????去年春天，默多克與IBM、安泰人壽保險公司（Aetna Life）和通信衛星公司（Comsat）聯合成立的衛星商業系統公司（Satellite Business Systems）簽署了長達五年、價值7，500萬的租賃合同，租賃五臺異頻雷達收發機。該設備可在放大地面信號后，將信號再次發射回地面。他承諾，在通用儀器公司（General Instrument Corp）旗下的聯合衛星通信公司（United Satellite Communications Inc.）和其他公司秋季推出類似服務之前，將自己的網絡投入運營。

????但默多克很快就發現他高估了自己的能力。在他確定的截止日期之前，設備制造商無法制造足夠的衛星天線，收看Skyband的節目。此外，節目制作中心也在猶豫是否要將其電影和電視劇的播放權出售給默多克。而有些人雖然愿意與他討價還價，但他們要求的價格遠遠高于向默多克的有線競爭對手要求的價格，而且隨著時間拖延，價格也在不斷上漲。這些談判通常會花幾個月時間，而當時默多克并沒有考慮到這個問題。

????整個夏季和秋初，默多克都在合縱連橫，努力尋找盟友，以便實現Skyband計劃。此時，該計劃已經推遲到1984年中旬。八月份，他試圖以1.6億美元收購美國第二大付費電視訂購服務提供商娛樂時間公司（Showtime）。而當時娛樂時間公司正在與華納美運有線電視公司（Warner Amex）旗下的付費電視服務電影頻道（Movie Channel）合并，因此斷然拒絕了默多克的收購。他還希望通過收購聯合衛星公司（United Satellite），以強化自己在節目制作領域的影響力，但該公司的所有者拒絕了他7，000萬美元的出價，控制該公司的如意算盤也隨之落空。

????十月份， 默多克依然在毫不氣餒的鼓吹Skyband計劃，宣稱截至1986年底，它將帶來3.25億美元總收入，截至1987年，將為新聞集團增加50%的收入。但幾周之后，默多克突然宣布放棄這一計劃，事出突然，與當初啟動項目時如出一轍。默多克宣布，這次冒險讓他損失了2，000萬美元。不過他表示，在1986年底，能夠向更小、更實惠的碟形天線發送信號的新一代大功率衛星或許將進入軌道，因此Skyband依然會有上升的空間。默多克在美國業務的負責人唐納德?坎莫費德駁斥了取消Skyband是由于計劃不充分的說法。他認為這是一次“謹慎的、計算精確的商業判斷”。而默多克的解釋更加直白：“我想是因為我臨陣退縮了。”

????去年夏天，默多克開始買進華納公司的股票，當時他的Skyband項目首次遇到麻煩。他的目標是華納公司的電影資料館與攝影棚。默多克表示：“我們基本上都認為對華納公司的收購超出了我們的能力，但也不是鐵板一塊。我們認定，這樣做不會使我們受到傷害，反而會給我們深入了解電影行業的機會。而其他的事情都還太過遙遠。”不過他的一位合作伙伴表示，默多克最瘋狂的想法是，如果有其他人對華納公司下手，史蒂夫?羅斯或許會把默多克視為白衣騎士，向他求助。但羅斯卻認為，默多克的這次收購，是雅達利（Atari）視頻游戲子公司收入暴跌之后最恐怖的噩夢。1983年前九個月，雅達利公司的虧損達5億美元——使華納公司的股票從55美元左右暴跌至20美元左右。

????12月29日，羅斯與克里斯?克拉夫特的董事會主席赫伯特?西格爾達成了交易。措手不及的默多克請求聯邦通信委員會（Federal Communications Commission）和特拉華州地方法院禁止此次股票交易。但1月18日，交易按計劃完成。盡管宣稱自己不會服輸，但默多克卻一反常態，表現得猶豫不決。隨著近期華納股價的上漲，如果他希望將持股比例提高到50%，就必須支付約10億美元，而目前他在華納的1.3億美元投資已經是他最大數額的投資，所以10億美元并不是小數目。默多克的首席顧問斯坦利?S?舒曼是投資銀行Allen & Co. Inc的執行副總裁，他一直在為默多克游說潛在的合作伙伴，以備將來他確定提出要約收購。但默多克對于進行高風險的投標競爭卻好像并不熱衷。在評估自己能達到的高度時，他說：“雅達利便是最大的未知數。”

????默多克似乎更傾向于發動代理權之爭。有關他本人對華納公司管理層的蔑視，他直言不諱——“那些人只是希望一直被寵著而已”——并且，他認為投資者對羅斯的普遍不滿將是自己取勝的關鍵。羅斯反擊道：“默多克想贏？沒門。”即便默多克獲得多數投票權，也依然不敢保證取得了勝利。華納公司的章程規定必須獲得80%多數票同意，才能在不獲得董事會批準的情況下進行資產轉移。所以默多克依然需要收購赫伯特?西格爾持有的股份。與此同時，默多克依然在盡最大努力請求最高法院宣布克里斯?卡拉夫特的交易無效，并在努力尋找便捷的途徑進軍娛樂業。

????鑒于默多克非凡的履歷，沒有人敢說他毫無機會成長為電子媒體業的巨頭。但正如他在Skyband慘敗中總結的教訓，他不可能復制當初在出版業的那一套做法，進行低廉的收購。他也不能大肆借貸，因為他已經負債累累。除非默多克能尋求合作伙伴，或通過發行新股稀釋他在新聞集團的所有權，否則，創建世界上最偉大的通信巨無霸的夢想無疑只能是個夢而已。

