????2003年6月2日加州桑尼維爾消息

????惠普與Opsware公司聯手加強惠普公用數據中心自動化系統

????2006年2月13日加州桑尼維爾消息

????Opsware公司宣布與思科公司達成全球分銷協議

????這兩個標題聽起來非常相似——“小企業與大公司合作，開拓更大的市場”——但最終卻導致了兩種截然不同的結果。我們公司2003年與惠普公司（HP）簽訂的協議沒有創造任何收入，但2006年與思科公司（Cisco）的合作卻為我們帶來了數千萬美元的銷售額，并幫助Opsware公司成為數據中心軟件領域難以企及的領導者。為什么一份合約大獲成功，而另一份卻一敗涂地呢？

????一家擁有絕佳產品的初創企業時常面臨的挑戰是：把產品擺到足夠多的客戶面前，說服他們購買。在理論上，與惠普、EMC或沃達豐（Vodafone）這樣的公司達成合作協議，讓它們向其客戶銷售你的產品，是覆蓋市場、促使銷售速度成倍提升的好辦法。但在實踐中，大多數“大衛-歌利亞”(David-Goliath)式的分銷協議都類似于我們在2003年與惠普公司的合作：它們都是不錯的公關手法，但也就僅此而已。以下是這類合作通常的演變路徑：

????? 分銷協議大張旗鼓地公布于眾，公司內外都抱有極高的期望。

????? 歌利亞需要你調整產品，同時在培訓和其他方面給予其大量幫助才會愿意試著推銷你的產品。

????? 歌利亞在產品功能和支持方面的要求讓你們公司業已超負荷運轉的員工團隊疲于應對。

????? 你缺乏足夠的理由指派專人去支持歌利亞，因為你根本就不確定這樣做能創造新的收入。

????? 歌利亞一套產品也沒有賣出去，甚至有可能出現更糟糕的一幕：歌利亞與你們公司自身的銷售團隊相互競相，爭奪你們原本有望以更高的利潤率直接贏得的客戶。

????? 雙方的“合作關系”無疾而終，不僅破壞了你與歌利亞的關系，還在公司內部留下了苦澀的回憶。

????一些初創企業往往應為沒有哪一個合作伙伴能夠完全依靠自己的力量完成產品的分銷，從而抵擋不住“以量取勝”的誘惑，與盡可能多的分銷伙伴簽約。盡管過度覆蓋市場的策略或許能帶來暫時的慰藉，但這樣做在實踐中只會成倍增加企業所面臨的挑戰。比沒有分銷伙伴更糟糕的情形是試圖管理多個效率低下、在市場上相互競爭的分銷伙伴，疲于應付它們的種種要求。

????SUNNYVALE, Calif., June 2, 2003

????HP and Opsware Inc. Join Forces to Deliver Enhanced Automation for HP's Utility Data Center

????SUNNYVALE, Calif., Feb. 13, 2006

????Opsware Announces Worldwide Distribution Agreement with Cisco

????These two headlines sound pretty similar—"Small company partners with giant company to reach a bigger market"—but they led to two very different outcomes. Our 2003 deal with HP (HPQ) didn't generate a single dollar in revenue, whereas our 2006 agreement with Cisco (CSCO) drove tens of millions of dollars in sales and helped to make Opsware the uncatchable leader in data center software. Why did one succeed spectacularly while the other never took off?

????As a startup with the best product, your challenge is often getting it in front of enough customers and getting them to buy. In theory, striking a deal to have an HP or an EMC (EMC) or a Vodafone (VOD) sell your product to their customers is the way to cover the market and exponentially increase sales velocity. In practice, however, most "David-Goliath" distribution deals turn out like our 2003 HP deal: great PR, but not much else. Here's the way it typically plays out:

????? The deal is announced with great fanfare and high internal and external expectations.

????? Goliath needs product changes, training and lots of help to even attempt to sell your product.

????? Goliath deluges your already overloaded people with feature and support requests.

????? You can't justify assigning dedicated people to support Goliath because you can't bank on any new revenue.

????? Goliath sells nothing, or even worse, ends up competing against your sales team for customers you would have won directly at a higher margin.

????? The "partnership" quietly withers away, leaving a damaged relationship with Goliath and a bad taste inside the company.

????The temptation for some startups is try to "make it up in volume"—sign as many distribution partners as possible on the basis that none of them is likely to deliver much on their own. While that degree of over-coverage might feel temporarily reassuring, it only multiplies the challenges exponentially in practice. The only thing worse than having no partners is trying to manage multiple ineffective partners competing with each other in the market and drowning the company with their demands.