????可以肯定的是，大型銀行絕不會束手就擒，毫不抗爭地接受新的監管規定。

????幾周前，有報道稱，摩根大通（JPMorgan）首席執行官杰米?戴蒙)在與加拿大銀行（Bank of Canada）的一位行長的見面會上情緒非常激動，以至于高盛（Goldman Sachs）首席執行官勞埃德?布蘭克費恩覺得有必要在小組會議后向出席會見的官員發送一份電子郵件致歉。(戴蒙后來承認他在表述自己的觀點時有些過激)。

????大型銀行的高管們或許以為向監管部門施壓，就能阻止針對大型銀行的新資本金規定出臺——但這種做法這次可能不會奏效了。

????原因或許是因為憂心忡忡的并不只是監管部門。公眾輿論同樣不會放過這些大型銀行。業界很多人（包括其他行業的高管們）都擔心如果放任不管，依賴美聯儲（Fed）窗口指導和救助的大銀行可能會無法避免金融危機的再次爆發。上周六，二十國集團（G20）的財長們對一項針對大銀行的附加資本金提議表達了支持，該提議要求大型銀行在執行適用于所有國際銀行的資本金要求之外，還需計提附加資本金。

????銀行業高管們的有些說法還不失公允【例如，花旗集團（Citigroup）首席執行官潘偉迪稱新的資本金提議是一把鈍刀】，但其他言論反而只能更加凸顯加強銀行業監管的必要性。

????例如，潘偉迪稱，新的資本金要求會導致銀行體系中無監管領域的泛濫。但如果銀行家們負責任的話，他們應該指出具體是哪些領域可能會出現問題，從而幫助監管機構堵塞漏洞，《大西洋》月刊（The Atlantic）的丹尼爾?英迪維格里奧稱監管部門很容易做到這一點。

????戴蒙在駁斥新規時稱，要滿足超大型企業的需求，必須依靠大型銀行：意即銀行必須具備一定規模要。如果是這樣，銀行家們應向超大型企業收取額外費用，因為這些企業享受了大型銀行的規模效應帶來的好處，但這種規模卻給其他客戶和利益相關者帶來了更多風險。

????雖然關于特定資產類別的資本金構成有些建議可能是合理的，但這些問題自1988年訂立首份《巴塞爾協議》以來就一直存在。如果對他們有利，銀行家們對這些問題的模糊性毫無意見。過去二十年里，太多銀行家們并沒有強化自身的風險管理，而是將低標準的監管資本金條例作為衡量風險的尺度。監管體制最終總是存在妥協的——銀行家們對這一點心知肚明。

????不過，提議對風險高度集中的大型金融機構實施附加資本金和新的聯邦存款保險公司（FDIC）費用評估卻是另一回事。它們是對基于市場之經濟價值的基本認可。

????憑借超大規模贏得超大客戶（其他中小型銀行無法染指這個領域）的這些大銀行一旦倒閉，也會給金融系統帶來很大風險。大型銀行業務涉獵廣泛，情況復雜，格外需要監管部門的關注。大型銀行吸引了監管部門過多的注意力，金融體系中的其他薄弱環節就容易遭到忽視，但體系中的每個人最終都要為此付出代價。因此，大銀行應支付一定的經濟費用，為其自身考慮也不能規模過大，并縮減需要很多監管力量的經營活動。

????這是對納稅人將要承擔之清理成本的經濟補償，不管這些金融機構是否獲準倒閉。從這個意義上說，“大到不能倒”并不是問題。

????需要大型銀行提供服務的大客戶們應該為他們享受的特權付出代價。這純粹是個經濟學問題。沒錯，銀行家們也許需要重新考慮商業模式，但這是一件好事。

????金融危機后大型銀行們并未像人們期待的那樣進行大量實質性改革。沒收抵押房產潮仍未減退，說明大型銀行不到萬不得已不會采取行動。另一個例證則是銀行業只是一味坐等，直到被迫制定“生前遺囑”（living wills）。

????如果銀行早就自覺定好生前遺囑，盡可能保證遺囑內容公開透明，市場本來有望更平穩一些，對銀行業也的信賴感也會更強一點。第三個例證是銀行業并沒有認真對待金融危機所揭示的的薪酬和風險問題。

????大型銀行應該成為模范公民，遠離賭博式交易，而不是反對新的監管條例。然后，它們才有可能與監管部門進行理性的對話。如果大型銀行將來不想招致監管部門采取行動，最好一開始就向監管部門證明，它們根本就不需要監管部門的關注。

????Eleanor Bloxham是董事會顧問公司The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance (http://thevaluealliance.com)的首席執行官。

????Make no mistake, big banks will not be submitting to new regulations without a fight.

