????這是一個美國人家喻戶曉的故事，而現在它也許正在中國徐徐拉開序幕。

????2008年至2010年期間，中國大型銀行向本國政府以及國有企業發放了大量的貸款。由于出口在金融危機中遭受重創，政府不得不采取措施增加就業并擴大內需。結果，高樓大廈和大型商場在中國遍地開花，中國的經濟也因此保持了約10%的增長速度。但是部分分析人士和評級機構認為中國的借貸審核標準不夠嚴格。他們說，銀行的壞賬層出不窮，但金融系統的改革卻裹足不前。

????上周，中國銀監會（China Banking Regulatory Commission）主席劉明康宣布，最近的銀行抗壓測試表明即使房價下跌五成，中國銀行業也能夠承受。中國的銀行主要是靠存款來獲取資金，而且利潤年增長率達到了20%。盡管現在經濟增速放緩，相關方面仍預測今年中國的GDP增速仍將維持在9%左右，在理論上，這一增長率足以抵消壞賬所帶來的損失。

????至少從銀行業發展的長期角度來看，劉主席并沒有說錯。雖然一些分析師人士稱抗壓測試的壓力過小，但是所有的存款仍有央行來做擔保。中國的銀行業仍處在起步階段，發展潛力不可限量。目前使用信用卡的消費者仍然不多，這對于金融機構來說是一個巨大的商機。隨著中國貨幣政策的緊縮，銀行的借貸收益也會水漲船高。

????在短期內，熊市仍將占據主導地位。目前有三個方面的問題比較突出。首要的問題是中國利率政策過于死板：銀行一年期存款的年儲蓄利率不能超過3.5%。然而由于中國目前的通脹率高于5%，中國企業和消費者在銀行的存款實際利率為負。

三大問題

????結果，希望獲得高儲蓄利率的公司將目光投向了信托公司。然而中國的信托市場缺乏規范，而且由于政府一直正忙于給過熱的房地產市場降溫，相關部門對這一領域十分警惕。《中國證券報》（China Securities Journal）的報道顯示，前半年信托公司在地產領域的投資約為2,078億人民幣（324億美元）。信托公司的借貸利率已超過20%，而銀行僅為6.7%，不過這一利率也有利于銀行壞賬的展期（是指貸款人在向貸款銀行申請并獲得批準的情況下，延期償還貸款的行為——譯注）。

????目前中國信托業務的贊成派和反對派爭論的焦點在于信托業務到底會對中國銀行業造成多大的沖擊。贊成派認為信托業務代表了健康的利率競爭，隨之而來的壓力將迫使決策者們放寬利率管制政策。反對派則認為信托公司是多年魯莽放貸之后信用過度擴張的產物，兩者最終都會在幾年后危及中國經濟。

????另外一個問題來自于中國資產管理公司（China's Asset Management Corporations，AMCs），它的表外貸款風險更大。上世紀90年代末，中國政府需要處理亞洲金融危機所產生的壞賬。中國資產管理公司應運而生。但是在2009年，中國政府并未償還剩余的債務，而是將資產管理公司的所有債券展期10年。因此很難預計這一融資平臺最終會帶來多大的損失。

????最后的問題來自于抵押貸款的繼續使用。抵押物一般都是土地或房產。咨詢公司畢馬威（KPMG）的杰森貝德福德說，一旦遭遇經濟不景氣，中國的銀行可能會面臨流動性問題。

????與此同時，貝德福德認為人們對資產負債表中所隱藏的壞賬的擔憂過于夸大。他說，“我每周都會接到一到兩個電話來詢問此事。”他還特別提到了穆迪評級公司（Moody’s, MCO）7月所發表的一份報告，其中提到了中國政府實際向地方政府所發放的貸款可能要比公布的總額高出5,000億美元。貝德福德說他自己的調查并不支持穆迪公司的報告，特別涉及是信用風險的內容。

????評估中國銀行業的障礙在于：誰的數據更可信。中國銀行系統絕大部分的交易都是內部交易，有關銀行健康狀況的關鍵數據都帶有主觀色彩。中國資本市場很難見到外國公司的身影，關鍵信息的可信度也難以得到佐證。沒有人知道資產價格是否準確，銀行債務的報告是否屬實，甚至是借貸市場的真實情況也無從證實。

????唯一的辦法就是全盤吸收銀行財務報表和國家統計局的信息，同時還得考慮執政黨的動機因素。雖然中國政府十分害怕出現系統風險，但它仍然需要監控好銀行來實現和諧社會這個終極目標。這個本身就存在一定的風險。

????魯比尼全球經濟咨詢公司(Roubini Global Economics)最近的報告顯示，中國銀行業近來不斷惡化的信用標準是人們目前最為關心的問題，但由此引發的另外一個擔憂是政府拒絕放棄將商業銀行業作為其私人儲錢罐。

????盡管中國銀行業在過去的幾十年中取得了快速、驚人的增長，然而其內部存在的問題也開始浮出水面。雖然中國可能已經吸取了美國的教訓，但它難免會犯一些中國式錯誤。

????It's a familiar story to Americans, but now it may be unfolding in China.