????對于投資者而言，默多克對新聞集團的管理，證明了在魯莽企業家身上押寶，會面臨非生即死的巨大風險。對股權的控制讓他可以冒極大的風險，按照自己的方式經營自己的資產——其中大部分都取得了成功。但控制也讓他沉溺于企業所有人的個人嗜好，把虧損的企業留在手里的時間太長，這無疑會損害公共股東的利益。

????（翻譯 劉進龍）

????Last spring Murdoch signed a five-year $75-million lease with Satellite Business Systems (a joint venture of IBM, Aetna Life, and Comsat) for five transponders, the satellite devices that amplify signals from earth and send them back down. He promised to have his new network operating before United Satellite Communications Inc., owned by General Instrument Corp. and others, launched a similar service in the fall.

????But Murdoch quickly found that he had overreached. Equipment manufacturers couldn't make enough satellite dishes to receive Skyband's signals before his deadline. In addition, studios hung back from selling Murdoch rights to broadcast their movies and TV series. Those willing to bargain demanded higher prices than they charged Murdoch's cable competition, and the prices went up as the year dragged on. These negotiations took months that Murdoch had not figured on.

????Through the summer and early fall, Murdoch twisted and turned to form an alliance that would let him deliver Skyband, by then postponed until mid-1984. In August he tried to buy Showtime, the second-largest pay TV subscription service, for $160 million. Showtime, in the midst of merging with the Movie Channel, a pay TV service owned by Warner Amex, rebuffed him. He tried to increase his clout with the studios by exploring a merger with United Satellite, but its owners rejected his tentative offer of $70 million for control of the company.

????In October Murdoch still bravely trumpeted Skyband, asserting it would gross $325 million by the end of 1986 and add 50% to News Corp.'s earnings by 1987. But weeks later Murdoch called it quits, grounding Skyband as abruptly as he had launched it. Murdoch figures the venture cost him some $20 million. He claims Skyband still might go up in late 1986 when a new generation of high-powered satellites capable of beaming signals to smaller, less expensive dish antennas, may be in orbit. Donald Kummerfeld, head of Murdoch's U.S. operation, rejects any notion that the Skyband setback reveals poor planning. He terms it "a prudent and calculated business judgment." Murdoch puts it more plainly: "I guess I just chickened out."

????Murdoch began buying up shares in Warner last summer, about the time he was first having trouble getting programs for Skyband. His objective was Warner's film library and studios. "We basically saw Warner as beyond our capacity, but vulnerable," says Murdoch. "We figured we couldn't get hurt and would learn a lot about the film industry. Anything else was a long, long way off." In his wildest dreams, says an associate, Murdoch thought that if someone else moved on the company, Steve Ross might turn to him as a white knight. But Ross saw Murdoch's purchases as the nightmare he had feared ever since earnings collapsed at his Atari video game subsidiary -- it lost more than $500 million in the first nine months of 1983 -- and pushed Warner's stock price from the mid-50s to the low 20s.

????On December 29 Ross struck his deal with Chris-Craft Chairman Herbert Siegel. Caught off guard, Murdoch petitioned the Federal Communications Commission and a Delaware court to block the stock swap. But the deal went through on January 18. Though he vows to fight on, Murdoch seems uncharacteristically indecisive about how to proceed. At recent prices, raising his holdings to 50% of Warner would cost him nearly $1 billion, a large sum for a man whose present $130-million investment in Warner is the largest he's ever made. Murdoch's principal adviser, Stanley S. Shuman, an executive vice president of Allen & Co. Inc., an investment banking firm, has been talking to prospective partners for Murdoch in the event he does decide to make a tender offer. But Murdoch appears queasy about getting in a high-stakes bidding contest. In assessing how high he might go, he says, "Atari is the great unknown."

????Murodch seems more inclined to mount a proxy fight if he does anything. He is openly contemptuous of Warner's management -- "those people just love to be loved all the time" – and seems to think widespread investor disaffection with Ross might carry the day for him. Counters Ross, "There's no way Mr. Murdoch can win." Even if Murdoch were to win a majority vote he still could not be certain of victory. Warner's bylaws require an 80% majority to approve any transfer of assets not backed by its board. So Murdoch would still have to buyout Herb Siegel. Meanwhile, Murdoch is still trying to void the ChrisCraft deal in federal court and trying to find a quick way into the entertainment business.

????Given Murdoch's remarkable record, no one can say he hasn't a chance of becoming an electronic media mogul. But as he learned in the Skyband debacle, he can't do it by making the kind of bargain-basement buys that he did as a publisher. Nor can he borrow great sums, considering his already heavy debt load. Unless Murdoch takes in partners or dilutes his ownership of News Corp. by issuing new equity, his dream of creating the world's greatest communications colossus will doubtless remain just that.

????For investors, Murdoch's management of News Corp. demonstrates the bright and dark sides of betting on an impetuous entrepreneur. His controlling interest has allowed him to take big risks and run his properties his way -- for the most part, successfully. But control has also let him indulge his proprietor's penchant for hanging on to losers too long, to the detriment of the public shareholders.