????經常關注財經媒體的讀者們對下面這個故事并不陌生：15個月前，也就是2010年12月份，華爾街巨星級分析師梅里迪斯?惠特尼在哥倫比亞廣播公司著名的電視節目《60分鐘》（60 Minutes）中預言，美國市政債券市場將出現一波違約潮。此言一出，震動了整個市場。而且，當時她的預測非常具體：“可能會看到50-100宗較大規模的違約，”她在接受《60分鐘》記者史蒂夫?克羅夫特采訪時稱。“相當于幾千億美元的違約額。”

????美國市政債券市場因此再創新低。2010年12月22日至2011年2月2日期間，市政債券市場資金流出約140億美元，2010年第四季度的回報率也創下了十六年來的新低。市政債券市場的長期參與者，包括分析師、基金經理以及市政債券經紀人，都怒火中燒——惠特尼這種自以為是的家伙這回居然敢插手他們的領域——在美國按揭貸款危機初顯之時，這位美女分析師就曾經因為大呼花旗集團（Citigroup）就是那個“沒穿衣服的皇帝”而名聲大噪。

????他們說，惠特尼錯了。她根本不知道他們的市場是怎么回事。她預測的這種違約永遠不會發生。嚴格按字面意思理解，他們說的沒錯。自那以來，這個3.7萬億美元的市場中只發生了26億美元的違約。而且，市政債券市場的下跌也并沒有持續很長時間；2011年，巴克萊（Barclay）市政債券指數上漲10.7%，是標準普爾500指數2.1%回報率的五倍多。

????一位高調預言家失手或許大快人心，此后，惠特尼在財經媒體和情緒化更明顯的博客界里受歡迎程度確實有所下降。至少在一定程度上，這是她自作自受，但也只是因為她當初的預測太過具體。她當時試圖表述的主要意思是，美國糟糕的市政財政狀況將每況愈下，這個判斷則非常準確。盡情笑話她吧，但是你能找出一兩個人來，證明過去一兩年地方稅收下調、市政服務得到了改善嗎？但愿你運氣好能找到。

????“美國各州已將越來越多的開支壓力推至地方政府，”惠特尼告訴《財富》雜志（Fortune）。“而市政機構根本沒有錢填上缺口。這塊壓力很大，特別是2011年6月美國復蘇與再投資法案（American Reinvestment Recovery Act）到期后。”

????惠特尼2010年9月的市政財政報告不光光是對具體的市政債券作出了預測。事實上，這份厚達1,400頁的詳盡報告《公地的悲劇》（The Tragedy of the Commons）側重于闡述美國最大的一些州在眾多市鎮債券上面臨的問題日益嚴重，甚至有些令人恐懼。她說，我們必須作出改變。有些事確實發生了變化。它并不像一批債券直接違約那么簡單。

????2011年初，批評宛如暴風驟雨般落到惠特尼頭上，但她解釋稱，她指的不只是“技術性”債券違約，她采用了一些更感性的詞語，還包括“社會責任違約”（如垃圾清運頻率降低）和“雇傭合同違約”（如政府雇員不得不自己繳納養老金）等。不管你認為她是在事后試圖轉換話題，還是闡明事實，事實上都不重要。因為所有這一切都已經變成了現實。市政債券經紀人可能仍然有時間嘲笑惠特尼自食其果，但如果你真正需要應對市政財政惡化的現實影響，恐怕不太能笑得起來。

????To readers of the business press, the story is a familiar one: fifteen months ago, superstar analyst Meredith Whitney rocked the world of municipal finance with a December 2010 prediction on 60 Minutes that a wave of municipal debt defaults was headed our way. Her forecast was quite specific: "You could see fifty to a hundred sizable defaults," she told her interviewer, correspondent Steve Kroft. "This will amount to hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of defaults."

????The bottom fell out of the muni bond market as a result. Investors pulled some $14 billion from muni bond funds between December 22 and February 2, 2011, and returns in the fourth quarter of 2010 were the lowest in 16 years. Long-time players in the space, including analysts, fund managers, and muni brokers, reacted with indignation that an arriviste such as Whitney—the woman who made her name calling out Citigroup (C) as an emperor with no clothes at the dawn of the mortgage crisis—dared to try to expand her analytical purview into their cozy little corner of the capital markets.

????She was wrong, they said. She didn't know squat about how their market worked. The kind of defaults she called for were never going to happen. And they were right, in the most literal sense. Since then, there have only been $2.6 billion in defaults from the $3.7 trillion market. And the muni bond swoon didn't even last very long: in 2011, Barclay's muni bond index returned 10.7%, more than five times the 2.1% return of the S&P500.

????Nothing satisfies like a comedown of a prominent prognosticator, and Whitney has taken her lumps in both the business press and the more unbridled blogosphere ever since. She deserves at least some of it, but that's only for being overly specific. The more general point that she was trying to make—that municipal finances in this country were a mess that was only going to get messier—was dead on. Laugh at her all you want, but then try this: go find one person who says their local taxes are falling or their municipal services have improved in the past year or two. I wish you luck in your endeavor.

????"States have pushed more and more expenses down to the local level," Whitney tells Fortune. "And municipalities don't have the money to make up the difference. That is where you see the real strain, especially after the American Reinvestment Recovery Act expired in June 2011."

????Whitney's September 2010 report on municipal finances didn't contain a single call on a specific municipal bond. Indeed, the 1,400-page beast of analysis, titled "The Tragedy of the Commons," was instead focused on delineating the myriad—and slightly terrifying—financial obligations that the largest states in the country were having increasing trouble meeting. Something had to change, she said. And something did. It just wasn't as simple as a bunch of outright defaults.

????When the criticism came raining down on her in early 2011, Whitney explained that she didn't just mean "technical" bond defaults but also mushier terms such a "social contract defaults"—e.g. less frequent trash removal schedules—and "employment contract defaults"—e.g. government employees being forced to contribute to their own pensions. Whether you think she tried to change the conversation after the fact or was merely elaborating is really neither here nor there. Because all of that is happening, and more. Municipal bond brokers may still find the time to chuckle about Whitney's comeuppance, but if you're someone responsible for actually dealing with the real-life implications of deteriorating muni finances, the mirth becomes a little harder to come by.