告訴國民正在持續(xù)的風險是什么。直到現(xiàn)在也是如此。

????去年12月16日，菅直人的繼任者野田佳彥宣布，福島第一核電站的反應堆已經(jīng)達到“冷停堆狀態(tài)”。日本有史以來最嚴重的核災難終于得到了控制。

????這堪稱是個里程碑式的時刻，它給這個震后傷痕累累的國家?guī)砹艘唤z心理上的安慰。唯一的問題是，今天仍堅守在福島第一核電站的工人們會告訴你，這個消息在當時不是真的，現(xiàn)在也仍然不是真的。在福島第一核電站工作的一位工程師表示：“冷凝劑把反應堆的溫度保持在一定水平，不過它離（冷停堆的）目標還有很遠。事實上，我們?nèi)匀徊恢婪磻牙锩媸鞘裁礃幼印！?/p>

????譯者：樸成奎

????The first team succeeded and quickly withdrew. But as the second team entered, their "dose rates" — their exposure to radiation—immediately spiked. One of the operators was instantly exposed to 106 millisieverts of radiation, above the 100 "emergency dose limit" mandated by TEPCO.

????The team was pulled out immediately, having failed to open the necessary valves to reduce pressure in the reactor. It took until 2:30 that afternoon—almost 24 hours after the earthquake —for venting of reactor one to commence.

????Just over an hour later, at 3:36, the massive explosion shook the site.

????Over the next three days, two more hydrogen blasts followed, one at reactor three, and one at unit four, which had been offline at the time of the tsunami.

????In the desperate days just after the accident, there was no single event or decision that brought the situation back from the brink. Yoshida's decision to ignore the order against spraying seawater was important. The eventual ability of the Japanese military, police and fire department units, using multiple water cannons and fire trucks, to get to the site and douse it with seawater prevented the crisis from becoming even worse.

????If there was a making-it-up-as-they-went-along quality to the effort, it's because they were: the defense forces didn't even have a site map for Fukushima Daiichi when its personnel first arrived.

????Still, starting from about March 17, Kan told Fortune he felt "we were creating a defense line, we were pushing back against the enemy.'' Radiation levels, while still high, had stopped increasing. Days later some electricity was finally restored to the site.

????But it would be a long time before Kan or anyone else felt any sense of relief. On July 19th, TEPCO said it believed it had stabilized the temperature inside the reactors -- an important step toward the goal of "cold shutdown." That was the first day, Kan says, when he could effectively exhale, when he thought "the worst was over."

????The Funabashi commission report points out in withering detail that the Japanese government never gave its citizens a realistic sense of just how long it would take to get control of the disabled plant, nor what the ongoing risks were as radiation continued to be emitted from the site. Arguably, it still hasn't.

????On December 16, Kan's successor, Yoshihiko Noda, announced that the stricken reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station had reached "a state of cold shutdown." Japan's worst-ever nuclear accident, the Prime Minister said, had finally been brought under control.

????The moment was meant to be a calming milestone, psychological balm for a wounded country in the process of trying to heal. The only problem with it, as workers today at the nuclear power plant, will tell you, is this: it wasn't true then, and it's still not true today. "The coolant water is keeping the reactor temperatures at a certain level, but that's not even near the goal [of a cold shut down,]" says an engineer working inside the plant. "The fact is, we still don't know what's going on inside the reactors."