????租金收益率是指用年租金除以市場價格，就好比債券收益是指用固定利息金額除以該債券的當(dāng)日價格。美國市場的平均租金收益率在6%左右，意味著房價租金比約為17。中國的租金收益率如果提高到5%，房價將下跌60%。

????艾利伯絕對不是唯一一個預(yù)言中國房市將崩盤的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家。美國傳統(tǒng)基金會（Heritage Foundation）的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家史劍道（Derek Scissors）表示：“我估計中國的樓市價格會下跌60%甚至更多，這的確是可能的。”

????房價的調(diào)整已經(jīng)開始了。官方數(shù)據(jù)顯示，從去年年末開始房價出現(xiàn)了適度下降，但眾所周知，那些數(shù)據(jù)是靠不住的。我們不妨看看那些試圖賣掉房子的房主們。折價30%賣房的現(xiàn)象并不鮮見。事實上，很多在2010年花了60萬美元買房的人都憤怒地發(fā)現(xiàn)，開發(fā)商現(xiàn)在正在同一幢大樓里以45萬美元每套的價格銷售那些尚未賣出的房子。

????究竟是什么有可能打擊到中國引以為傲的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率？我們不妨重新梳理一下中國炒房熱的動力。中國政府對利率、政府債券收益和其它國內(nèi)投資工具施加了嚴(yán)格的限制。2011年的通脹率超過了5%，而10年期債券收益率僅為3.5%。在中國，你很難找到比通脹跑得更快的投資工具。2008年全球金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)后，隨著貨幣政策由緊轉(zhuǎn)松，大量過剩現(xiàn)金流到了唯一一個能產(chǎn)生巨額回報的地方——房地產(chǎn)。

????在大約四年多的時間里，中國平均每年新建住房面積10億平方米，為美國的10倍。而要想滿足那些有剛性住房需求的購房者——比如說那些從農(nóng)村搬到城市里的人，每年只需要7億平方米足矣。

????所以我們不妨按照這個數(shù)據(jù)來假設(shè)需求水平。另外中國還有700萬至800萬套閑置的房子。如果每年可賣掉其中的200萬套，那么中國每年再建造5億平方米就夠了，這只相當(dāng)于過去幾年每年新建住房面積的一半。新建住房面積的下降不僅會影響住房支出，還會影響鋼鐵、銅和家用電器的產(chǎn)量。

????根據(jù)艾利伯的計算，新建住房量的迅速下跌會使中國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率降低整整5個百分點。在他看來，2011年中國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率雖然高達(dá)9 .2%，但其中大概有3個百分點都來自泡沫。考慮那些待售的空房，還要再下調(diào)2個點，因此中國未來的增長前景遠(yuǎn)沒有官方預(yù)測的那么強(qiáng)勁。

????與后危機(jī)時代的美國不同，中國在泡沫破裂后還將繼續(xù)增長，即便增長步伐速度會放緩很多。屆時中國會出臺另一個龐大的經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激計劃來彌補(bǔ)房市崩盤的損失，這個刺激計劃的效果值得觀察。如果隨后再次發(fā)生通脹，就需要用減緩經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的代價來控制通脹。

????或者就像艾利伯所觀察到的那樣：“中國以10%的增長率高速發(fā)展的日子可能將成為歷史。”

????譯者：樸成奎

????The rental yield is simply the annual rent divided by the market price, just as the yield on a bond is the fixed interest payment divided by the price of the bond that day. In the U.S., the rental yield averages around 6%, meaning the multiple of prices to rents is around 17. The adjustment to a 5% rental yield in China would push prices down by 60%.

????Aliber is by no means the sole China expert to predict that a steep drop is coming. "I estimate that a decline of 60% or even more is the upper end of the range, but is indeed possible," says Derek Scissors, an economist at the Heritage Foundation.

????The adjustment has already begun. While the government's official figures show modest declines starting late last year, those numbers are famously unreliable. A better view comes from owners trying to sell their units. Losses of 30% aren't uncommon. In fact, many owners who paid, say, $600,000 in 2010 are furious that their landlords are now offering unsold units in the same building for $450,000.

????What's the probable hit to China's vaunted growth rate? It's important to recap the forces that caused the frenzy. China imposes tight restrictions on returns on bank accounts, government bond yields and other domestic investments. Inflation for 2011 exceeded 5%, but 10-year bond yields are just 3.5%. It's extremely difficult to find investments that yield more than inflation. When the easy money policies took charge after the worldwide crash of 2008, the excess cash flowed into the only place with big returns -- real estate.

????For around four years, China has been building around 1 billion square meters of housing a year, ten times the figure in the U.S. The amount needed to accommodate real owners -- people moving from farms to the cities, for example -- is 700 million square meters.

????So let's assume that demand goes back to that level. China is also swamped with seven to eight million vacant units. If around two million of those are sold a year, China will need to build just 500 million square meters annually -- half of the total over the past several years. That decline will pound not just expenditures on apartments, but production of steel, copper and appliances.

????By Aliber's reckoning, the sharp decline in housing production could lower China's growth rate by a full five points. In his view, around three points of its 9.2% growth rate in 2011 came from the bubble. Shave two more points for the empty apartments that need to be sold, and future growth looks far less robust than the official projections.

????Unlike the post-crash U.S., China will keep growing after the bubble bursts, though at a far slower rate. What bears watching is the effect of another gigantic stimulus program to compensate for the decline in housing. If renewed inflation follows, so will a slowdown needed to tame it.

????Or as Aliber observes, "China's spurt of a 10% growth rate is likely to be history."