????From 2008-2010, China's largest banks made scores of loans to local governments and state-run companies. Exports had fallen in the wake of the financial crisis, so the government wanted to create jobs and boost local demand. As a result, developers erected high rises and shopping malls across the country and the Chinese economy grew at roughly a 10% clip. But some analysts and ratings agencies assert that lending standards weren't strict enough. Too many bad loans were made, they say. Financial reform didn't come fast enough.

????Last week, Liu Mingkang, the chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, announced that a recent round of stress tests proved that Chinese banks could handle up to a 50% drop in property prices. Banks, which fund themselves mainly through deposits, are growing their profits at 20% per year. Though the economy appears to be slowing, it is still estimated to grow around 9% this year, which could theoretically offset any losses incurred by bad loans.

????Liu may well be right, at least in looking at the sector over the long term. Though some analysts balk at the lack of stress in the stress tests, the Chinese central bank essentially backs all deposits. Banking in China is still in its infancy, with huge upside potential. Few consumers use credit cards yet, which represents a major opportunity for financial institutions. And as China tightens its monetary policy, lending margins are tilting even more in favor of the banks.

????In the near-term, however, the bears may win out. Three areas of concern stand out. The first is China's overly managed interest rate policy: Banks are only allowed to offer its customers a maximum 3.5% interest rate on one-year deposits. With China's inflation rate currently above 5%, Chinese companies and consumers investing in banks face the prospect of a negative real savings rate.

Three areas of concern

????As a result, companies that want better rates of return are looking at trust companies, which are unregulated and have caught the wary eye of Chinese authorities, particularly as the government has attempted to cool the countrys supposedly overheating property market. The China Securities Journal reported that trusts invested about RMB 207.8 billion ($32.4 billion) in the property market in the first half of the year. The rate at which they're lending is upward of 20%, compared to the banks' 6.7%, a rate at which it is easier to roll over bad loans.

????The extent to which these trusts will have a major effect on the health of the Chinese banking industry is a major area of disagreement between China's bulls and bears. The bulls say that trusts represent healthy interest rate competition, a way for corporations to put pressure on regulators to liberalize interest rate policy. The bears argue that trusts are an example of excessive credit in the aftermath of years of reckless lending, both of which will come back to haunt the Chinese economy over the next few years.

????Another source of worry is China's Asset Management Corporations (AMCs), which present more measurable off-balance-sheet loan risk. In the late 1990s, the Chinese government needed a place to dump bad loans left over from the Asian financial crisis. AMCs were created to serve this purpose. But in 2009, instead of paying off the rest of the debt, the government rolled over all the AMC bonds another ten years. The depth of the potential losses in these vehicles remains unclear.

????A final source of concern is the continued use of collateralized lending. Much of this collateral is typically in the form of land or property. In an economic downturn, Chinese banks might face liquidity issues, says Jason Bedford of KPMG, a consultancy.

????All the same, Bedford thinks the fears about the bad loans lurking off the balance sheet are overblown. "I'm getting one or two phone calls per week from overseas asking me about this topic," he says, specifically referring to a July report in which Moody's (MCO) said the Chinese government may have underreported loans made to local governments by half a trillion dollars. Bedford says his own analysis doesn't support some of the claims in Moody's report, particularly those relating to credit risk.

????And herein lies the problem in assessing Chinas banks: figuring out whose data to trust. The Chinese banking system trades disproportionately with itself, and much of the critical information about bank stability is colored by the data sources.There are so few foreign companies trading within China's capital markets that critical pieces of data can never be corroborated. No one knows whether asset prices are accurate, whether banks liabilities are accurately reported, or even the true depth of the lending market.

????The only way to judge, then, is by examining it all -- banks' financial statements and information from national statistics bureaus, keeping in mind the motivations of the ruling party. Though the Chinese government is terrified of systemic risk, it also needs to control its banks in order to promote its ultimate vision of a harmonious society. This cause presents risks of its own.

????A recent report from Roubini Global Economics says the most critical concern for Chinese banks is the recent deterioration of credit standards, but that a major side concern is the state's refusal to stop using the commercial banking sector as its personal piggy bank.

????Though China's banking system has undergone decades of rapid and impressive growth, underlying cracks are starting to appear. China may have learned from America's mistakes, but it will inevitably make some of its own.