????A few weeks ago, JPMorgan (JPM) CEO Jamie Dimon reportedly got so worked up during an exchange with a governor from the Bank of Canada that Goldman Sachs (GS) CEO Lloyd Blankfein felt the need to send an email apology to the regulator after the group meeting. (Dimon later acknowledged the intensity with which he expressed his views).

????Bankers at the largest institutions may think bullying regulators will stop new capital requirements for the largest institutions -- but that tactic just may not work this time.

????Perhaps that's because regulators aren't alone in their concerns. Public opinion is not in favor of letting the largest banks off the hook. Many in the business community (including executives in other industries) are skeptical that, if left to their own devices, the largest banks that relied on the Fed window and bailouts will be able to avoid a repeat of the financial meltdown. And on Saturday, finance ministers from the G20 offered their support for a requirement that big banks be subject to an additional capital surcharge, on top of the capital requirements all international banks will be required to follow.

????While some of the arguments bank executives are making are fair (for example, Citigroup (C) CEO Vikram Pandit called new capital proposals a blunt instrument), other statements just reinforce the need for additional bank oversight.

????For example, Pandit says new capital requirements would simply encourage unregulated parts of the system to flourish. But if bankers behaved responsibly, they'd disclose where those issues would come from and help regulators close the gaps, something Daniel Indiviglio at The Atlantic says regulators could easily do.

????In arguing against new rules, Dimon says large banks are necessary to support the needs of the very largest corporations: scale is essential. If this is true, bankers should be charging the very largest corporations for the luxury that their scale offers and for the increased risk it poses to other customers and stakeholders.

????While it is possible to make rational arguments over the basis of capital for particular asset classes, those issues have existed since the first accord in 1988. Bankers had no problems with inexactitude when it moved in their favor. Rather than step up their own risk management over the past two decades, too many bankers used weak regulatory capital guidelines as the way to measure risk. Regulatory regimes always involve compromise -- and the bankers know this.

????The proposed capital surcharge and new FDIC fee assessments on the largest institutions with high risk concentrations, however, are a different matter. They are simple recognition of the market-based economics that exist for regulators and taxpayers.

????By way of their scale, the same big banks that have access to the largest customers (unavailable to other, smaller banks) are also the banks that pose the greatest risk to the financial system if they fail. Because of their scope and sophistication, they demand extraordinary attention from regulators. By requiring so much attention from regulators, other weaknesses in the financial system go unaddressed, a cost everyone in the system pays for eventually. For these reasons, big banks should incur certain economic charges to discourage size for its own sake and activities that continue to require so many regulatory enforcers on the beat.

????The requirements are economic recognition of the cleanup taxpayers will incur whether or not these institutions are allowed to fail. In this sense, too big to fail doesn't matter.

????Large bank customers who make such scale necessary should pay for the privilege. It's simple economics. Yes, bankers may need to rethink their business models, but this is a good thing.

????Post crisis, the largest banks have done less than one would hope to demonstrate meaningful change. The foreclosure issues that continue unabated are an example of the larger banks' failure to address issues unless they are forced to do so. The fact that banks are just waiting around until they are required to develop living wills is another example.

????Instead of waiting to be told, banks could have promoted calmer markets and greater trust by producing robust living wills on their own and providing transparency to their contents as much as feasible. A third example is the failure to take seriously the compensation and risk issues demonstrated by the crisis.

????Instead of railing at the new rules, the largest banks should become model citizens and step away from casino-like trading. Then, it might be possible for them to have a rational conversation with regulators. If the largest banks want no action from regulators in the future, the best place to start is by showing regulators that they don't require their attention at all.

????Eleanor Bloxham is CEO of The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance (http://thevaluealliance.com), a board advisory firm.