????石油價格已經(jīng)告訴我們，短期內，中東地區(qū)目前的混亂局面將無法得到解決。繼利比亞緊張局勢升級之后，絕大多數(shù)主要等級的石油價格日前均大幅上揚 ，盡管近來價格有所反彈，但仍在波動之中。

????此外，我們在下圖中標出了過去15年來每年2月份的最高收盤價。一般而言，2月份對于美國（全球最大的消耗國）來說是需求相對較低的季節(jié)性月份，原因在于冬季取暖用油需求減少，而夏季駕車季節(jié)尚未到來。有趣的是，盡管油價仍然比有史以來最高位低 40美元以上，但已非常接近2008年2月創(chuàng)下的101.78美元最高2月收盤價。這一異常的非季節(jié)性價格變動證明，我們目前所見的價格漲勢十分強勁。

????The price of oil is already indicating to us that the current turmoil in the Middle East will not be resolved in the short term. Prices of most major grades of oil spiked last week after tensions heightened in Libya and, although they've retreated a bit, they remain volatile.

????Further to this point, we've outlined in a chart below the highest closing price in February going back the last 15-years. Typically, February would be a relatively slower seasonal month for demand in the United States (the world's largest consumer) as the need for winter heating oil diminishes and summer driving season hasn't picked up. Interestingly, while the price of oil is still more than $40 from its all time high, it is very close to highest February close of $101.78 in February 2008. This abnormal and non-seasonal price movement emphasizes the powerful price move we are seeing.

????上個月早些時候，在一篇強調我方多頭觀點的評論中，我們就已指出了利比亞和伊朗大規(guī)模騷亂的這種潛在影響，文中這樣寫道：

????“我們開始看到埃及和突尼斯式的大規(guī)模緊張局勢正向一些主要產油國蔓延，這應該會給石油這種大宗商品提供重要支持。特別是伊朗與利比亞兩國的抗議活動均有所增多。這兩者之間具有相關性的原因在于，根據(jù)最近的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，伊朗是石油輸出國組織（OPEC）中第二大原油生產國，日產370 萬桶石油，而利比亞也是規(guī)模較大的產油國，日產160 萬桶石油。

????然而，鑒于利比亞占全球石油產量不到2%，且國際能源署（IEA）擁有的石油儲備超過16億 桶，很顯然目前的價格波動不僅僅是因為利比亞的動亂。即使利比亞完全關閉石油生產，國際能源署也有充足的石油儲備，足以抵消一整年石油產量下滑帶來的供應短缺。此外，據(jù)估算，石油輸出國組織的日閑置產能合計達400萬到600萬桶。那么，油價走勢為何在過去幾天內出現(xiàn)戲劇性變化？簡單來說：目前出現(xiàn)的是恐慌性石油交易。

????事實上，人們正是擔憂大規(guī)模動蕩從利比亞蔓延至更多的中東地區(qū)重要產油國（如伊朗），并最終導致政府更迭或武裝沖突，從而造成石油產量普遍下滑。與此相關的擔憂是，石油輸出國組織最終并不具備他們所聲稱的閑置產能，這可能導致全球石油供應緊縮的速度快于大多數(shù)人預期。最后，在我們看到中東地區(qū)做出某些決議或澄清之前（這顯然不會馬上出現(xiàn)），這種擔憂將繼續(xù)支持并引領全球石油市場。

????長期來看存在這樣一種情境（當然這不是共識），即中東地區(qū)的大規(guī)模自由化和民主化可能會對石油生產構成利好。俄羅斯也許是這種情況的極好范例。

????20世紀80年代末，俄羅斯石油產量達到巔峰水平，日產油1250萬桶。由于前蘇聯(lián)時期減少投資，此后俄羅斯石油產量逐漸下降，到20世紀90年代中期跌至每日600萬桶左右的水平。蘇聯(lián)解體外加油田私有化引發(fā)石油產量從1999年開始回升。目前，由于私有化和隨后進行的石油資產現(xiàn)代化，俄羅斯石油產量已經(jīng)回復到接近巔峰時期的水平。

????看起來伊拉克將走上與俄羅斯極為相似的道路。這并不令人驚訝，因伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭和薩達姆?侯賽因下臺之后緊隨而來的混亂，造成伊拉克石油產量急劇下滑，至2007年初之前始終徘徊在日產油150萬桶的水平。從那時起，后薩達姆?侯賽因時代的現(xiàn)代化和投資開始初見成效，伊拉克石油產量開始攀升。今年1月，伊拉克石油產量達到每日260萬桶的戰(zhàn)后最高水平，預計到年底時將達到自20世紀70年代末以來就未曾出現(xiàn)過的每日產油近300萬桶的水平。事實上，正如《華爾街日報》（Wall Street Journal）在去年末所報道的那樣，一部分伊拉克人認為產量增長對今后十年意義重大：

