????1973年，默多克悄然進軍美國，首先以1，800萬美元的價格，收購了圣安東尼奧市兩家勉強盈利的報紙。第二年，他高調創辦了《星報》（Star），這是繼周報《國家詢問報》（National Enquirer）之后，又一份轟動全國的報紙。在此之后，他先后收購了《紐約郵報》；《紐約》雜志（New York）；紐約的一份極左周報《鄉村之聲》（Village Voice）；以及《波士頓先驅報》（Boston Herald）。

????而在美國之外，他吞并了倫敦的《泰晤士報》，并獲得了澳大利亞航空公司安塞特運輸工業公司（Ansett Transport Industries）一半的股份。與安塞特的交易充分展示了默多克的狡猾；在四年時間里，該公司僅一半的留存收益和額外紅利便已經超過了他1億美元的收購價格。

????默多克收購的報紙大部分都是勉強盈利或徹底虧損，但他的收購活動并沒有表面看起來那么魯莽。大多數情況下，他所挑選的資產，其價值都被疲軟的表現所掩蓋。為了收購持續虧損的《波士頓先驅報》，他付出了100萬美元現金和700萬美元未來利潤（如果有的話），但實際上這筆交易還包括房產，僅這部分的價值便接近700萬美元。

????《泰晤士報》所附帶的房產和固定資產價值更是默多克收購價格的兩倍。除此之外，《泰晤士報》還帶來了更加豐富的資源。通過這份報紙，默多克獲得了新聞與金融信息服務公司路透集團公司（Reuters Ltd.）4.6%的股份。一旦公司股東確定利益分配方式，路透集團公司將會上市，屆時公司總市值將達到15億美元甚至更高。4.6%的股份將為默多克帶來6，900萬美元。默多克還通過其他報紙，持有路透6.4%的股份。或許，他看重的正是這些隱性資產。不過，他堅持認為，路透集團股票所帶來的財源“純粹是走運”。

????之后，新聞集團開始鞏固其在澳洲、英國和美國的戰果，在兩年時間內，公司收益增長了14%，達到14億美元。但由于這些結果都以美元計算，因此新聞集團的真正收益要高于這個數字。新聞集團的大部分業務都是以澳元和英鎊結算，而這兩種貨幣的價值相比美元都出現了下跌。如果按照澳元計算，過去兩年，新聞集團的收入增幅高達41%。1982年，不計算與匯率相關的收益與損失，公司的利潤僅為43%，而去年則增長了98%。1983財年，公司的利潤為6，990萬美元。

????去年早些時候，隨著新聞集團收益的突然好轉，公司的股票也直線攀升。（股票在澳大利亞交易，并在紐約進行柜臺交易）。當時有傳言稱路透集團公司即將上市，因此，新聞集團的股票再度暴漲。而投資華納公司的消息傳出后，公司的股票又出現了新一輪上漲，近期公司的股價達到11.80美元，約為1983年初的五倍。

????盡管公司股票漲勢喜人，但新聞集團的利潤率和資產回報卻一直低于出版公司的一般水平。1983財年，公司的資產回報率為6.4%，而同一時期，美國七大出版公司的平均資產回報率為9.1%。但新聞集團同年的股本回報率卻達到驚人的22.4%，遠遠超過其他七家公司。這是因為默多克舉借了驚人數額的債務，以維持所謂的“舉債經營”。新聞集團的債務資本比率為0.8，而其他大型出版公司的平均比率僅為0.3。

????Murdoch stole quietly into the U.S. in 1973, buying two marginally profitable papers in San Antonio for $18 million. The next year he splashily launched the Star, a knock-off of the sensational weekly National Enquirer. Then came the acquisitions of the New York Post; New York magazine; the Village Voice, a far-left New York weekly; and the Boston Herald.

????Outside the U.S., he gobbled the Times of London and took his half interest in Ansett Transport Industries, the Australian airline. The Ansett deal showed how crafty Murdoch could be: in four years his half of retained earnings and a special dividend have already exceeded his $100-million purchase price.

????Murdoch's newspaper buys -- mostly marginal profitmakers or outright losers --haven't been quite as reckless as they might appear. In most cases, he picked up assets whose value was masked by dismal performance. He paid $1 million in cash and $7 million in future profits, if any, for the money -- losing Boston Herald, but the deal included real estate worth an estimated $7 million.

????The Times came with real estate and fixed assets worth twice as much as Murdoch's purchase price. But the Times brought a much richer lode. With it Murdoch got 4.6% of Reuters Ltd., the news and financial information service. Reuters probably will go public once its shareholders decide how to divide the spoils, and its total market value could be $1.5 billion or more. The 4.6% could bring Murdoch more than $69 million. Murdoch owns 6.4% of Reuters through his other papers and presumably could have spotted that hidden asset. He insists otherwise, saying that the prospective bonanza from the Reuters shares is "sheer luck."

????In the two years since News Corp. began consolidating results from Australia, Britain, and the U.S., revenues have increased 14% to $1.4 billion. Because these results are stated in U.S. dollars, however, they understate the true gains. Most of News Corp.'s business is conducted in Australian dollars and British pounds, both of which have fallen relative to the U.S. dollar. Measured in Australian dollars, revenues jumped 41% over the last two years. Profits before currency-related gains and losses were down 43% in 1982 and up 98% last year. The fiscal 1983 profits were $69.9 million in U.S. dollars.

????The sharp turnaround in earnings sent News Corp.'s stock rocketing early last year. (The shares trade in Australia and over the counter in New York.) When rumors spread that Reuters would go public, the stock kicked in the afterburners. Nudged up again by the news of the investment in Warner, the shares recently were selling at $11.80, up nearly fivefold since early 1983.

????Despite its impressive growth, News Corp.'s profit margins and return on assets have been below par for a publishing company. Its return on assets was 6.4% in fiscal 1983, vs. an average of 9.1% for the seven largest U.S. publishers in the same period. News Corp.'s return on equity, on the other hand, was a stunning 22.4% in fiscal 1983, higher than any of the seven. That's because Murdoch operates with a phenomenal amount of debt, or gearing, as Australians call it. The debt-to-equity ratio is 0.8, vs. an average 0.3 for the other large publishing companies.