????“總而言之，伊拉克希望這方面的努力能在不到10年時間內，將產能從目前每日250萬桶提升至1200萬桶。那將成為現(xiàn)代石油時代有史以來無可匹敵的一項豐功偉績。上個月，國際能源署首席經(jīng)濟學家法提赫?比羅爾稱伊拉克是全球石油市場潛在的‘游戲規(guī)則變更者’。”

????實際上，去年贏得伊拉克眾多合約之一的荷蘭皇家殼牌石油公司(Royal Dutch Shell)最近將該公司位于伊拉克Majnoon油田的產量從每日45,000桶增加至每日70,000桶。變化雖小，但是在逐步增加。

????毫無疑問這是一種比較少見的情況，而且西方石油公司不會輕易增加對伊朗和利比亞等欠穩(wěn)定地區(qū)的投資。但在某種程度上，伊拉克和俄羅斯的事跡確實證明，如果最終結果是普及民主和法治，石油產量將在長期內實現(xiàn)增長。

????Earlier last month, we called out this potential impact of popular unrest in Libya and Iran in a note that underscored our long position when we wrote:

????"We are starting to see Egyptian and Tunisian type popular tensions spread to some key oil producing states, which should provide a key support under the commodity. Specifically, both Iran and Libya have seen an increase in protests. This is relevant because, based on the most recent data, Iran is the second largest producer of crude oil in OPEC, at 3.7MM barrels of oil per day, and Libya is a sizeable producer as well at 1.6MM barrels of oil per day."

????Given that Libya represents less than 2% of global production and that the IEA has over 1.6 billion barrels of oil in storage, clearly the current price movement is about more than Libyan disruption. Even if Libyan oil production were completely turned off, the IEA has enough oil in storage to offset that lack of production decline for a full year. Further, it is estimated that OPEC collectively has between 4 and 6 million spare barrels of daily production. So, why has oil gone parabolic over the past couple days? Simply put: oil is now trading on fear.

????In effect, this is fear that popular upheaval goes well beyond Libya and into more significant producers in the Middle East (like Iran) and that the ultimate outcome is a transition in government, or armed conflict, that leads to a broad decline in oil production. An associated fear is that OPEC ultimately doesn't have the spare capacity they claim, which could lead to a global oil supply tightening quicker than most expect. Ultimately, this fear will continue to buoy and lead the world oil markets until we have some resolution or clarity in the Middle East, which certainly does not seem imminent.

????Longer term there is a scenario, which certainly isn't consensus on a week like this, that vast liberalization and democratization in the Middle East could be positive for oil production. Russia is probably the prime example of this occurring.

????In the late 1980s, Russian oil production reached a peak of production of 12.5 million barrels of production per day. Due to a decline of investment during the Soviet era, Russian oil production gradually fell thereafter and had fallen to around 6 million barrels per day by the mid-90s. The collapse of the Soviet Union combined with a privatization of the oil fields initiated a turnaround in production starting in 1999. Currently, Russia is back to near peak production levels due to privatization and subsequent modernization of its oil assets.

????Iraq looks to be on a very similar path to that of Russia. Not surprisingly, with the Iraq War and the ensuing chaos following the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, Iraq oil production fell dramatically and was mired in the 1.5 million barrels per day level of production until early 2007. By then, post Saddam Hussein modernization and investment started to pay off and Iraqi oil production began to climb. In January of this year, Iraqi oil production hit a post-war peak in production of 2.6 million barrels per day and is expected to be near 3 million barrels per day by year-end, a level not seen since the late 1970s. In fact, as reported late last year in the Wall Street Journal, some Iraqis believe that growth in production could be meaningful in the coming decade:

????"In all, Iraq hopes the work will boost output capacity from the current 2.5 million barrels a day to 12 million barrels a day in less than a decade. That would be a feat unrivaled in the history of the modern oil era. Last month, Fatih Birol, the International Energy Agency's chief economist, called Iraq a potential "game changer" for global oil markets."

????In fact, Royal Dutch Shell (RDSA), which was awarded one of the Iraqi contracts last year, recently upped its Iraqi production from the Majnoon field from 45,000 barrels per day to 70,000 barrels per day. A small change, but incremental.

????No doubt this is a long-tail type scenario, and a lot would have to happen for Western Oil companies to up investment in less stable regions like Iran and Libya, but both Iraq and Russia do provide some credence to the idea that production, over the longer term, could grow if the ultimately outcome is the spread of democracy and rule of law.